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The Satellite-Cable Public Affairs Network (C-SPAN) is the only television outlet
in the U.S. providing Congressional coverage. Scholars have studied the network's
public affairs content and unedited "gavel-to-gavel" style of production that distinguish it
from other television channels. However, the network's ownership structure and funding,
which are also unique, have not been systematically analyzed. This study fills a gap in
C-SPAN scholarship by providing a structural analysis of the network.
C-SPAN was founded and is sponsored by the U.S. cable industry. The industry
insists its support for the network is based on public service. However, this study reveals
that C-SPAN affords the cable industry a number of substantial political economic
benefits: a political lever in Washington and with local franchise authorities, a risk-free
testing ground for new products and services, and assistance in selling subscriptions for
vother fee-based services. This study argues that these material benefits are the motivation
for the cable industry's support, not public service.
It also is argued that C-SPAN can only be comprehensively understood through
its relationship to the capitalist political economy of the U.S. To contextualize this
relationship, the study provides a history of Congressional television, the cable industry,
and satellite technology. These circumstances reveal that the network was less an act of
individual cable executives' selfless altruism than a product of political pressures,
economic realities, and technological breakthroughs.
The study also discusses the implications of a private public affairs network.
C-SPAN is a perfect case study of what has been labeled "neoliberalism," or the form of
global capitalism based on privatizing social services and regulating industry using rules
favorable to the needs of capital, not civil, society. At a social level, the network enables
the accumulation of wealth for a select few, enabling these private interests to gain social
power. The study concludes that C-SPAN may serve the public, but it is not a public
service.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
It's often been said that C-SPAN is the crown jewel ofcable programming
and I want to agree with that. It's singularly the most important public and
political relations project in cable television}
-Jim Keller, interviewerfor the Cable Center's Oral History Project
In April 2006 an event occurred that revealed some of the deep seated political
and economic realities about the structure of the U.S. media and mass communication
systems. For two days one of the most popular video clips on YouTube, with 2.7 millions
views, was produced by the Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network (C-SPAN).2 Best
known for its unedited coverage of Congressional hearings and floors sessions, C-SPAN
is not synonymous with popular culture "hits." This particular clip featured the cable
television comedian Stephen Colbert delivering the traditional Presidential "roast" at the
annual White House Correspondents' Association dinner. President Bush attended the
dinner and C-SPAN televised the event. Going beyond good natured "ribbing," Colbert's
1. Jim Keller, interviewing Brian Lamb, September 26, 1998, transcript, The Hauser Oral and Video
History Collection, The Cable Center, Denver Co.,
http://www.cablecenter.org/education/library/oralHistoryDetails.cfm?id=132
2. Tech Biz, Media, "C-SPAN Asks Sites to Pull Colbert," Wired, May 6, 2006, np,
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/media/newsI2006/05/70849
2jokes displayed an obvious disdain for President Bush. From the reactions of the
President, the master of ceremonies and audience members Colbert pushed boundaries.
Word quickly spread of Colbert's speech and viewers immediately posted the Colbert clip
to YouTube-the nation's leading video sharing website.
Within days of appearing on YouTube, C-SPAN's legal department sent the video
sharing site a cease-and-desist letter, demanding the video be removed under conditions
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998. YouTube complied and all variations
of the clip were removed. However, there were widespread reactions, with accusations of
censorship, even conspiracy. It seems clear, though, that C-SPAN was less interested in
protecting President Bush than in maintaining its control over the video. As the New
York Times put it, "this was a business decision, not a political one.,,3 Since YouTube's
inception, commercial television networks have taken legal action against YouTube for
posting copyrighted material. But none of these cases prompted the public outrage that
followed after C-SPAN's actions.
One claim was that C-SPAN was protecting its copyright because it planned to sell
DVD's of the event. However, even a casual familiarity with C-SPAN's business structure
debunks this assertion. C-SPAN is a registered non-profit corporation and less than 5%
of its revenue comes from sales of merchandise (DVD's, branded items such as mugs and
3. Noam Cohen, "A Comedians Riff on Bush Creates an E-Spat," New York Times, May 6, 2006, C6.
3T-shirts, etc.).4 Not only are video sales a rather small portion of C-SPAN's revenue, the
network is legally prohibited from making a profit.
Further weakening the sales explanation, C-SPAN replayed the entire dinner over
its cable television network several times and made the streamed video available, without
cost, on the C-SPAN website. Since American media content is overwhelming
subsidized by corporate advertising, it might be assumed that C-SPAN was directing
viewers to its website as an attempt to increase traffic for its sponsors' ads. However,
C-SPAN's three cable channels, terrestrial radio station, and website do not carry
advertising.
Additionally, once C-SPAN realized the video's popularity, it negotiated an
agreement for Google Video to concurrently carry the video-on the condition Google
stream the entire dinner, not just the Colbert clip, and provide links to C-SPAN's website.
It was obvious the network was less concerned about making money from the video than
it was in letting viewers know who owned the clip. As C-SPAN's legal counsel, Bruce
Collins stated
C-SPAN's video coverage of public affairs events is copyrighted in the
same way Fox News or CNN video coverage is. Neither the popularity of
an event, nor the fact that it involves public affairs subject matter, makes
the video coverage of it public domain material.5
4. C-SPAN, IRS Form 990, 2008, available from http://www2.guidestar.org/
5. Bruce D. Collins, "The Colbert Factor Reaction to C-SPAN: Video of Stephen Colbert Reveals the
'Truthiness' About Copyrights," Inside Counsel, July 1, 2001,
http://www.insidecounsel.com/Issues/2006/July%202006/PageslThe-Colbert-Factor.aspx#
4Copyrighting a telecast of a private, invitation only, dinner was one thing, but the
following year in another incident, C-SPAN enforced its copyright over television
coverage of public meetings. In February 2007, C-SPAN requested that House Speaker
Nancy Pelosi remove a clip of herself testifying before the House Science and Technology
Committee from her official blog, "The Gavel." Pelosi's office had taken the clip directly
from C-SPAN's telecast. Although the meeting itself was public, C-SPAN's video of the
meeting was privately owned. C-SPAN used its own equipment and crew to shoot the
video and because of this, the network, not the public, held the exclusive rights to the
video. Pelosi's office had not sought, nor was given, permission to use the footage.
Again, C-SPAN's counsel stressed the difference between public and private
organizations:
What I think a lot of people don't understand-C-SPAN is a business, just
like CNN is. If we don't have a revenue stream, we wouldn't have six
crews ready to cover Congressional hearings.6
Actually C-SPAN is not like CNN, which is a private, commercial, for-profit cable news
network that is owned by Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., which is a subsidiary of the
giant Time Warner media empire. C-SPAN is an independent, 501 (c)3 corporation. Time
Warner's annual revenue approached $47 billion in 2008.7 C-SPAN's revenue is about
1/1000 of 1% of that-or $58 million. Though fewer people were affected (judging by
6. Noam Choen, "MEDIA; Which Videos are Protected? Lawmakers Get a Lesson," New York
Times, February 26, 2007,
http://query.nytimes .COIn!gst/fullpage.htmlres=9DOCE7D6113EF935A15751COA9619C8B63
7. Time Warner Inc., lO-K, February 20,2009, 135, http://ir.timewarner.comJphoenix.zhtml?
c=70972&p=irol-sec
5the lack of public outcry) by C-SPAN enforcing its copyright on Pelosi, the network
quickly amended its copyright policy. Shortly after C-SPAN's action against Pelosi was
made public, the network amended its copyright policy to "permit [... ] non-commercial
use of its video coverage of federal government-sponsored events so long as C-SPAN is
identified during the use as the source of the video."g C-SPAN spokespersons stated the
network had been considering this action since the Colbert controversy. However, the
network did not take action until a social player with political power to impact the
network became involved. Apparently, public outcry from general viewers was not
enough to get the network to reassess its policies on video ownership. C-SPAN's
president, Robert Kennedy, said "an open approach is the most consistent with our
mission."9 What, then, is C-SPAN's mission?
The mission statement of C-SPAN begins, not with the goals of the network, but
by stating "C-SPAN is a public service created by the American cable television
industry."10 It is here that the political economic value of C-SPAN is revealed. Although
C-SPAN does not include commercial advertising it does have sponsors. Anyone who
has watched C-SPAN will understand that letting know who provides C-SPAN is quite
important to the network. A visitor to the network's website who clicks on the "Company
Page" link will encounter this video:
8. C-SPAN, "C-SPAN Copyright Policy," National Cable Satellite Corporation, http://www.c-span.org/
about/copyright.asp
9. Kasie Hunt, "C-SPAN Alters Copyright Over Pelosi Flap," USA Today, March 7, 2007,
http://sfgate.comJcgibiniarticle.cgif=/n/a/2007/03/07/nationallw170806S96.DTL
10. C-SPAN, "The C-SPAN Mission," National Cable Satellite Corporation, http://www.c-
span.org/about/company/index.asp
Narrator: C- SPAN, created in 1979 by the TV cable
industry...but with no commercials, how is C-SPAN
funded?
6
(Cut to montage ofpeople interviewed on the street)
Man 1:
Man 2:
Woman 1:
Woman 2:
Man 3:
Woman 3:
From Donations?
More than likely, advertisers.
It's government funded.
I dunno..maybe it's just...funding...
The government.
I think its a consortium ofcable companies.
(Title: "How is C-SPAN Funded?" fade to full screen "C-SPAN")
Narrator: That's right,for nearly 30 years America's cable
companies have been providing C- SPAN
programming to you, commercially free, as a public
service. 11
The cable industry provides C-SPAN.
The Colbert and Pelosi incidents also revealed C-SPAN's mission. If the network
is a "public service," why was C-SPAN upset by the public using it through wider
distribution outlets? What did C-SPAN have to lose? A better question is: in a capitalist
media and mass communication system, what does C-SPAN gain and for whom?
According to C-SPAN's Director of Affiliate Relations, Peter Kiley, "Everything
we put out we tag with a 'public service provided by the cable industry."'12 Letting the
public know who provides the network is part of C-SPAN's austere text-only logo:
C-SPAN: Created by Cable. Offered as Public Service. In virtually every public
11. C-SPAN, "About Us," http://cspan.org/about/index.asp?code=About
12. Peter Kiley, (VP Affiliate Relations, C-SPAN) interview with the author, February 23, 2006.
7appearance C-SPAN founder and CEO, Brian Lamb, draws attention to the fact the cable
industry provided, and continues to provide, C-SPAN's funding. "And so with every
member of the press I've ever talked to, I've tried to get them to say what I'm saying now
-That the industry deserves credit for its commitment to C-SPAN.,,13 Lamb's resolute
devotion to this creed is unwavering. For creating such a vital public service President
Bush awarded Lamb in 2007 the highest civilian honor a President can bestow: The
Presidential Medal of Freedom. Lamb accepted, not for himself but"...on behalf of the
cable television industry who created C-SPAN as a public service almost 30 years ago for
the American people."14
Overview of the Study
Advocates for C-SPAN bypass issues relating to ownership, preferring to highlight
the network as a public service. The central goal of this study is to shift the way the
network is perceived. The network a group of philanthropic cable executives created in
the mid-seventies has become the premier public affairs network on U.S. television. This
study moves beyond the trope of philanthropy and private dedication to public service to
investigate the social conditions under which this national resource was created and the
current role it plays in a market-based media system.
13. Brian Lamb, interviewed by Jim Keller, September 26, 1998, transcript, The Hauser Oral and
Video History Collection, The Cable Center, Denver Co.,
http://www.cab1ecenter.org/education/library/oralHistoryDetai1s.cfm?id=132
14. Job Well Done, Cablefax, October 30,2007, np.
8In a market-based media system corporations actively seek ways to promote their
products and services. C-SPAN offers the cable industry a unique opportunity to promote
itself. This assessment is widely acknowledged and is not new. In 1997, Pat Aufderheide
wrote that C-SPAN was "...a charitable gesture of an industry in perennial need of an
image transplant. Cable operators dreamed it up as a legislator-friendly service in 1979."15
In 2005 journalist Peter Meredith began a flattering profile of Lamb by stating "C-SPAN,
entirely funded by the cable television industry, began as a public relations venture by a
heavily regulated business eager to stay on the good side of Congress.,,16 The cable
industry is not only concerned with federal regulation, as cable systems are franchised in
communities by local municipalities. In 1984 Timothy Hollins found that local cable
operators "...offer [C-SPAN] in order to demonstrate cable's value to the local politicians
who award franchises."I? By the early-to-Iate 80's, Hollins observed that "services
supported entirely by a per-subscriber fee are as much a consequence of the politics of
franchising (e.g., C-SPAN) [... ] as of economic logic and consumer demand."18
Meanwhile, Robert McChesney, analyzing public policy and public service cable
programming, argued that "C-SPAN has provided an invaluable nonprofit and
noncommercial service on cable television, through it is not the result of public policy so
15. Pat Aufderheide, "C-SPAN Fights for Respect." Columbia Journalism Review, July/August 1997,
14.
16. Peter Meredith, "Playing it Straight," US News & World Report, October 31, 2005, 82.
17. Timothy Hollins, Beyond Broadcasting: Into the Cable Age, (London: Published for the
Broadcasting Research Unit by BFI Publishing, 1984), 152.
18. Ibid., 172.
9much as a PR gesture by the cable industry to fend off regulation in the public interest."19
And the two leading C-SPAN scholars in the U.S., Stephen Frantzich and John Sullivan,
have concluded "cable operators are proud of C-SPAN and use its success to promote
their own brand of private entrepreneurship."zo
Lamb has continually refuted this conclusion, most often ignoring C-SPAN's
social context and concentrating on the individuals who are the network's sponsors who
provided the seed money required to start the network. Although he as stated that "It had
nothing to do with cable industry PR,,,zl he also admits" ...there were people in the
industry who thought it might be good PR, at a time when cable TV was a new
product."ZZ
As a structural analysis of C-SPAN, this study will not focus on the personal
motivations behind C-SPAN's creation. Rather, it concentrates on historical material
circumstances and how philanthropy can be institutionalized to assist corporate goals of
accumulating capital. Most of the original C-SPAN patrons have died or retired from
corporate life; at some point personal generosity was replaced by industry-wide corporate
policy. Current leaders in the industry readily admit the "charity" of providing public
19. Robert McChesney, The Problem o/the Media: U.S. Communication Politics in the 21st Century,
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 2004), 242.
20. Stephen E. Frantzich and John Sullivan, The C-SPAN Revolution, (Norman OK: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1996), 322.
21. Brian Lamb, interviewed by Jim Keller, September 26, 1998, transcript, The Hauser Oral and
Video History Collection, The Cable Center, Denver Co.,
http://www.cablecenter.org/education/library10ralHistoryDetails.cfm?id=132
22. T.R. Reid, "C-SPAN Gauged 25 Years After Start; Network Has Given Public Wider Access to
Congress," Washington Post, March 19,2004, A21.
10
affairs content endures because it is congruous with the business goals of the large cable
corporations and advances those goals. In a cable trade magazine, Steve Effros, the
president of the industry's leading trade (i.e., lobbying) organization, the National Cable
Telecommunications (NCTA), pleads with local cable system operators to continue to
carry C-SPAN not only because "it has materially changed our democracy for the better,"
but because "The fact that cable has created C-SPAN has not been missed by our
regulators, legislators and jurists. In the long run we will all do well by fully supporting,
and being proud of it. ,,23 In another trade publication, a Time-Warner Cable executive
stresses "It's a given that a strong public affairs department can help a company curry
favor with regulators and keep politicians out of its business affairs. What's less obvious
are the bottom-line benefits."24 With such explicit strategies, it is easy to see how this
non-profit public affairs network serves the needs of capital. Amongst themselves, cable
industry leaders recognize and acknowledge that C-SPAN is more than a public service.
Research Questions
This study is going look in depth at the cable industry's sponsorship of nation's
premier public affairs network. The study's primary goal is to answer the following
research questions: Why does the cable industry provide C- SPAN? and What does it
meanfor U.S. society to have C-SPAN privately controlled?
23 Steve Effros, Think About That for a Minute, "Doing Well by Doing Good," Cablefax, March 18,
2004, np.
24. John P. Durand, "Making Money by Doing Good," Cablefax, February 21, 2005, np.
11
Why Does the Cable Industry Provide C-SPAN: C-SPAN has a ready answer to this
question that is included within the network's motto: "Created by Cable. Offered as a
Public Service." Why does the cable industry provide C-SPAN? The cable industry
provides C-SPAN "as a public service." From a casual inspection of what has been
written and said about the network it is apparent the public service explanation is widely
accepted. C-SPAN provides the public a vital service and it is offered by the cable
industry. At this point discussion typically turns towards the positive effects of C-SPAN's
programming on U.S. society. What is lacking is any elucidation on why the industry
offers such a public service. Just how shaky the the public service premise is becomes
clear when the research question is altered to read, why does the cable industry provide a
public service like C-SPAN? The favored explanation of the network and its industry
sponsors is now hopelessly tautological. The industry provides public service because it
is a public service? A more useful track to follow is to learn what the cable industry gets
out of serving the public. At the level of the individual executives who provided the
initial seed money, fostering a personal sense of service to the public is a reasonable
motivation, but this explanation fails to move our understanding of the network beyond
the superficial.
At a deeper, social, level individual's magnanimity is far from a complete
explanation. Focusing on public spirited charity fails to discern that the network is part of
larger social structure. This study places the network within a context of market and
social relationships in order to better understand the structural reasons why a private, for-
12
profit industry might provide such a public service. In answering this question it is vital
to understand the historical conditions under which C-SPAN was created. Journalists,
scholars and the general public have demonstrated a tendency to highlight Brian Lamb's
role in the founding of C-SPAN. Lamb is seen, literally, as the "founding father" of
C-SPAN and without Lamb's dedication and perseverance the network would not exist.
Under such an explanation the citizens of the U.S. owe a debt of gratitude to one man,
Lamb. However, Lamb himself is quick to divert all credit. According to Brian Lamb, in
the mid-to-Iate-seventies a handful of philanthropic minded cable executives made the
decision to forgo profit in order to offer a service to the American public. It is an
empirical fact individuals provided the seed money to begin C-SPAN. In interviews these
men express immense pride in the fact they established such a network. However, this
biographical explanation abstracts these individuals from the larger contexts of the
industry they were a part of. These men were all owners or executives of the largest cable
systems, making them representative of an industry. C-SPAN did not accept donations
from charitable organizations or other private donors. The network did not seek federal
grants available to nonprofits. All the money and equipment needed was provided
exclusively by representatives of the cable industry. Because C-SPAN was clearly an
industry initiative the study seeks to analyze the cable industry as a whole, not just a few
select charitable men. The study will re-contextualize C-SPAN's founding within the
historical processes occurring during the late 1960's and 1970's and in doing so
13
reestablishes the historical specificity of the network's evolution. The history of C-SPAN
is not the biography of Lamb but the political economic realities of the cable industry.
If C-SPAN's ready explanation of why it exists is accepted without question it
becomes a myth based on ideology rather than careful analysis. This study proposes the
public service explanation is a myth. A myth based on incomplete facts which are
carefully screened to highlight sets of values that ultimately serve the industry. By
critically researching the network, the industry, and the society both are a part of, the
study will reveal what the industry's guiding values might be and how C-SPAN is able to
support them. By examining the needs of the industry the study will be able to
comprehensively answer the question: why does the cable industry provide C-SPAN?
What Does It Mean for U.S. Society to Have C-SPAN Privately Controlled: Through
answering the first question, why the cable industry provides C- SPAN, this study seeks to
uncover the cable industry's motivations for providing C-SPAN. Revealing the context
of of C-SPAN's social production, the study places the network within the U.S. media and
mass communications system. Once seen as a part of the U.S. communications system
the study turns its attention to discussing the impact of ownership on democratic
communications. The U.S. media system is dominated by the capitalist marketplace. The
second question moves from explaining how C-SPAN functions in a capital marketplace
to reveal what the implications of this are for citizens. In seeking to answer the study's
second question, what does it mean for C- SPAN to be privately controlled, the study
14
examines whether there is any conflict between a citizen's right to be informed and a
private company's right to exclusive ownership of that information. The Colbert and
Pelosi examples at the beginning of this chapter demonstrate private ownership has a
tangible effect on the information available to U.S. citizens. By asking this second
question the study analyzes whether these effects are detrimental to the citizens of the
u.s.
The first question answers what the industry gains by offering C-SPAN. The
second question answers what do citizens of the U.S. give up by not controlling C-SPAN?
In the discourse around C-SPAN citizens are frequently presented as "viewers." By
addressing the public ownership of media, the second research question re-frames debate
to return viewers to being citizens within a democratic society. Citizens of a democratic
state have very different rights than do the customers within a marketplace. So much of
the discussion around C-SPAN revolves around what the content provides citizens
without ever asking what the structure of the network's ownership means for citizens. By
questioning the ownership structure of C-SPAN the study seeks to bring communication
studies back to recognizing the irreducibility of physical infrastructure. What does it
mean that the citizens of the U.S. are completely dependent upon a privately owned and
controlled system of communications infrastructure?
15
How the Study Is Organized
To reveal the ways the political economic concerns of the industry are placed
before the public service aspects of the network, this study examines both the historical
contexts of Congress and cable television, as well as looking directly at C-SPAN and its
actions. The following chapter provides the theoretical foundation of this study---eritical
political economy. The third provides an overview of C-SPAN as an organization,
including a brief history, what services the network provides, and how it differs from
other cable networks. Chapter IV presents the history of Congressional television,
demonstrating that C-SPAN followed an existing movement rather than creating one.
This chapter reveals how, at the beginning of the neoliberal period in the U.S., private
control of television distribution of a public service was seen as an ideal solution to many
problems. Chapter V continues the historical context of C-SPAN's creation by laying out
the early history of cable television, starting with the "Blue Sky" period. During this
time cable was not just a way to receive clearer television signals, but was considered a
revolutionary force with the potential of altering society for the better. Chapter VI
continues the history of cable into the period when social ideals gave way to economic
necessity. Once cable was seen as a big business, competitors began using legislation as a
way to inhibit the technology. During this time cable needed every powerful friend it
could find and was looking for ways to promote itself. After establishing context,
Chapter VII returns directly to C-SPAN and discusses the network's direct involvement
with the three most important pieces of legislation for cable: The Cable Communications
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Policy Act of 1984, Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,
and The Telecommunications Act of 1996. By investigating these acts, the study
demonstrates C-SPAN's ability to influence federal regulators and lawmakers, as well as
providing a political lever for the industry to combat the power of entrenched competitors
(e.g., the broadcast industry). Chapter VIII looks at more economic uses of C-SPAN and
how it has been used to promote the cable industry to consumers and local politicians
who control franchise agreements. Additionally, this chapter emphasizes the role that
C-SPAN plays in selling subscriptions to fee-based services. Finally, Chapter IX
summarizes the study's findings, and considers implications of having private ownership
of public affairs outlet in the U.S. in private hands.
Significance of the Study
C-SPAN marked its thirtieth year on television in 2009. C-SPAN is the only
full-time public affairs channel. It is the only place on television where a viewer is able
to watch uninterrupted meetings of Congress. C-SPAN is also the only private non-profit
network on U.S. television. Anyone of these factors alone would warrant an extended
research project. Given C-SPAN incorporates all three, it is surprising how little research
is conducted on the network. The existing scholarly studies tend to come from outside of
the communications field and many studies on C-SPAN analysis the effects of the
network rather than the network itself. There are no critical studies of the network. No
studies have undertaken a sustained social analysis of the network in terms of its place
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within the capital political economy of the U.S. media and mass communication system.
Because it is a private network conducting a public service, C-SPAN is an ideal case
study for the process of economic liberalism. Celebrating the product of private
industry's initiative to voluntarily provide a public service without question obscures a
complex set of social dynamics. Scholars looking at the network presume C-SPAN's
existence and move onto other matters, leaving our understanding of the U.S. media
system incomplete. In many ways, scholarship on C-SPAN mimics popular opinion of
the network-that it is a neutral window on the process of federal legislation. C-SPAN is
frequently referred to as the "network of record" as if it was simply a tool and not the
product of social conditions. Neither the public nor scholars notice C-SPAN's intensive
marketing efforts to gain attention for itself and the cable industry. The result is popular
opinion and scholarship normalizes the structure of private media system. No one
questions the fact the only way to access live coverage of Congress is to pay a substantial
monthly fee for either cable television or broadband Internet connection. An underlying
significance to the study is the way it reveals how a private C-SPAN gains a private
industry power at the expense of citizens.
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CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
It's the engine here in this country: money, money, money, money.
For those ofyou who deplore it, you can't get away from it. This is
a free country, money is the engine, it works. We have fit into this
thing with a bunch ofphilanthropic people who have given of their
time and effort and made th[is] thing happen.... 25
-Brian Lamb, founder and CEO of the
Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network (C-SPAN)
This chapter begins by acknowledging that the central theoretical concept guiding
analysis is political economy. A discussion of what political economic theory is, and
what types of issues it is concerned with, follows. The study then demonstrates why,
given the research questions being asked by this study, political economic theory is the
most appropriate theory to use. Once the logical relationship between the study's
questions and political economy is established the study lays out the bodies of literature
that affect the topic. Firstly, literature around the cable industry is explored so that the
reader may understand the industry C- SPAN is sponsored by. After literature about the
25. Brian Lamb, "Debunking the Myths" (speech, at the National Press Club, Washington D.C.,
January 6, 1997), available from http://www.c-span.org/about/company/debunk.asp?code=DEBUNK2
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industry is sketched out the study moves on to describe what has been written about
C-SPAN itself. Finally, literature surrounding the concept of corporate charity, or
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), is presented so the reader can begin to see
C-SPAN in terms of a preexisting movement among private corporations to offer public
service as a public relations/marketing strategy. After the literature section the study
discusses the methods used to answer the questions posed by this study. The primary
method is document analysis and this section elaborates on why this method is suited to
answering the questions posed. The chapter ends by acknowledging some of the
limitations encountered through pursuing this topic in the manner prescribed in this
chapter.
Theories of Political Economy
As the title of this study indicates, this work is a political economic analysis of
C-SPAN. The following section briefly gives an overview of political economy and then
explains how the field of communication studies has integrated political economy. Before
elaborating on political economic theory, it is helpful to define a related, if antithetically
so, theoretical perspective: conventional economics. From a standard college-level
economics textbook, a widely accepted definition is
Economics is the study of how the goods and services we want get
produced, and how they are distributed among us.
20
Economics is also the study of how we can make the system of production
and distribution work better.26
Opposed to this perspective is critical political economy. The (political) economist
Robert Heilbroner feels economics definition lacks, and political economy retains, a key
concept. For Heilbroner
Political economy, unlike conventional economics, does not believe that
the economic scene can be understood without explicit awareness that
considerations and structures of class interest precede and underlie the
social arrangement to which economics directs its inquires....27
Class is the conceptual cornerstone of political economic theory. A class-based society,
by definition, is a society based on inequity. Inequities are important to acknowledge
because they indicate how the current social system of production is set up to benefit
some members of society more than others. Heilbroner asserts studies that exclude the
concept of class produce"...models that are mere shadow play, not representations of a
real historical drama.,,28 The removal of class from the analysis of social production was
first recognized, and critiqued, by Karl Marx. What this study refers to as "political
economic theory" is based on Marx's social analysis. In Marxist analysis, class is
important insofar it reveals the essence of social relations behind the appearance (form)
these relationships take on. For Marx the appearance of a thing existed in simultaneous
tension and equilibrium with its essence. A good produced in a capitalist society is a
26. George Leland B~ch, Economics: an Introduction To Analysis and Policy, 7'h ed., (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971),2.
27. Ibid., 2.
28. Robert Heilbroner, preface to Economics as a Social Science: Readings in Political Economy, 2nd
ed. or Economics, Political or Otherwise, ed. George Argyous and Frank Stilwell, (Annadale, N.S.W.,
Australia: Pluto Press Australia, 2003), iii.
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commodity and Marx systematically revealed the ways the production of commodities
hide a complex web of social relationships based on power. Economics (the form of
political economic analysis critiqued by Marx) chose to ignore the social relationships
inherent to the production of the commodity and focus on the appearance of the process,
the commodity. This severing the dialectical relationship between the appearance and the
essence allowed Economics to drop the "political" from political economy. Any
theoretical framework predicated upon the appearance of things is best described as an
ideology. For Marx, the most effective way to bypass ideology was to analysis the social
production of the material goods and physical services required to support society.
Modes of social production are historically specific and Marx analyzed capitalist social
relations because that was the dominant form of social production. Capitalism remains
the dominant form of social production in not only the U.S. but the world. Since the time
of Marx, capitalism has adapted and incorporated historical changes. Two of the most
important modern products of social relations are mass communication systems and the
media organizations that utilize these systems.
Communication studies is broken into many different subfields and perspectives.
One of these subfields is media economics. Like the social discipline of Economics from
which it is derived, media economics has developed into a branch of study dedicated to
material social relationships lacking any acknowledgement of social inequities. "Media
Economics is a term employed to refer to the business operations and financial actives of
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firms producing and selling output into the various media industries."29 Unsurprisingly,
media scholars interested in critically understanding how media industries contribute to
social power distribution have embraced political economy and developed their own
branch, political economy of communication.
Despite the prominent role mass communication systems and media play within
our modern society, political economy of communication scholars "have sought to
decenter the media" by conceptually placing it "within a wider social totality.,,30 The
point of political economy of communications is not to understand "the media" but to
understand society. Because it seeks to explain how disparities in access and changes to
content reveal the values and practices of a larger social order; the political economic
approach to communication studies maintain a class component.31 Just as Heilbroner
chides his larger discipline, Economics, for removing class, British political economic
communication scholar Peter Golding laments the fact media scholars have largely
foregone issues of poverty or inequity in favor of embracing the concept of classless
"information societies" created by global media and communication systems. Golding
states "The conglomerate capitalist control over cultural and communication industries
represents and expresses the triumph of private profit over collective need, corporate
29. James Owers, Rod Carveth, and Alison Alexander, "An Introduction to Media Economics Theory,"
in Media Economics: Theory and Practice, 2nd ed. (eds.) Alison Alexander, James Owers, and Rod
Carveth, (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1998),2.
30. Vincent Mosco, The Political Economy of Communication: Rethinking and Renewal, (London:
Sage Publications, 1996), 71.
31. Ibid., 75.
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strategy over democratic direction."32 As Robert McChesney states, the political
economy of communication "Addresses the nature of the relationship between media and
communication systems on the one hand and the broader social structure of power. In
other words, it examines how media and communication systems and content reinforce,
challenge or influence existing class social relations."33
Ownership, or control, of mass communication systems and media outlets is the
central concern for political economy of communications. Political economic
communication scholars equate ownership to control because "the individuals and groups
who own the basic means of mass communication-the printing press, radio stations, and
so on-have the final say over how these facilities are used."34 Under such a situation the
political economic communication scholars fear the views of the owning class are more
likely to receive notice and distribution. This ideological domination has the real
potential to facilitate class inequities.35
Political economic communication scholars recognize that patterns of ownership
were not the product of some kind of natural law of human evolution, they reflect the
historical circumstances under which they arose. In what is recognized as the inaugural
political economic communications study in the U.S., Mass Communications and
32. Peter Golding, forward to Who Owns the Media?: Global Trends and Local Resistances, ed. Pradip
N. Thomas and Zaharom Nain (London: Zed Books, 2004), vii.
33. Robert McChesney, "Political Economy of Communication and the Future of the Field," Media,
Culture and Society, 22 (2000): 110.
34. Graham Murdock, Media Organizations: Patterns of Ownership and Control, (London: Open
University Press, 1977), 95-6.
35. Ralph Negrine, Politics and the Mass Media in Britian, (London: Routledge, 1989),73.
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American Empire, Herbert Schiller wrote "the market economy provided the institutional
climate in which the contours of American broadcaster gained their early character as
their more durable features.,,36 The economic (material) conditions provided "the
climate" for a privately owned and controlled communications system in the U.S. but they
did not inexorably determine.37 Political economic of communication scholars draw
attention to the ways alternative ownership models were presented, and are still possible,
while recognizing these models are in conflict with a larger social order interested in
protecting its interests. Returning to Schiller,
Communications, which could be a vigorous mechanism of social change,
have become instead, a major obstacle to national reconstruction. They
have been seized by the commanding interests in the market economy, to
promote narrow national and international objectives while simultaneously
making alternative paths seem either undesirable or prevent their existence
from being known. 38
Once a system of social production becomes dominant it tends to become normalized and
is seen as invisible. From this process certain assumptions about a society's system of
communications take on the air of fact. Political economic of communication scholar
Janet Wasko highlights another important characteristic of the subfield stating "One of
the contributions of critical political economy in communication studies has been to
challenge some of the myths and assumptions associated with the development of media
36. Herbert I Schiller, Mass Communications and American Empire, 2nd ed., updated, (Critical
Studies in Communication and in the Cultural Industries, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 20.
37. Nicholas Garnham, "Political Economy and Cultural Studies: Reconciliation or Divorce?" Critical
Studies in Mass Communications, 12, no. 1, (March 1995): 62.
38. Schiller, 73.
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and communication systems." 39 Wasko's point is key to understanding the project of
political economy of communications. This critical subfield of communications studies
uses empirical facts about the structure of media and communication systems to challenge
commonly held beliefs that are based on the surface appearance.
Like the political economic thought developed by Marx, underpinning all political
economy of communications theory is a praxis based on social justice.40 Political
economic studies of communications all share a desire to reduce social inequity through
directed action informed by careful analysis. Critical political economy of
communication theory is scholarship for social justice not, in the colloquially pejorative
sense, an academic exercise. Political economic studies ofter prescribe real actions that
can be undertaken to return social power back to the majority. The goal of the theory is
to change society by changing the media and communication systems.
In summary
a primary concern of political economists is with the allocation of
resources (material concerns) within capitalist sodeties. Through studies
of ownership and control, political economists document and analyze
relations of power, a class system, and other structural inequalities.
Critical political economists analyze contradictions and suggest strategies
for resistance and intervention.41
39. Janet Wasko, "Challenging Disney Myths," in Journal ofCommunication Quarterly, 25 no. 3 (July
2001): 237.
40. Vincent Mosco, The Political Economy ofCommunication: Rethinking and Renewal, (London:
Sage Publications, 1996). 47.
41. Janet Wasko, "The Political Economy of Communications," in John Downing, The SAGE
Handbook ofMedia Studies, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2004), 309.
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Political Economic Theory and C-SPAN
This section discusses why political economic theory most appropriate framework
to answer the study's research questions: Why does the industry provide C-SPAN and
What does it mean for U.S. society to have C-SPAN privately controlled?
Because it deals with the cable industry the first question requires a structural
analysis to answer. The goal is not to abstract the network apart from the larger U.S.
media and communications system but to integrate it. Political economy excels at
mapping out the ways a particular organization is part of larger structures. Political
economy, because it is primarily concerned with the production and distribution of media
products and services, excels at analyzing the ownership of media organizations. By
focusing on C-SPAN as an organization, rather than on the products of the network, this
study incorporates ownership into the analysis. As has been established in Chapter I,
ownership of C-SPAN is key feature the industry seeks to promote. Political economy's
debate over ownership and control brings the sponsorship of the cable industry to the
forefront.
The cable industry's explanation of why it sponsors C-SPAN-to offer a public
service-has the air of a myth about it. As a theoretical framework, political economy is
ideally suited to test the myth against empirical realities. The goal is not to disprove the
industry's explanation more than it is to provide a wider context in which it is possible to
discern whom this explanation benefits the most. Political economy is a critical research
theory because it is based on questioning social phenomena. The study moves beyond
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the surface appearance of C-SPAN and investigates the hidden social relationships behind
the production and distribution of federal public affairs television. The study is interested
in questioning the industry's explanation and political economy is well suited to provide
evidence that challenges the status quo.
This study is not only interested in researching the current motivations of the
industry's support of C-SPAN but seeks to understand the historical path of the industry's
sponsorship. Political economy, being founded on the historical specificity of social
phenomenon, is an fitting way to disclose what kinds of social circumstances influenced
the industry to offer such a public service. The industry that originally brought C-SPAN
to life is considerably different than the current cable industry that supports the network.
Despite the technological, political, and economic changes the industry's support for
C-SPAN has remained. The unwavering dedication to public service is one interpretation
for this, but a historical look at the practice allows the study to see whether cable as an
industry has other, more tangible, needs throughout the decades. By critically examining
the political and economic conditions affecting the cable industry in the 1970's the study
invites a political economic approach.
The final way political economy is revealed to be the most appropriate body of
theory to utilize the goals of this study is through the theory's integration of moral praxis.
The study is predicated on a deeply held concern about the private ownership of media
and mass communication systems in the U.S. This concern is reflected in the second
research question, what does it mean for U.S. society to have C-SPAN privately
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controlled? Political economy investigates the issue of control because control of social
production leads to social power. Economics is concerned with the production and
distribution of goods and services. Political economy is concerned with how the
production and distribution of goods and services contributes to the accumulation of
wealth. C-SPAN is nonprofit organization but is available exclusively through a
subscription to a privately run, fee-based, telecommunications service. Political
economy allows the study to fully explore the ramifications of this.
Literature
In this section the study outlines three important bodies of literature that affects
our understanding of C-SPAN.
Cable Industry: While little has been written about C-SPAN there are numerous studies
of the cable industry. Some of to these works feature themes consistent with political
economic theory-how cable television involves political, economic, social, and cultural
factors. For instance, Megan Mullen notes that when she studied the rise of cable
programming, "A complementary goal [was] to develop a theory that uses historical
developments in economics, policy, and technology to explain formal attributes of cable
programming."42 While studies of cable television may take different theoretical tacks to
explain cable's evolution, there is broad agreement on the most important historical
42. Megan Mullen, The Rise of Cable Programming in the United States: Revolution or Evolution?,
(Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2003), ix.
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moments in cable's evolution. One of the commonly acknowledged historical watermarks
for cable was the period C-SPAN came into existence, or the mid 1970's. In a general
survey on cable television, Ralph Negrine says cable's transformation in the mid 1970's,
was the result of changes in two areas: "Firstly, the means to deliver more, and different,
services were developed and proved to be, in the main, profitable. Secondly, decisions
were taken which permitted both cable's physical expansion and its fuller exploitation"43
Another cable scholar, Patrick Parsons concurs, going so far as to describe cable in the
mid 1970's as a "phoenix" rising on the ".. .fortunes of the cable industry brought about
by both the relaxation of federal control and the harnessing of the satellite.,,44 Writing the
year C-SPAN was incorporated, Paul W. Macvoy-who edited the Ford Administration
Papers on Regulatory Reform for the cable industry-wrote "A majority of voting
Americans would agree that in the past twenty years, the level and intensity of
government involvement in our national life has increased, is increasing, and ought to be
diminished. The Carter administration, after all, was elected on a platform that included
firm promises to cut back on wasteful and intrusive federal actions.,,45 Unsurprisingly, the
papers advocated for deregulation of the cable industry_ Authors recognized the stakes for
cable-friendly regulations were high: "Broadcasting, and television broadcasting in
43. Ralph M. Negrine, Cable Television and the Future ofBroadcasting, (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1985), 2.
44. Patrick R. Parsons, Blue Skies: A history ofCable Television, (Philadelphia, PA: Temple
University Press, 2008),342.
45. Paul W. MacAvoy, Deregulation of Cable Television, (Ford Administration Papers on Regulatory
Reform; Studies in Government Regulation, Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, 1977),95.
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particular, is widely regarded by both elected and non-elected politicians, as the most
powerful of the celebrated Washington lobbies. Some evidence to the contrary
notwithstanding, few politicians are willing gratuitously to assault the television
establishment and thus, conceivably, jeopardize the most important of individual
objectives-reelection, reappointment, or future employment by the industry."46
Some Scholars understood taking on broadcasters meant addressing the social
issue of media ownership. Etzioni argued "The way cable television will be owned has
many consequences, not just for those who will use CATV [community antenna
television: the original name for cable]. CATV is potentially a major corrective to other
media, especially over-the-air TV and telephones, which are governed by three networks
or one giant corporation.,,47 Vernone Sparkes agreed, saying "In the early days of cable
TV, the Federal government was aware that the existing communications industries
perceived a threat in this new technology, and might seek to retard or even destroy it.,,48
Cable technology depended on satellites, and C-SPAN's birth was the direct result
of satellite technology. C-SPAN, after all, stands for Cable-Satellite Public Affairs
46. MacAvoy, 96.
47. Amitai Etzioni, preface to Economic and Legal Foundations of Cable Television, by Leonard
Ross, (Sage Research Papers in the Social Sciences; Policy Research Series, Beverly Hills; London: Sage
Publications, 1974), 6.
48. Verone Sparkes, "Cable Television in the United States: A Story of Continuing Growth and
Change," in Cable Television and the Future ofBroadcasting, ed. Ralph M. Negrine, (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1985), 33
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Network. As James W. Roman states in his Cable Television Sourcebook, "For the cable
television industry the satellite has become the harbinger of success and profitability."49
While all these studies examine political economic relationships (e.g., economic
studies analyze policy, cultural programming studies look at economic realities, and
political studies address issues of ideology), there are few political economic studies that
use class as a central framework to understand how political economic relationships fit
together nor do they fundamentally challenge the presumptions of capitalism.
C-SPAN Studies: It may be surprising that studies specific to C-SPAN do not address
these larger issues. Some C-SPAN studies focus on the network's non-gavel-to-gavel
programming. For instance, Kurpius and Mendelson looked at how callers brought new
political ideas to C-SPAN's call-in show Washington Journal, effectively expanding the
topics up for discussion.50 The authors concluded that Washington Journal provides its
viewers with a "deliberative forum" for civic discourse where the audience shapes the
content. Riggs studied "well-educated, upper middle-class retirees" in nursing homes and
the ways they used C-SPAN to engage in national public affairs through discussions of
content featured on C-SPAN.51 In some cases, C-SPAN is the focus of discourse analysis.
49. James W. Roman, Cablemania: The Cable Television Sourcebook, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1983),55.
50. David D. Kurpius and Andrew Mendelson, "A Case Study of Deliberative Democracy on
Television: Civic Dialogue on C-SPAN Call In Shows," Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 3
(2002): 587-601.
51. Karen E. Riggs, "Television Use in a Retirement Community," Journal of Communication, 1
(1996): 144-156.
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For instance Muir and Mangus, in "Talk about Sexual Harassment: Women's Stories on a
Woman's Story" analyzed "women's responses during C-SPAN TV call-in program"
about the Anita Hill hearings.
Scholars who focus on the gavel-to-gavellegislative coverage have studied the
effect of C-SPAN on voting patterns by studying qualitative and quantitative changes in
legislative sessions. Crain and Goff undertook an extensive statistical analysis of both
federal (C-SPAN) and state televised legislatures in order to draw correlations between
gavel-to-gavel coverage and voting patterns of citizens and legislators alike.52 Mixon
studied two aspects of C-SPAN's gavel-to-gavel coverage: 1) how C-SPAN has
qualitatively changed legislative floors sessions (e.g., legislators began to "grandstand")
and 2) how the televised sessions constitute a form of free political advertising.53 Mixon,
an economist, was able to calculate the approximate cost of this "advertising," at
anywhere from $16 million to $393 million, as well as observing that sessions have
become longer.
Without a doubt, Stephen Frantzich and John Sullivan are the most cited C-SPAN
scholars.54 Frantzich, a political scientist at the U.S. Naval Academy, and Sullivan, an
English professor at University of Virginia, wrote The C-SPAN Revolution-the only
book-length treatment dedicated to the network's history, operations and plans. The book
52. Mark W. Crain and Brian L. Goff, Televised Legislatures: Political Information Technology and
Public Choice, (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998).
53. Franklin G. Mixon, Jr., (2002). "Does Legislative Television Alter the Relationship Between
Voters and Politicians?" Rationality and Society, 1 (2002): 109-128.
54. Stephen Frantzich and John Sullivan, The C-SPAN Revolution, (Norman, OK: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1996).
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is written as a quasi-ethnographic study, heavily reliant upon first-person observation and
information gained from interviews with most of the network's founding benefactors and
(then) current managers. In a book review shortly after publication, Muir stated that The
C-SPAN Revolution "far surpasses anything else that has been written about C-SPAN."55
Her statement remains true over ten years later. The authors' thesis is C-SPAN was a
"revolution" in the way public affairs were covered on TV. Frantzich has since published
a biography of Brian Lamb but information relating the network is repeated from
Frantzich's earlier work.56 The authors' dedication and passion for the network is
apparent, earning them unprecedented access. The book is rich in empirical details and
yields many critical insights-much the same way the business press is a important tool
for critical research. Like business research, the authors do not question the status quo of
social arrangements.
Corporate Social Responsibility: In providing C-SPAN cable corporations are
exhibiting what has been identified as "Corporate Social Responsibility" (CSR). First
identified in the late 1960's, CSR has yielded a large body of literature and has recently
seen a scholarly resurgence among administrative studies around the turn of the century57.
55. Janette Kenner Muir, review of The C-SPAN Revolution, by Stephen Frantzich and John Sullivan,
Quarterly Journal ofSpeech, 3 (1998): 390-391.
56. Stephen Franztich, Founding Father: How C-SPAN's Brian Lamb Changed Politics in America.
(Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008)
57. David Vogel, The Marketfor Virtue: the Potential and limits ofCorporate Social Responsibility,
(Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 2005), ix.
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Economists, political scientists, legal, marketing and business scholars have all
contributed to CSR literature.
At the most basic level, CSR is the practice of a firm "sacrificing profits in the
social interest."s8 CSR presupposes the actions undertaken are voluntary, not legally
compulsory. Corporations who provide a commercial-free, public affairs cable channel,
without any government compulsion to do so, could be considered CSR. CSR centers on
the question "whether corporate decision makers should be concerned with issues other
than profitability."s9
The most infamous rebuttal of CSR came, not from political economists, but from
one of the biggest advocates for capitalism, Milton Friedman. In 1970 Friedman
published a brief polemic titled "The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its
Profits," stating
there is one and only one social responsibility of business-to use it resources and
engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the
rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition without
deception or fraud. 60
Friedman was unable to quell the spread of CSR and in the mid-nineteen nineties a new
term appeared, "the triple bottom line,"61 indicating: business profits, environmental
58. Forest L. Reinhardt, Robert N. Stavins and Richard H. K. Vietor, abstract for "Corporate Social
Responsibility Through an Economic Lens," Review ofEnvironmental Economics and Policy, 2 (2008):
219.
59. Lois A. Mohr, Deborah J. Webb and Katherine E.Harris, "Do Consumers Expect Companies to be
Socially Responsible? The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on Buying Behavior," The Journal
of Consumer Affairs, 1 (2001): 46.
60. Ibid., 126.
61. Wayne Norman and Chris MacDonald, "Getting to the Bottom of 'Triple Bottom Line,'" Business
Ethics Quarterly, 2 (2004): 243.
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health, and general social welfare. According to John Elkington's "Cannibals with
Forks" (considered one of the first studies of the triple bottom line movement) the revival
of CSR was triggered by the mainstreaming of environmentalism, the second "green
wave" that occurred in the 1990's.62 CSR and "the triple bottom line" movements are part
and parcel of the same concept-"compassionate capitalism." In a book with the same
name, entrepreneur Marc Benioff insists corporations are "doing good and doing well.,,63
By this thesis, corporations will lose money if they do not consider green and socially
conscious programs. These programs "need to be consciously, visibly and systematically
integrated into the nuts and bolts of investing-asset allocation, stock selection and
portfolio construction.,,64
The conservative London-based Economist took up the battle against CSR where
Friedman left off, dedicating an issue to debunking the concept.65 The editors expressed
the same argument as Friedman: "...the selfish pursuit of profit serves a social purpose.
And this is putting it mildly. The standard of living people in the West enjoy today is due
to little else but the selfish pursuit of profit."66 The editors sum the movement up by
62. John Elkington, Cannibals with Forks: The Triple Bottom Line of21st Century Business, (The
Conscientious Commerce Series, Gabriola Island, Vancouver B.C.: New Society Publishers), 43.
63. Marc Benioff and Karen Southwick, Compassionate Capitalism: How Corporations Can Make
Doing Good an Integral Part ofDoing Well (Franklin Lakes, N.J.: Career Press, Inc., 2004), 25.
64. Kiernan, 15.
65. "The Good Company: A Skeptical Look at Corporate Social Responsibility," The Economist,
January 22, 2005.
66. Leaders, "The Good Company," The Economist, January 22,2005, 11.
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asking "Is CSR, then, mostly for show?" Their answer is "yes: for most companies, CSR
does not go very deep."67 While popular with socially active corporate CEOs, such as
Whole Foods founder John Mackey, most business and economic scholars dismiss the
concept en bloc. One economic think tank white paper states that "The bulk of the
available evidence suggests that most firms view socially responsible actions in the same
way that they view more traditional business activities, such as advertising and R&D.
Instead of altruistically sacrificing profits, they engage in a more limited-but more
profitable-set of socially beneficial activities that contributes to their financial goals."68
Under such a system, the only true acid test of sincerity behind corporate giving is
whether "the organization would pursue the [CSR project] even if no one ever knew about
it.,,69 Since there are no firms that actively seek to hide their attempts at CSR it is easy to
understand how the concept is a useful tool for public relations more than shifting the
dominant forms of social relations.
Methods
Document analysis was the primary method used in this study. John Scott has two
categories of documentary evidence for social scientific purposes: documents as
67. "The Good Company," 4.
68. Forest L. Reinhardt, Robert N. Stavins and Richard H. K. Vietor, "Corporate Social Responsibility
Through an Economic Lens," National Bureau ofEconomic Research, working paper # 13989, May 2008,
24, http://www.nber.org/papers/w13989
69. Michael E. Porter and Mark R. Kramer, "The Competitive Advantage of Corporate Philanthropy,"
in Harvard Business Review on Corporate Responsibility, (The Harvard business review paperback series,
Boston: Harvard Business School Pub, 2003), 54.
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resources and documents as topics.70 When acting as a resource, documents allow the
researcher to "Compile a comprehensive set of data" to "construct descriptive statements
about the things to which they refer: the researcher is interested in what they denote about
the world.'>71 The study utilized this type of document analysis to denote the ways
C-SPAN is part of a larger political economic structure. Through trade publications,
Congressional documents, and press reports, the study demonstrates the ways the network
operates within a larger context, one guided by a cohesive set of values. When used as
topics, documents "are regarded as social products and are treated as the objects of
sociological analysis.'>72 At times the documents themselves, were examined in light of
audiences and possible motives for the production of the document (e.g., a C-SPAN self-
promotional web video). The study utilizes a wide variety of documents from a number
of categories including:
1. Government documents. A variety of government documents were analyzed. For
instance, as early as 1944, Congress considered the idea of broadcasting its
proceedings to the public. C-SPAN's offer to distribute the signal to the public
filled a gap in the Congressional plan, which made no provisions for distribution.
Congressional hearings, reports and floor debates were examined to determine the
reasons why Congress proposed television coverage and what importance
70. John Scott, A Matter ofRecord: Documentary Sources in Social Research, (Cambridge, UK: Polity
Press, 1990), 36.
71. Ibid..
72. Ibid..
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legislators placed on public control of the broadcasts. Other documents included
testimony by C-SPAN executives before congressional hearings.
2. Sources originating from C-SPAN. As with any political economic analysis, it is
important to examine documents created by the organization being studied. Not
only is this vital to cross check empirical data, but to learn how an organization
presents and interprets facts. From its inception C-SPAN has attempted to draw
attention to its funding source and C-SPAN's documents provided insights about
these efforts. C-SPAN's website provides a bounty of information about the
network-particularly the pages designed for use by cable affiliates who carry the
network. C-SPAN's press releases indicate what messages it deems important
enough for public distribution. Internal marketing/promotion guidelines were also
explored. In addition, C-SPAN has published a book, "America's Town Hall,"
collecting essays from C-SPAN viewers who wax eloquent about the value of the
network. This book encapsulates the way C-SPAN is viewed by those who watch
it, but more importantly, C-SPAN's public mission. C-SPAN has also
commissioned studies of its audiences and makes these reports available.
3. Cable industry trade associations: a) National Cable & Telecommunications
Association (NCTA). NCTA is the main lobbying organization for the cable
industry and regularly creates documents featuring statistics and highlighting
accomplishments of the industry. NCTA representatives are frequent witnesses at
Congressional hearings on cable and telecommunication regulations, and provided
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written testimony and white papers explaining their policy positions. These
documents provide an understanding of the major issues the industry faces and the
solutions it proposes. b) The Association of Cable Communicators (ACC). The
ACC was specifically designed to assist the public relations professionals in the
cable industry. The organization's work suggests that public affairs content on
cable is a product that is marketed like any other. These documents, in the form of
papers, event and seminar agendas and reports, assisted in analyzing public
service as a means rather than an end.
4. Popular press. Journalistic sources such as editorials and news articles about
C-SPAN, helped contextualize C-SPAN within the larger U.S. media system.
C-SPAN's founder Brian Lamb insists his network is a type of journalism, but do
journalists respect the network.
5. Trade publications. Publications such as Broadcast & Cable, Cablefax,
Multichannel News and Variety offer trade/industry perspectives about the cable
and television industry. These sources rely on the frank assessment of industry
insiders-people whose interests and concerns about cable may differ from the
general public. As with the business press (e.g., Wall Street Journal, Fortune,
Business Week), trade journals present stories from the perspective of producers
not consumers (i.e., citizens.) These sources are a way to develop perceptions
about C-SPAN from the perspective ofmedia producers.
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As Thomas Lindlof and Bryan Taylor have described, documentary analysis in
communications research is best used along other methods.73 To "build up a fully
rounded analysis" of C-SPAN, documents were used in conjunction with interviews under
the conceptual framework of political economic theory. The combination of multiple
methods and a guiding theoretical approach allowed the study, the words of Fortner and
Christians to "triangulate" meaning.74
In 1994, the cable industry established The Cable Center in Denver to celebrate
cable's contribution to society. One of the institution's main research contributions has
been to establish an oral history archive of cable pioneers. This archive has been heavily
utilized in this study as a source of information about the industry's most influential and
powerful men and women, about their views on cable's values and how C-SPAN
represents these values. Because of the popularity of his network, Brian Lamb is
frequently interviewed in the media and these interviews have revealed Lamb's vision for
the network. The richest source of information about C-SPAN's inner-workings and
institutional values carne from a personal interview with Peter Kiley, the VP of Affiliate
Relations at C-SPAN.
73. Thomas R. Lindlof and Bryan C. Taylor, Qualitative Communication Research Methods, 2nd ed.,
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2002), 117.
74. Robert S. Fortner and Clifford G. Christians, "Separating Wheat from Chaff in Qualitative
Studies," in Mass Communication Research and Theory, (ed.'s) Guido H. Stempel, III, David H. Weaver
and G. Clevland Wilhoit, (Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2003), 354.
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Limitations
Labor relations is a standard area for political economic studies to analyze.
C-SPAN is a non-unionized workplace and has actively fought off efforts of the National
Association of Broadcast Employees and Technicians-Communications Workers of
America (NABET-CWA). As recently as 2006 workers within C-SPAN sought
representation. Utilizing an interview with Mark Peach, NABET-CWA president during
the 2006 campaign, the study was able to learn the network engenders a culture of
sacrifice for the larger good of public service. Despite this culture of sacrifice, a group of
workers sought to hold a vote on unionizing. At that point, the network actively sought to
destroy the attempt by making threats to workers and hiring a professional union-busting
firms to conduct an anti-union campaign. A sustained labor-based analysis of C-SPAN
would allow the study to demonstrate ways the network absorbs and facilitates the
economic values of the capitalist market. Unfortunately, there was not room in the study,
or time to further research this aspect of the company.
The regulation of mass communication systems is an immense topic with its own
subfield-policy studies. While television/telecommunication policies are integral to
analyzing the historical evolution and continued survival of C-SPAN, this study is not a
policy study. Policy studies focus on an industry as the irreducible unit of analysis and in
doing so would de-center C-SPAN. The study sought to understand a specific network in
the industry. A thorough policy study of the cable industry would add to the context of
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C-SPAN, but this task was beyond the resources of this study. In addition, such an effort
would be duplicating existing studies.
This study founded on the idea that there is value in televising and streaming the
federal lawmaking process live, unedited, and without narration to the citizens of the U.S.
For these reasons the study will not explore the other sources of public affairs content.
Once the full spectrum of C-SPAN's programming is examined it is possible to discern a
potential effect of corporate sponsorship on the editorial decisions of producers. A
report undertaken by the media watchdog group, Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting
(FAIR), referred to again in Chapter III, indicates the non-gavel-to-gavel programming of
C-SPAN favors a Republican bias. An equivalent content analysis of C-SPAN's
gavel-to-gavel government programming would prove useful but far beyond the scope of
this study. Of C-SPAN's gavel-to-gavel programming, however, FAIR writes, "Since
1979, C-SPAN has provided an invaluable service to viewers with its no-frills coverage of
congressional hearings, press briefings, demonstrations, book readings and other political
events." For all of these reasons, this study is limited to analyzing C-SPAN's gavel-to-
gavel programming.
The study also does not investigate C-SPAN's audience. C-SPAN has undertaken
research into its audience but to develop an independent data set is beyond the scope of
this study. Focusing on audience shifts the study from an institutional analysis and would
open up issues of individual use. It would be beneficial to learn who uses C-SPAN and
for what purposes to answer other questions but in a political economic sense it is more
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useful to learn to whom the network is targeted and for what purpose. Because the study
concentrated on the network as a media organization within a profit-based industry there
was less need to know who is watching the programming and more need to know how
certain audiences serve the political economy.
The study is limited by the amount of financial information on C-SPAN that is
publicly available. Because the network is private non-profit, it is not required to publish
an annual financial reports or submit SEC filings. The network's IRS 990 form is
available, but does little to shed light on its internal operations. Likewise, cable MSO's
do not mention C-SPAN in their tax filings, SEC documents or annual reports, so there is
no way to track how C-SPAN's affiliate fees are accounted for.
There have been no critical studies of the political economy of C-SPAN and thus
this study intends to fill this gap. By focusing on Congressional television offered by
C-SPAN, the study seeks to answer the basic questions: why does the industry provide the
network? and what does it meanfor U.S. society for a private organization to offer a
public service such as C-SPAN?
Conclusion
This chapter begun by outlining the basic tenets of political economic and
political economy of communication theory. The theory is founded on praxis and guided
by moral assessments of social equity. Communication political economy has taken up
this framework and strives to apply the theory to the media and mass communication
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systems. Owing to the continued growing global disparity of wealth accumulation
coupled to the importance of mediated communications within societies, political
economy of communication is as vital as it ever was. Next, the study described the ways
political economy assisted in answering the guiding research questions. The study is a
structural analysis and the theory surpasses other framework in its ability to address
issues of ownership and control. Following this the study explained what literature
illuminates C-SPAN: writings about the cable industry, studies on the network itself, and
the curious scholarship around the business concept of CSR. The preferred method used
by the study was document analysis, with interviews. The various document sources
were then listed. Finally, the limits of the study were acknowledged.
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CHAPTER III
PROFILE OF C-SPAN
C-SPAN has once again provided a public service that promotes
our democracy and digital citizenship. 75
-National Cable & Telecommunications Association
President & CEO Kyle McSlarrow
The Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network (C-SPAN) is a "cable satellite & radio
network producing coverage of both houses of the US Congress and other significant
governmental and public affairs events.,,76 For any television viewer wanting to watch
Congress, there is only one place to turn: C-SPAN. Available on cable, satellite, radio,
and the web, C-SPAN is the nation's premier public affairs network. Begun in 1979 with
a single channel showing a government-produced feed from the House of
Representative's floor sessions, C-SPAN now includes three cable/satellite networks, one
radio station (available on XM satellite radio) and one the most video-rich websites of
75. NCTA, "Statement of NCTA President & CEO Kyle McSlarrow Regarding the Launch of the
C-SPAN Video Library," March 17,2010,
http://www.ncta.comlReleaseType/Statement/cspanvideolibrary.aspx
76. C-SPAN, IRS Form 990, 2008. Available from http://www2.guidestar.org/
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any cable network. With 98.6 million subscribers, C-SPAN is among the 25 largest cable
networks in the U.S.-larger than Fox News.77 C-SPAN is carried by 7,000 of the 7,677
cable systems across the country.78
A Brief History of C-SPAN
Brian Lamb, an ex-Nixon administration aide, began to pitch the idea of an
all-public affairs network to cable executives as early as 1976 while he was a reporter for
the cable trade magazine Cablevision. At the beginning Lamb intended a "Meet the
Press" type of channel with long-form interviews with policymakers. Lamb had no plans
to televise live Congressional meetings and even if he wanted to, Lamb would not have
been able to; despite years of committee hearings on the subject, Congress prohibited
cameras to record its deliberations.79
Lamb initially had trouble garnering support for his network. Although Robert
Rosencrans, a substantial figure in the development of cable programming, was the first
to support Lamb with a check for $25,000. He told Lamb "The industry doesn't want it, I
can't raise the money, they don't care.,,80 Then in 1977 and event occurred that would
shape the future of C-SPAN: the House Representatives began a limited test to televise its
77. KC. Neel, "Extended Reach: Cable Networks Close in on 100M Subscriber Milestone,"
Multichannel News, July 6, 2009, 6.
78. National Cable and Telecommunications Association, "Directory of Cable Networks; C-SPAN,"
NCTA, http://www.ncta.com/OrganizationType/CableNetwork/1426.aspx
79. Brian Lamb, "Debunking the Myths" (speech, at the National Press Club, Washington D.C.,
January 6, 1997).
80. Ibid..
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floor sessions. The signal was available on a closed-circuit system only within buildings
on the Capitol mall, not to the general public or the media. After prolonged political
wrangling, the House Speaker approved permanent cameras in the chambers and, most
importantly, gave his tacit approval for future public dissemination of the signal. The
Speaker's only provision: cameras were to be controlled by employees of the House. The
Senate continued to ban television cameras.
Lamb quickly realized if he could secure permission to tap into the House signal,
he would have an abundant source of low-cost programming. He quickly switched his
concept from an interview-based network to a gavel-to-gavel government video network.
Lamb pitched his idea to Speaker "Tip" O'Neil, who gave his permission for Lamb to
carry the House signal over a cable channel. Once Lamb was able to secure content that
cost virtually nothing, he was able to find financial backers. More importantly than the
initial funds to launch the network, cable systems began to sign up for the service,
ensuring its viability. In other words, cable companies provided the funds, equipment and
satellite transponder time to get the network running. In late 1978, Lamb incorporated the
nonprofit National Cable Satellite Corporation, C-SPAN's holding company. By the time
the House began its first public telecast on March 19, 1979, Lamb and his influential
industry benefactors had found 200 cable systems willing to carry the government's live
signal to a potential audience of three and a half million subscribers.
In 1981 C-SPAN was able to secure permission to televise House committee
hearings. The following year the network was cablecasting 24 hours a day, seven days a
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week. The Senate voted to televise its floor sessions in 1986 and Lamb launched his
second network, C-SPAN 2, to feature Senate events. By 1990 C-SPAN potentially
reached 50 million subscribers. In 1995 C-SPAN transformed its call-in show into the
immensely popular three hour "Washington Journal." Another C-SPAN non-legislative
staple, its book shows, began in 1996. The next year the network bought a radio station in
the D.C. area and started utilizing streamed video and audio on its website. In 200t the
network added its third channel, C-SPAN 3, which features educational programs about
U.S. history.
C-SPAN's Unique Characteristics
C-SPAN is considered the premier cable network, an example of the good things
that cable television can provide. It is cable's "crown jewel" because it stands out among
all other cable networks. Three attributes set the network apart from other cable and
satellite television networks:
•
•
•
C-SPAN's dedication to public affairs programming.
C-SPAN's staid production style used to cover these events.
C-SPAN's unique ownership structure.
These three components of C-SPAN's operation will be discussed at length below. This
study is a political economy, and the network will be analyzed using the theories and
terms of political economy. The first two components of the network, content and style,
establish the use-value of the network. The use-value is the qualitative utility of a good
or service as determined by its users. Without a use-value a good or service would, quite
49
literally, be worthless. The public affairs programming and the gavel-to-gavel video
production style used to cover these events provide the users of C-SPAN a service that is
useful. The study presumes there is immense value in presenting U.S. society with the
type of programming C-SPAN is known for. Because of this, and the fact C-SPAN is the
only network offering this type of service, it offers an unparalleled social good. Most
studies and analysis of C-SPAN reside at this level-the utility of the network's products
and services. Whether its a media effects scholar, a Washington D.C. insider, or a citizen
living in a rural area, all expound on the way C-SPAN is used. The utility of C-SPAN is
an important component to analyze because it establishes the network's particular service
is socially needed. The last component of C-SPAN-its ownership-represents the
exchange-value of the network. This aspect of the network has been under-considered by
scholars and the public alike. The exchange-value of the network is tied to how C-SPAN,
as a unique organization, is able to perpetuate its existence in our society.
Exchange-value is a quantitative measure of a good, representing the socially necessary
time it took to produce the good. Because all products represent a certain amount of
abstracted labor, people are able to trade dissimilar products. When C-SPAN is analyzed,
its price is mentioned (how much money it took to produce the network) but not its
exchange-value. Exchange-value is a political economic concept incorporating concepts
beyond monetary ones; it places a good in a context of material social relationships. No
good meant for social consumption is produced outside of the larger system of social
relationships. In the U.S., and most of the world, the social system-or political economy
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-producing social goods and services is capitalism. No one has yet studied C-SPAN
from a structural level and examined the ways it enforces the social power in the U.S. let
alone how it contributes to capitalism's continued survival. While some scholars have
looked at how C-SPAN's products foster democracy, their studies inevitably reinforce the
existing capitalist order by focusing on the use of products rather than the larger system
these goods were produced under. Many have taken a look at the product and not the
structure of the entity that produced the good. Abstracted from the productive process it
took to create the service inequities in social power are flattened and history ignored. For
this reason the study will engage in an extended political economic history of not only the
network, but how Congress opened its doors to television cameras, the development of
cable television as a social and economic force, technological development of geo-
synchronous telecommunication satellites, and major regulatory legislation affecting
cable television. Through the historical context the reader will be able to comprehend the
ways in which C-SPAN was the product of historical circumstances more than a
revolutionary force onto itself as the premiere C-SPAN scholars, Stephen Frantzich and
John Sullivan, have proposed81 • Ignoring the political economic conditions surrounding
C-SPAN's founding and continued existence, the cable industry is able to propagate a
myth; offering C-SPAN is a form of charity from which the industry gets nothing, except
satisfaction of doing the right thing. The heart of this study is dedicated to understanding
81. Stephen Frantzich and John Sullivan, The C-SPAN Revolution, (Norman, OK: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1996)
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and refuting this myth. Before this can happen it will be helpful to reveal the three unique
aspects of the network so the reader has some concept of the network and its services.
Content: The "PA" in "C-SPAN" stands for public affairs. C-SPAN does not feature
comedies, sports, game shows, news reports or children's programming. All three of its
networks offer only public affairs programming-something no other privately held
television network can claim. This factor alone creates a justifiable use for the network.
The term "public affairs programming" is generally understood, but difficult to
define. One FCC study examining public affairs programming tautologically defines it as
any programming that "could be categorized objectively as public affairs
programming."82 It is most often defined by what it is not. Public affairs programming is
not entertainment (popular or elite),83 nor is it news.84 The overall concept is closely tied
to the central principle guiding the Communication Act of 1934-public interest. The
1934 act created the Federal Communications Commission giving it the right to
"prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry
82. Thomas C. Spavins et aI., "The Measurement of Local Television News and Public Affairs
Programs," Federal Communications Commission; Media Bureau Staff Research Paper, Media Ownership
Working Group, September 2002, 5, http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/materials/already-
released/measurement090002.pdf
83. The Federal Communications Commission Media Bureau, "The Public and Broadcasting: How to
Get the Most Service for Your Local Station," FCC, July 2008, np
http://www.fcc.gov/mb/audio/decdoc/public_and_broadcasting.html
84. Steven S.Wildman, "Indexing Diversity" in Media Diversity and Localism: Meaning and Metrics,
ed. Philip M. Napoli (Mahwah, NJ.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2007), 164.
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out the provisions of this ACt.,,85 Whether the FCC was evaluating a new technology or
granting a broadcaster a license to use the publicly owned electromagnetic spectrum, the
ultimate criterion was the same: will the action be in the "public interest?" The terms
have legal power-if viewers determine a broadcast station is not serving the public (i.e.,
no longer operating for the public's interests) they can petition the FCC not to renew the
station's license. A television station can serve the public by acting as a place where
issues and ideas about current social and cultural events are discussed and debated.
C-SPAN has become synonymous with public service programming. For
instance, in Megan Mullen's Rise of Cable Programming C-SPAN is mentiond in every
instance discussion of public service. Newton Minnow, who labeled television "a vast
wasteland" in 1966 when serving as FCC chairman and is still a strong advocate of
television programming public interest, recently singled out C-SPAN as the only effort
television has made towards public service; "We still-with the exception of C-SPAN [...]
-do not use this great medium as we might."86
C-SPAN serves the public by televising federal meetings and debates as well as
other gatherings where national issues are discussed and debated. But the network does
not limit its coverage to government sponsored events. Among its three channels, typical
program schedules might include: viewer call-in show discussing the day's political
events with an expert guest, a White House daily briefing, a federal agency or
85. The Communications of 1934, June 19, 1934, ch. 652, title II, § 201,48 Stat. 1070.
86. The Communicators, "Newton Minnow," July 16,2008, C-SPAN, http://www.c-
span.org/search.aspx?For=newton%20minow
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department press conference, House and Senate committees and floor sessions, a lecture
from Washington D.C. think tank experts, an interview show with leaders in mass
communication (e.g., communication corporation CEO's, media watchdogs, federal
regulators, etc.), and documentaries or interviews about U.S. history.8? While each one
of these programs would fit the most stringent definition of public affairs, the majority of
C-SPAN's content features Congress. This is hardly surprising, given the network is
located in Washington D.C. and started by retransmitting television coverage of the House
of Representatives. The network acknowledges that the core sources of its programming
are federal "political" events, explaining that C-SPAN "Cover[s] Washington like no
other.,,88 But again, the most recognizable form of C-SPAN's political coverage is its
Congressional programming. C-SPAN's Director of New Media points out "Our gavel~
to-gavel Senate and House floor coverage is perhaps the most widely recognized aspect of
our coverage. "89 C-SPAN scholar Stephen Frantzich, states the "...coverage of the House
and Senate sessions, no matter how mundane or tedious, serve as the backbone of C-
SPAN coverage and remain inviolate no matter what else is happening in the world.,,9o
According to Brian Lamb, providing legislative coverage is the network's "core
87. C-SPAN, "Schedule," March 1,2010. http://www.c-spanvideo.org/schedule
88. C-SPAN, "Marking 30 Years: Covering Washington Like No Other," http://www.c-
pan.org/30Years/default.aspx
89. Peter J. Brown, "Getting Your Assets in Gear," Broadcasting and Cable, November 6,2000,50.
90. Stephen E. Frantzich and John Sullivan, The C-SPAN Revolution, (Norman, OK: University of
Oklahoma 1996), 77.
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programming commitment.,,91 Indeed, company's official mission statement states the
network's goal is "To provide C-SPAN's audience access to the live gavel-to-gavel
proceedings of the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate, and to other
forums where public policy is discussed, debated and decided."92 Although C-SPAN
produces historical, educational, cultural programming, they are not specifically
mentioned in the mission statement and can be considered "value-added" content on top
of the Congressional meetings and sessions. For these reasons, and because of its
inherent value to democracy, this study focuses on C-SPAN's Congressional
programmmg.
Who watches C-SPAN's programming is another issue. C-SPAN viewers are
often labeled "political junkies."93 "People who understand the ins and outs of politics in
general are fascinated by C-SPAN. People who don't, find it boring."94 According to a
survey by C-SPAN to mark its 30 th anniversary, over 90% of its viewers vote, 35% have
contributed to political campaign, 32% have written an elected official and 22% have
actually talked to their elected officia1.95 C-SPAN is a public affairs network dedicated
91. Frank J. Prial, "After Many Million Pages, 'Booknotes' Ends its Run," New York Times, December
4,2004, B7.
92. C-SPAN Company Page, "Mission Statement," C-SPAN, http://www.c-
pan.org/about/company/index.asp
93. Blaine Harden, "Feasting on C-SPAN; Diet of Public Affairs puts Political Junkies in side
Beltway," Washington Post, May 9, 1996, AOI.
94. Pam Brock, "C-SPAN Gets Real Madison Style," Montpelier Magazine, Spring 2002, np, http://
www.jmu.edu/montpelier/issues/spring02/main/cspan.html
95. C-SPAN News Release, "C-SPAN at 30: Who's Watching," C-SPAN, March 18,2009,
http://www.c-span.org/30Years/media-release.aspx#30years
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to covering national politics. How the network choses to do this is the second reason why
the network stands out from other television networks.
Production Style: A cursory glook at C-SPAN reveals that the network is different, not
merely because of the public affairs content, but in the way the network looks and sounds.
The overwhelming majority of C-SPAN's content is shot live or live-to-tape
(where an event is recorded live and is played back later without editing). When C-SPAN
covers a public affairs event live, it televises the entire meeting from beginning to end
without interruption. This is called gavel-to-gavel coverage, a term related to the
network's focus on government. Coverage begins the moment a chairman or woman
bangs a physical gavel to open a meeting and ends when the chair adjourns the meeting
with another gavel bang. C-SPAN does not cut back to a studio where an anchor or
pundit explains what you have heard and seen-analysis is left to the viewer. The choice
of this staid visual style is more than superficial. According to its mission statement,
C-SPAN has consciously chosen "To employ production values that accurately convey the
business of government rather than distract from it,,96
Some have found C-SPAN less than exciting, as Brock observes: "Alfred
Hitchcock said that film is really life with the boring parts left out. C-SPAN leaves all the
96. C-SPAN website. Company Page. Mission. http://www.c-span.org/about/company/index.asp
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boring parts in.,,97 However, C-SPAN's unedited gavel-to-gavel coverage represents a
radical departure from previous forms of public affairs television.
For viewers [... ] C-SPAN was an electronic marvel, since it allowed the
politically minded to see their government in action, rather than watching
abbreviated news reports on the three network evening news shows.98
Information that was once the sole province of journalists to distill and
impart is now available, unfiltered, to anyone who cares enough to subject
himself to it.99
Indeed, whether its viewers count themselves Democratic, Republican or
independent, whether they consider themselves liberal, conservative or
somewhere in between, almost all agree that C-SPAN is a national
treasure. 100
C-SPAN does not add musical soundtracks or narrators and does not edit the
coverage in any way. In comparison, during the 2004 presidential coverage, the average
length of a candidate's sound bite on the mainstream media channels was under eight
seconds. lOl In 2008, C-SPAN provided 4,190 hours of presidential campaign coverage and
without editing. 102
97. Brock, np.
98. Dusty Saunders, "CSPAN Celebrates 25 Years," The Rocky Mountain News, March 17, 2004, 2D.
99. Ruth Marcus, "Confessions of a CSPAN Junkie," The Washington Post, March 18,2004, A31.
100. Editorial, "25 Years Later; Innovative CSPAN is a National Treasure," The San Diego Union-
Tribune, April 3, 2004, B8.
101. Erik P. Bucy and Maria Elizabeth Grabe, "Taking Television Seriously: A Sound and Image Bite
Analysis of Presidential Campaign Coverage, 1992-2004," Journal of Communication 57 (2007): 664.
102. C-SPAN webpage; Marking 30 Years: Covering Washington Like No other, "30 Facts about
C-SPAN," http://www.c-span.org/30Years/default.aspx
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While other networks may feature public affairs programs, their coverage style is
quite different, including shouting pundits, selective editing, overwrought graphics, and
bombastic music. Without the gavel-to-gavel style of coverage, C-SPAN would be unable
to claim to be "unbiased."103 and "the political network of record." 104 C-SPAN's
broadcasts can be considered a record of events in ways mainstream journalism cannot as
C-SPAN's cameras are more akin to the aesthetic of surveillance than what we consider
professional television production. While it may not make for exciting television, (for
some viewers) it offers "a window on the legislative process"105 and provides an
experience as close to being at the event as a mass mediated electronic communication
method allows.
Ownership and Funding: Both of these aspects of C-SPAN-an all-federal public
affairs programming lineup and unedited, live, gavel-to-gavel production style-
demonstrate that the network is exceptional and warrants further study. Another unique
characteristic is its ownership and funding, which is the focus of this study.
103. C-SPAN Press Release. "C-SPAN Statement Regarding Colbert Video." nd, http://www.c-
span.org/special/colbert.asp
104. C-SPAN Press Release. "C-SPAN Takes Lead in Making Video of Congressional Hearings,
White House and Other Federal Events More Widely Available to the Online Community," March 7, 2007,
http://www.c-span.org/about/press/release.asp?code=video
105. Catherine J. Hosley, "C-SPAN Used as Window on the Legislative Process," Chronicle of
Higher Education, December 16, 1987, A14.
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Ownership: C-SPAN is owned by the National Cable Satellite Corporation-a
registered 501 (c)3 nonprofit organization, incorporated November 14, 1978, in the District
of Columbia. 106 The network is considered a "cable industry cooperative"W7 because it is
owned and operated by those who use its services-the cable industry. C-SPAN's
governing board and executive committee are composed of officers from large and small
(mostly large) cable system owing corporations (also known as Multiple Service
Operations-MSOs). The directors are a "who's who" of the cable industry. Between
C-SPAN's board of directors and its executive committee, the network has representatives
from nine out of the ten largest cable companies. C-SPAN's executive committee
includes the presidents of the three largest cable corporations: Comcast, Time-Warner and
Cox. The board also includes a representative from the National Cable Television
Cooperative, Inc. (NCTC)-a nonprofit cooperative that "negotiates master agreements
with programming networks [and equipment manufacturers] on behalf of participating
member companies" in order to secure better rates. The NCTC board contains many of
the same members as C-SPAN's board.
Many of the C-SPAN board members are ex-cable executives who have gone into
advising or consulting work. For instance, Kelvin Westbrook, a prominent black
entrepreneur, worked for large communications corporations (including Charter Cable
106. Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs; Corporations Division, District of Columbia,
http://mblr.dc.gov/corp/lookup/status.asp?id= 110889
107. Television and Cable Online Factbook 2010, "C-SPAN," http://www.warren-
news.comlfactbook.htm
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and SBC) before starting his own cable company in St. Louis. 108 Another board member,
Amos Hostetter, has played a key role in the history of cable television. In the1960s he
and a partner started a small cable company, Continental Cablevision, which was sold to
US West in 1996 for $11 billion. Hostetter is now the 158th richest person in the U.S. 109
He was an early supporter of C-SPAN and was the leading figure behind another cable
industry public service with wider public relations overtones; Cable in the Classroom.
C-SPAN's board represents the often conflicting range of companies and services
within the cable industry and includes members from both American Cable Association
(ACA) and National Cable & Telecommunications Association (NCTA). With slightly
over 1, 000 independent cable system owners, ACA represents the smaller cable operators
who provide service to 7 million subscribers in the nation's minor markets and rural
areas. 110 NCTA, on the other hand, represents the nation's largest cable operators-often
called multiple system operators (MSO)-and represents 90% of the cable households in
the U.S. (approximately 94 million subscribers). NCTA also includes 200 cable program
networks and even cable equipment manufacturers. lll
108. Alvin A. Reid, "Entrepreneur of the Year: Kelvin Westbrook," The S. Louis American,
September 28,2005.
http://www.stlamerican.com/artic1es/2005/10/03ibusiness/local_business/localbusinessOl.txt
109. Forbes, "America's Richest List," http://www.forbes.com/lists/2007/54/richlist07_Amos-
Hostetter-IeTVQX.htrnl
110. American Cable Association, "About Us," http://www.americancable.org/abouCus/aca_history_O
Ill. National Cable Telecommunications Association, "About Us,"
http://www.ncta.com/About!About!AboutNCTA.aspx
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However, C-SPAN is a service to the entire cable industry and is not the property
of any single provider or company. It has to represent the needs and voices of the many
divergent and competing corporations that make up the industry. Because it is a cable
network, however, C-SPAN does not have other cable network representatives on its
board. This would clearly present a potential for conflicts of interest.
Board members receive no direct compensation for serving. As Brian Lamb
explains: "They get nothing to serve on the board. They're all members of the cable
television industry. They gave their time. They fly to wherever we're having our meetings
on their nickel, not on ours. All their expenses are paid by their own companies. And they
get absolutely nothing out of it except some satisfaction that they're giving something
back for their country."ll2 This is an interesting point and should be considered unusual,
since half of corporate directors earn over $100,000 for serving on a company's board. ll3
Many board members receive bonuses for chairing committees and often given additional
compensation in the form of stock options. C-SPAN's directors are not paid or even
compensated for their expenses. But this does not mean there is no value in serving on
the board. As corporate power structure research has demonstrated, serving on boards of
other corporations is one of the major ways power elites manage to secure and strengthen
112. Brian Lamb, "Debunking the Myths" (speech, at the National Press Club, Washington D.C.,
January 6,1997), available from http://www.c-span.org/about/company/debunk.asp?code=DEBUNK2
113. Josh Funk, "Corporate Board Pay Soars as Directors' Tasks Grow," New York Times, May 5,
2008, available from http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/05/business/worldbusiness/05iht-
board.4.12575884.html
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power. 1l4 C-SPAN's directors are presidents and CEOs of the largest cable
communication corporations representing the will of the cable industry. They are not a
random selection of civic minded people.
The point here is that C-SPAN is a private, not public, cooperative. Not only do
the directors corne exclusively form the ranks of the cable industry's elites, the network
also limits public involvement or financial support of the network. C-SPAN does not
solicit or accept donations from general viewers and there are no public "members" of the
cooperative. With ownership (even partial) comes influence and the most obvious way
for this is manifested in media organizations is through editorial control over
programming. This is illustrated by looking more carefully at C-SPAN's programming.
At least one study has focused on C-SPAN's political bias. In 2005, the media
watchdog group, Fairness and Accuracy In Reporting (FAIR), conducted a study using
the daily call-in show "Washington Journal." FAIR determined that C-SPAN favored
studio guests and callers expressing right-of-center attitudes. ll5
But another kind of influence is also possible. C-SPAN has limited resources and
time slots available and cannot possibly air every legislative hearing. By selecting what
committees are featured, editorial control can be exerted. For instance, what would
C-SPAN's programmers do if a legislative hearing was corning that featured anti-cable
114. See: Val Burris, "Interlocking Directorates and Political Cohesion among Corporate Elites,"
American Journal ofSociology III (2005): 245-83. & William G. Domhoff, Who Rules America: Power,
Politics. and Social Change (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2005).
115. Steve Rendell, "Failing at its 'No.1 Goal:' Lack of Balance at C-SPAN's Washington Journal,"
Extra! NovemberlDecember 2004, np, http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=2764
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bills. It might be possible that the industry would be motivated to get its side of the
argument out to as wide an audience as possible during such hearings. And yet, in 2004
C-SPAN telecast a speech by a Canadian cable executive denouncing "a la carte"
programming options for subscribers. A la carte, where subscribers pay and receive only
the channels they want, is adamantly opposed by C-SPAN and the cable industry. The
issue is supported by consumer groups, who presented their case before a House
committee. C-SPAN did not cover the hearings. 116
Beyond the potential for editorial control over programming, it is possible to argue
that: the industry is far less interested in using C-SPAN to control information than in
using the network to promote the industry. C-SPAN's raison d'etre is to act as a form of
industry promotion. If C-SPAN was publicly owned, or legally mandated, the cable
industry would be unable to claim credit for it and would lose a political lever in
Washington. C-SPAN is the only U.S. cable network to feature this unique form of
ownership.
Funding: C-SPAN carries no advertising and does not accept program
underwriting. How then, is C-SPAN funded? As the promotional video from C-SPAN's
website (described in Chapter I) explained it: "America's cable companies have been
providing C-SPAN.,,117
116. Kent Gibbons, Through the Wire, Multichannel News, July 19, 2004, 6.
117. C-SPAN, "About Us," http://cspan.org/about/index.asp?code=About
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While the video makes it clear that C-SPAN is funded by America's cable
companies, this is not the whole story. At another location on C-SPAN's website, it is
further explained "Its operating funds are derived from monthly fees paid by affiliated
cable TV systems and other distributors of C-SPAN programming."1l8
According to C-SPAN's IRS 990 form, the company's total revenue was $58.1
million in 2008. Total expenses were 93% of total revenue ($54 million). Of the total
revenue, $55 million came directly from "programming fees." Which are referred to as
affiliate or franchise fees, with minimal revenues from videos and merchandise. An
affiliate fee is a standard industry practice where a local cable operator pays the owner of
a cable network a per-capita fee based on the number of subscribers in the system for the
right to carry the programming. In 2008, the entire cable industry paid $3 billion in
affiliate fees to network programmers. 1l9 C-SPAN represents slightly over one half of one
percent of that total. If a local cable system wants to carry C-SPAN programming, it
directly pays C-SPAN 5¢ per subscriber in its system. 120 In this way C-SPAN is funded
like any other basic cable network.
Other cable channels without advertising are "premium" channels (e.g., HBO).
Subscribers pay an additional fee to receive the channel. C-SPAN is not a premium
channel but a basic cable channel; often included as part of the lowest tier of
118. C-SPAN, Information for Viewers; Frequently Asked Questions, "How is C-SPAN Funded?"
http://www.c-span.org/about/viewecinfo/faq.asp?code=ABOUT#funded
119. NCTA, "Industry Data," http://www.ncta.com/Statistics.aspx
120. John Higgins, "Man on a Mission: C-SPAN's Kennedy Sees a Multip1atform Future for Pub1ic-
Affairs," Broadcasting & Cable, March 27, 2006, 24.
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programming packages that cable operators offer to customers. For the monthly fee, a
cable operator receives the rights to carry C-SPAN, C-SPAN 2 and C-SPAN 3. Thus,
C-SPAN's $58.1 million budget, which is already far below the industry standard for a
cable network, funds three separate networks. C-SPAN's 5¢ affiliate fee is the lowest in
the cable industry for a national cable network. As a comparison, ESPN's affiliate fees
are the highest in the industry at $3.25 per subscriber. 121 In order for a cable company to
carry C-SPAN 2 or C-SPAN 3, however, it must agree to carry C-SPAN. Because it does
not need to garner profits or attract large audiences in the hopes of attaining advertising
dollars, C-SPAN has maintained its fee schedule for over fourteen years. It is able to do
this because of low production and labor costs.
C-SPAN uses non-union staff and has actively fought several attempts of C-SPAN
workers to unionize by hiring union-busting consultants. 122 While the company will not
allow its workers to unionize, the disparity between executive and general workers is one
of the lowest in the industry-to such a degree one might assume C-SPAN executives
chose C-SPAN for non-monetary reasons. Executives' salaries are at least 75% below the
121. Andy Fixmer, "Iger's ESPN Sports Contracts Squeeze Profit at Disney (Update2),"
B1oomberg.com, September 6, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/09/06/bloomberg/bxespn.php
122. Mark Peach, (President, 2002-2006, of NABET..CWA Local 31) interview with author, June
2009.
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industry standard123 (e.g., Lamb's salary is $332,090124 compared to David M. Zaslav,
CEO of the cable programming giant, Discovery Communications, who earned a
$2,000,000 salary and $15,480,000 in total compensationI25). C-SPAN distinguishes
itself among other corporate entities by the fact it has two chief operating officers: Susan
Swain and Robert Kennedy. Kennedy handles the business, finance, and technology
operations, while Swain oversees the programming and marketing. 126 Unlike other for-
profit corporations where co-COO's might cause competition and backbiting, the
arrangement has worked quite well for the past fifteen years. Not only does C-SPAN
keep labor costs low, the nature of gavel-to-gavel coverage means production costs are
kept to a minimum.
With only the most basic effects, no scripts and limited cameras/lighting, an hour
of C-SPAN programming costs around $2,300 to produce, compared to $20,000 for a live
studio cooking show or $2 million for a major network drama program. 127 Except for a
few hosts of its studio shows, the network does not have expensive "talent" costs. By
123. John Higgins, "Man on a Mission: C-SPAN's Kennedy Sees a Multiplatform Future for Public-
Affairs," Broadcasting & Cable, March 27, 2006, 24.
124. C-SPAN, IRS Form 990, 2008. Available from http://www2.guidestar.org/
125. Scott DeCarlo and Brian Zaja, ed., Special Report, "CEO Compensation; #86 David Zaslav,"
April22, 2009, available from http://www.forbes.com/listsI2009/12/best-boss-09_David-M-
Zaslav_D9HF.html
126. David Hatch, "1\vo Heads are Better than One: Swain and Kennedy Find the Right Balance at
C-SPAN," Broadcasting and Cable, May 3, 2004, 70.
127. Higgins, 24.
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relying on public meetings, C-SPAN avoids costly licensing fees charged for private
entertainment or sporting events.
Generally then, because affiliate fees are a standard revenue source across the
cable industry, C-SPAN's ownership structure is more unique than its funding
mechanism. Despite the fact affiliate fees are a fee-for-service payment there is a clear
attempt to promote the industry's support of C-SPAN as voluntary contribution. For
instance, on its twentieth anniversary, C-SPAN purchased a full page advertisement in the
New York Times, with the headline the ad "Cable's gift to America.,,128 The text then
explained how "20 years ago America's cable companies decided to provide gavel-to-
gavel coverage of Congress as a public service, at no cost to the taxpayer." The ad
doesn't use the term "donation," but uses "gift" instead. Gifts, in the pecuniary sense, are
free. The ad alludes to this definition with the "at no expense to the taxpayer" line.
While the thrust of the advertisement is the industry foots the bill, the actual "donation"
might be considered the opportunity cost of tying up a channel (or three) for
noncommercial programming. 129 The channel space dedicated to C-SPAN networks
could be used for a commercial network, allowing the system to sell local advertising or
receive money based on product sales (e.g., home shopping networks or pay-per-view
programming). More on this to follow.
128. C-SPAN advertisement, "Cable's Gift to America," New York Times, January 11, 1999, A6.
129. Peter Kiley, (C-SPAN Director of Affiliate Relations), interview with the author, February 26,
2006.
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Despite the claim that C-SPAN is non-profit and a "public service," the network is
still part of a commodification process. In other words, the network is purchased and
sold as part of an overall cable package. C-SPAN is only available to viewers through a
fee-based service (cable television, satellite television, high speed Internet connection).
C-SPAN is bundled with other cable channels and the entire package is sold to
subscribers as a programming "tier" for a national average price of $71 per month. 130
The "opportunity cost" of not being able to reap the revenue of another home
shopping network or popular sports channel is an economic matter with political
economic ramifications. It is a straw man argument, put up to prevent the public from
recognizing larger political economic realities (i.e., the industry gains social power
through capitalizing on a public service). Economic cost-benefit analyses deal with
intangible future or current alternative outcomes and frequently under-value the current
choice. It may be true a cable system could make more money by offering another
network but we are lead to believe there is no economic benefit to offering C-SPAN, e.g.,
C-SPAN is a "gift." In an economic, not anthropological, sense, the giver of a "gift" is
not remunerated. The exchange value of voluntary public service is satisfaction, and if
this is the actual reward, it outweighs any monetary opportunity cost. In fact, if there
wasn't an opportunity cost to public service it would not be a donation. Public service
freely given is ignoring monetary opportunity costs in favor of emotional rewards. If a
130. Todd Spangler, "Study: Average Cable TV Bill Is $71 Per Month," Multichannel News, April 16,
2009, np, http://www.multichannel.com/article/196364-
Study_Average_Cable_TV_BiIUs_7LPeCMonth.php & NCTA, "Key Policy Issues; ala carte,"
http://www.ncta.comlIssueBriefs/ALaCarte.aspx
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giver gives up nothing, the "donation" would not have any costs to the giver and because
he or she was not giving up anything, would not have any value. In this way, only by the
industry saying it is giving up potential revenue can offering C-SPAN be considered a
public service donation.
By examining the economic costs and benefits, the entire premise of sacrifice is
based on an incomplete picture. C-SPAN is presented as a cost to the cable industry. It is
the public, not the cable industry that receives the benefit-quality public affairs
programming. Only by obscuring the political economic benefits-political leverage,
marketable programming, and testing ground for new services-behind a veil of charity is
the industry able to present the network as a sacrifice. The industry hides the true social
relationships behind the network's operation within a capitalist media system.
Ultimately, whether or not the industry donates C-SPAN is an economic question
but it is an important one to consider because it helps shed new light on the cable
industry's inferences that C-SPAN represents a kind of charity. By giving the impression
that C-SPAN is donated, it is able to present its motivations as "public service" rather
than profit. The goal of this study is not to disprove the motivations of cable operators or
to put a price tag on the donation of each MSO carrying C-SPAN, but to suggest that
other, more important, considerations are at play when we consider the network as part of
a larger capitalist political economy. For this reason, a historical analysis is vital. Only
through understanding the material social conditions under which the network was
formed, and continues to thrive, are we able to comprehend how it has been expedient to
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serve the public with this type of network, and how technological and market realities
made the "charity" of C-SPAN affordable.
Conclusion
This chapter has discussed how three characteristics-public affairs-only
programming, unedited gavel-to-gavel production style, and an industry-based
cooperative ownership structure--combine to make C-SPAN unique.
While more discussion of C-SPAN's exceptional nature is possible, this study has
focused on uncovering and analyzing the political economic benefits of this network. By
critically examining the description of C-SPAN that is offered by the network and its
industry owners, it is possible to place the network in its actual social context. The
network's founding is an excellent example. As is so often the case with historical
accounts, history becomes biography. Lamb has publicly singled out eleven individuals
by name and explained that "We wouldn't be where we are if they hadn't been involved
and looked back at their own industry and said to their own people, 'Do this."'131 It is true
that these individuals had a key role in the birth and continued success of C-SPAN, but
given the change in the cable industry from small independent "mom and pop" outfits run
by entrepreneurs to the managerial capitalism of large multinational corporations,
individual dedication has been transformed into corporate policy.
131. Brian Lamb, "Debunking the Myths" (speech, at the National Press Club, Washington D.C.,
January 6, 1997), available from http://www.c-span.org/about/company/debunk.asp?code=DEBUNK2
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C-SPAN began at the same historical moment that the cable industry was
developing into a powerful interest group. While several cable pioneers donated time and
money to the fledgling network, it indeed appears that C-SPAN was the product of
Lamb's personal fervor for such a channel. While Lamb praises his industry sponsors,
who "haven't hiccuped" with their support during the recession, he still recognizes larger
economic forces. "There's just not a great deal of appreciation right now for
nonprofits." 132
The creation myth surrounding C-SPAN is that the industry leaders stood up,
made a pledge to provide C-SPAN and have stood by this pledge ever since. Lamb
explains "They are cable television executives who have been slammed by Congress
saying, 'They're nothing but greedy people--all they care about is money.' But they did
create an institution that truly belongs to the public. "133 As discussed in this chapter,
C-SPAN is hardly owned by the public and represents a "public service" that has been
turned into a commodity that also serves the cable industry in various ways.
The wider context of social, political, economic and technological developments
of the late 1970's allows us to understand how this "public service" not only possible, but
became profitable. The next chapter explores the history of Congressional television so
that C-SPAN's creation is not conflated with the efforts and motives of elected officials.
132. Paul Bedard, "Even at 67, C-SPAN Boss Brian Lamb Isn't Slowing Down," Washington
Whispers Blog; US News and World Report, comment posted April 11, 2009.
http://www.usnews.com/blogs/washington-whispers/2009/04/ ll/even-at-67-c-span-boss-brian-lamb-isnt-
slowing-down.html
133. Brian Lamb, interviewed by Thomas Hazlett, "Changing Channels," Reason, March, 1996,40.
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C-SPAN was made possible because of an already existing movement to open Congress
to cameras. Through exploring the process of Congressional television it is possible to
discern the ways in which the controlling interests of a capitalist media system are not
questioned in any sustained way, and that legislators' desire to televise their actions was
the result of political needs that had little to do with democracy. In short, C-SPAN took
advantage of historical circumstances favorable to a market-based solution, it did not
create any sort of social movement.
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CHAPTER IV
CONGRESSIONAL TELEVISION
None ofus know who owns ABC, CBS, or NBC, who makes the decision,
or where the money comes from. We do not know those things, and as
long as we do not know those things, we should not give it up to the
networks. Let us give it to the people. 134
-u.S. Representative Ronald V. Dellums
On March 19, 1979 the House of Representatives convened to debate such routine
matters as the creation of a committee to study committee jurisdictions and the impact of
shipping U.S. lottery tickets overseas. 135 The debates were far from monumental but the
floor session made history nevertheless-for the first time the U.S. House of
Representatives televised a regular floor session live to the American public. This date
also marked the maiden cablecast of the C-SPAN network. Thirty years later, it is often
assumed that C-SPAN "opened up" Congress to cameras. Viewers watched Congress on
134. Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, HR 1293, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record
124 (June 14, 1978): H 17665.
135. Stephen Frantzich and John Sullivan, The C-SPAN Revolution, (Norman, OK: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1996), 38.
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C-SPAN, but the live telecast was produced by government employees using government
equipment and was available to any media outlet that wanted to take the feed. So,
C-SPAN did not open up Congress, Congress opened up itself.
The New York Times article describing the event, published the day after the
telecast, failed to mention C-SPAN by name, reporting that the signal was carried "by
some cable systems."136 C-SPAN was not the only television outlet utilizing the feed. A
handful of PBS stations chose to take the event live, displacing Sesame Street, and the
major broadcast networks aired edited portions during the evening news. C-SPAN,
however, was the only network to continue transmitting the floors sessions live and
unedited. The emergence of the C-SPAN network was such as radical departure from all
other forms of public affairs coverage up to that point it is easy to conflate C-SPAN's
coverage with Congressional television. In other words, the network overshadows the
historical significance of Congress opening itself up to cameras.
Historical Overview: Congress and Television the 1930's - 1970's
Commercial television broadcasting in the U.S. debuted at the 1939 World's Fair.
At the time RCA was looking for a way to use its broadcasting company, NBC, to
promote its new line of television receivers. 137 The World's Fair offered both an
136. B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., "First TV Broadcast of House Session Isn't High Theater." New York
Times, March 20, 1979. AI.
137. Office of Managing Director, "History of Communications; Historical Periods in Television
Technology; Golden Age, 1930's through 1950's," Federal Communications Commission,
http://www.fcc.gov/omd/history/tv/1930-1959.html
74
appropriately large venue to showcase the new technology and a singular event for the
maiden transmission-the Fair's opening speech by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
FDR, however, was not the first government official to appear on television.
Three months earlier, four U.S. Congressmen and Congresswoman were interviewed on
camera in front of the Federal Department of Agriculture building. 138 The signal was
received at the National Press Club, where reporters and select guests watched. The FDR
speech is frequently cited in histories of television, the Representatives' interview has
been forgotten. The 1939 telecasts set precedents for future federal political television
coverage by showing from the very beginning of television that there was an interest in
televising political figures, but it would be presidents, not Congress, dominating
television coverage.
Most viewers take the gavel-to-gavel coverage offered by C-SPAN for granted.
However, before C-SPAN could exist, Congress would have to open its deliberations to
television cameras and microphones, something not inevitable with the invention of
electronic mass communications. In 1944, five years after television was introduced to
the world, Sen. Claude Pepper proposed a resolution permanently opening Congress to
sound and image broadcasts. 139 The resolution died. In 1947 the House of
Representatives did allow television cameras to broadcast the opening ceremonies of the
80th Congress. This broadcast marked the premier of Congressional television, but after
138. Office of the Clerk, "House History; Electronic Technology in the House of Representatives,"
U.S. House of Representatives, http://clerk.house.gov/archistory/house_history/technoiogy/tv.html
139. Ibid..
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the ceremonial portion of the floor session ended, the broadcast ended. House members
had previously ruled that cameras would not be allowed to cover routine business. Three
days later, the cameras were brought back to cover Truman's State of the Union Address.
For the next 32 years, television cameras were only allowed to broadcast special joint
sessions of Congress and visiting dignitaries speaking on the floor.
Over the next three decades, Congressional committees received far more
television coverage than the floor sessions. The Senate was the first body to televise its
committee hearings. In 1948, the Senate Armed Services Committee allowed television
cameras in its hearings on universal military training. 140 Television was still a new
technology in the late 1940's and few Americans owned sets. Thus, the telecast received
little or no public notice. Three months later the House undertook an investigation of the
communist infiltration of the U.S. government and entertainment industries. The House
Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) marked the first sustained live broadcast
of Congress. Again, given limited saturation of television set ownership in 1948, there
was modest viewer interest. But this situation didn't not last long.
By the early 1950's television set ownership ownership was up and in 1951 the
Senate began its televised investigations into organized crime to a large and eager
audience. The Special Senate Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate
Commerce (Kevauver Commision) gained so much notoriety that its chairman, Sen. Estes
Kevauver, was given a "special achievement" award at the 1952 Emmys for "arousing the
140. Ronald Garay, Congressional television: A Legislative History, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1984),36.
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conscience of the American people to the fact that we have organized crime." 141 The
Kevauver commission was popular and traveled around the nation to hold its hearings, but
they were never broadcast coast-to-coast. The broadcast reach was limited to the
geographic areas wherever the commission convened (e.g., New Oreleans, Detriot, St.
Louis, Los Angeles, New York, etc.). Three years later, Kevauver's impact on
Congressional television would pale in comparison to the events put on by a junior
senator from Wisconsin-Joseph McCarthy.
The 1954 Army-McCarthy hearings were the first live coast-to-coast television
broadcast of a congressional event. Though these hearings were a historical milestone in
television history, only one network, ABC, chose to broadcast the hearings live and gavel-
to-gavel. Then, as now, programming decisions were made with commercial
considerations in mind. Hearings occurred during the afternoon when popular soap
operas were scheduled. So the other networks were loathe to sacrifice advertising
revenue by offering live and uninterrupted coverage of the hearings. With its news
division in last place ABC's president, Robert E. Kintner, decided the network had little
to lose by broadcasting the entire hearings. 142 NBC and CBS offered edited highlights
during the evening newscasts and replayed larger chunks around midnight. This hearing
not only demonstrated how television could build, and consequentially destroy, the career
of a public figure it defined a generation.
141. "Senator Kefauver Cited for TV Inquiry." New York Times, February 20, 1952,37.
142. Thomas Doherty, "The Army-McCarthy Hearings," in The Encyclopedia of Television, ed.
Horace Newcomb, Cary O'Dell and Noelle Watson, (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1997), 85-87.
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By the mid-1950's, television was both culturally and socially ubiquitous in the
u.s. Despite, or perhaps because of, the popularity of the McCarthy hearings Congress
actively limited television access to the legislative process. The Senate allowed cameras
in committee hearings only with consent of the committee members and banned them
from the Senate floor altogether. In 1952 Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn expressly
barred cameras from televising House Committees and regular floors sessions. 143 Despite
efforts to permanently televise Congress beginning as early as 1944, television coverage
for the next thirty five years would be piecemeal. No formal rule forbid Congress from
allowing television coverage but tradition and fear kept out cameras and microphones.
Decorum became the priority for legislators who wanted to avoid turning committees and
floor debates into the circuses of the previous special investigatory hearings. Television
was a new technology and Congress was an old institution. As one pivotal congressional
report put it: "Innovation by Congress in mass communications at the institutional level is
rare and hard to find."144 Before Congress could be televised, elected officials would have
to radically rethink the way they conducted business within the US political system. As it
would turn out, television rode the coattails of a larger institutional reorganization
campaign following the Second World War.
143. Garay, 52.
144. Joint Committee on Congressional Operations, Congress and Mass Communications: An
Institutional Perspective, a study conducted by The Congressional Research Organization, 93rd Cong., 2nd
sess., 1974, Committee Print, 24.
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Legislative Reorganization Movements
After the World War II members of Congress "[...J shared concerns about the
increasing size and expanding power of the executive branch that had come with the New
Deal programs of the 1930's and then World War 11."145 In addition to losing power to the
president, Congress had to answer to a multitude of critics who felt that Congress was not
a modern organization. "The critics saw a tradition-bound institution incapable of
governing in the second half of the 20th century.,,146 The first attempt to deal with both of
these issues was the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. This act was "The most far-
reaching organizational restructuring since the First Congress."147 The act streamlined the
legislative process and cleared away arcane procedural restrictions. The act also, for the
first time in the history of Congress, made provisions for hiring permanent professional
and clerical staff for every committee, greatly increasing productivity and access to expert
knowledge. By far, the act's most important contribution was the restructuring of the
committee system. It reduced the number of standing committees and attempted to
routinize committee subject areas between the two houses. The number of committee
assignments for each members was reduced in the hope that committee members would
become experts in the subject of the committee. The net result of the act was to give more
145. Steven S. Smith, Jason M. Roberts and Ryan J. Vander Wie1en, The American Congress, 5th ed.,
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 49.
146. Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, House, Organization ofthe Congress, 103rd
Cong., 1st sess., December 17, 1993, Committee Print H. Rpt. 103-413, np, available from
http://www.ru1es.house.gov/archives/jcoc2.htm
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autonomy to the committees. While the act made no provisions for broadcasting
Congress, it set a precedent for modernizing Congress.
By the middle of the 1960's, it was clear times had changed yet again. Not only
had technology brought the U.S. into the computer age, social unrest bred popular distrust
of Congress. A resolution to create a committee to look at another massive
reorganization of Congress was submitted in 1965. The omnibus bill would eventually
take five and half years to pass, becoming the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970.
With its passage, Congress made efforts, yet again, to combat voter cynicism and bring
the institution into the modern age. Modernization provisions included highly technical
components, such as restructuring of committees and how the Federal budget went
through the Congressional approval process. The act also made smaller, more tangible,
changes such as installation of an electronic push-button voting system in the House
chambers. But what the bill is generally known for are the efforts to battle public
cynicism, as it "opened to the public eye more of the operations of Congress and the
positions of its Members.,,148
While the 1946 act restructured committees, the 1970 act opened them up to
public scrutiny. Committee chairs no longer had discretion in declaring their committees
closed to the general public, while committee members' roll call and amendment votes
were made public. 149 After the act was eventually signed into law by Richard Nixon, the
148. Major Congressional Action, "First Congressional Reform Bill Enacted Since 1946,"
Congressional Quarterly Almanac, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly News Features, 1970),447.
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New York Times singled out these open committee provisions as "important."15o In an
age of electronic mass media, the efforts to open Congress could not avoid the issue of
media access. During public hearings on the act, Sam Archibald, of the Freedom of
Information Center at the University of Missouri School of Journalism, testified that "the
proposal before this subcommittee to increase public access to congressional information
may not be the greatest step since the first amendment toward the people's right to know,
but it certainly moves in the same direction."151 Archibald's testimony was about one
particular aspect of the broad reform resolution-allowing television cameras in House
committee meetings. During hearings John Lynch, the network news director for ABC,
commented how the Senate's allowance of cameras while the House denied coverage, had
resulted in "a disproportionate share of the public attention on that body of the
Congress."152 The news director was trying to convince the committee members to open
House committees. It is important to recognize his rhetorical strategy involved playing on
the representatives' sense of insecurity over senators having more power over public
opinion-just as both reorganization acts were attempts to address power inequities
between Congress and the executive branch. When questioned by a committee member
about why the media televised a particular Senate committee, Roger Mudd, Chairman of
the Executive Committee of Radio and TV Correspondents' Galleries, pointed out that
150. "Defense Measure Signed by President," New York Times, October 27, 1970, 30.
151. House Committee on Rules, Legislative Reorganization Act of1970, 91st Cong., 1st sess., October
3D, 1969, 45.
152. Legislative Reorganization Act of1970,63.
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the Senate's use of television coverage was strategic, telling the committee "You
understand that the [Senate] Foreign Relations Committee embarked in that period on a,
what they regarded as an educational campaign and asked for live television. They were
using the media.,,153 The act, when passed, officially opened House committee hearings
-contingent upon majority vote among the committee members-to television cameras.
This move revoked the two decade old ruling of Speaker Rayburn and placed the House
on par with practices within the Senate.
More important than making television coverage of committees possible was the
concept of tying an "open congress" to a "televised congress." The Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1970 marks the inception of sustained, and coordinated, efforts to
make television broadcasts of Congress a permanent feature of a more open institution.
As has been summarized above, opening Congress to television cameras was an enduring
issue for three decades. Without the backing of leadership and the majority of members,
these early attempts ultimately failed. The early debate managed to keep the topic from
disappearing until the right historical circumstances occurred. In the early 1970's
opening Congress to cameras fit the historical moment when secrecy within institutions
was increasingly intolerable to citizens. The Reorganization Act was proposed the same
year that the sweeping Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) began to gain political
support (1965). President Johnson grudgingly signed the FOIA bill only a year later, but
Congress would not mandate committees be publicly open for four more years. The 1970
153. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970,84.
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act represents a turning point in the way Congress perceived its role in an open and
democratic society.
It is vital to understand that Congressional members' desire to have a publicly
open institution was balanced against the institution's need to compete for social power
with other institutions. While it would be unwise to doubt any single member's capacity
for heartfelt popular egalitarianism, we must contextualize this sentiment with the historic
conditions of the day. Congressional reorganization efforts were a reaction to
technological changes, social unrest, and increasing presidential power that made
legislative transparency not only possible but desirable. Using television to open
Congress did not gain traction until there were corresponding social circumstances
making this particular democratic action beneficial to the institution. Thus, televising
Congress represented an intersection between Congress's institutional need for power and
an individual members' longing for a more democratic institution. Once the issue was
officially undertaken by a committee, this relationship would prove to hold contradictions
that would determine the form of Congressional television.
It's Official: Form a Committee
In 1972 Representative Jack Brooks, acting as vice-chair of the Joint Committee
on Congressional Operations, ordered the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service to
"prepare a study of congressional capacity for utilizing the communications media more
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effectively in communicating to the American people."154 The purpose of the study, titled
"Congress and Mass Communications: An Institutional Perspective," was to:
(1) Describe the existing imbalance between Executive and Legislative Branch
communications capacities,
(2) Identify and analyze some of the consequences of this imbalance; and
(3) Suggest and evaluate various ways that Congress might more effectively
communicate the meaning of its constitutional role and daily activities to
the American people. 155
As the title states, the report was from an institutional perspective-how Congress, not
US society, could benefit by improving its use of mass communication. The point of
increasing Congressional use of mass media, as far as Congressmen and women were
concerned, was to remedy the imbalance between Congress and the President.
Constitutionally, Congress, the President and the Supreme Court are considered coequals,
but the study found that by putting ".. .its resources to more effective use in the exercise of
presidential and executive power duties," the executive branch was able to gain social
power beyond the other two branches of the government. 156 The study doesn't to offer
specific examples of the social damage caused by this "dangerous" imbalance, but in the
historical context of the late 60's and early 70's, examples of unchecked executive power
were readily available.
154. Joint Committee on Congressional Operations, Congress and Mass Communications: An
Institutional Perspective, a study conducted by The Congressional Research Organization, 93rd Cong., 2nd
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On February 7, 1973 the Senate unanimously voted to form a committee to
investigate the political scandal called Watergate. The first Watergate hearing was held
May 17, 1973. The committee was open to cameras and gavel-to-gavel coverage was
available to television viewers meeting from the beginning to the end. All three networks
dedicated live coverage the first five days. On the sixth day, the networks worked out a
pool rotation, with each commercial network responsible for broadcasting live, gavel-to-
gavel coverage once every three days. PBS taped the hearings and replayed them at night.
For once, the legislature was able to harness the power of the media against the executive
branch. Ironically, however, the legislative branch gained positive media attention
because of the President.
Four months after Nixon resigned, the Joint Committee on Congressional
Operations reconvened its "Congress and Mass Communications" hearings to address the
issues brought up in the CRS study. These hearings would produce the legislative debate
that eventually opened the House chambers to television. The committee had started its
work well before Watergate, but its final interim report, was published after Watergate.
The committee noted "Popular cynicism about and alienation from democratic
institutions and processes were persistent and disturbing factors long before the national
consciousness began to be preoccupied with the Watergate revelations."157 While
157. Joint Committee on Congressional Operations, Broadcasting House and Senate Proceedings,
interim report of the Committee on Congress and Mass Communications with separate views, 93rd Cong.,
s,2nd sess., 1974, Committee Print 93-1458,49.
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Watergate was seldom mentioned during committee hearings, the point that Congress had
"fallen to yet another new low in public confidence," was mentioned frequently. 158
Congress Seeks Public Relations Makeover
In 1973 the Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations commissioned
the prominent pollster Louis Harris to produce a "comprehensive study on the attitudes
and expectations of Americans toward their government."159 The Harris poll revealed that
the American public knew very little about the operations of Congress, and what the
public knew about Congress, it did not like. Elected officials were distressed that
Americans lacked basic knowledge of government structure. Senator Edmund Muskie,
who chaired the Intergovernmental Relations subcommittee that commissioned the poll,
found the public knowledge about Congress "uniformly discouraging."16o Rather than
condemn the quality of primary and secondary education civics instruction, Congress
became self reflexive; seeing the issue as one of failed public relations. In its simplest
form, the Harris study, and subsequent Gallup polls, revealed Congress had reached a
historical nadir in public confidence by late 1974. Part of the solution members proposed
to this problem was to reassess the way Congress used and interacted with mass media.
With the Harris study, the work begun by the Joint Committee on Congressional
Operations became increasingly pertinent. The time was ripe for reassessing Congress
158. Congress and Mass Communications: An Institutional Perspective, 45.
159. Ibid., 12.
160. Ibid..
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and television. Committee Chairman Senator Metcalf laid out the three questions the
committee would seek answers to:
1) How can the institutional role and activities of Congress be more fully and
accurately covered in the news media?
2) How can spokesmen for Congress gain direct access more readily to the
broadcast media to present congressional points of view?
3) What additional facilities, staff, and other supporting services, if any, are
required to provide Congress with more adequate institutional capability in
the area of mass communications?161
Metcalf was careful to differentiate between improving public opinion and controlling
public opinion, stating that the committee "is not interested in managing the news,
Madison Avenue image making, or in packaging the Congress for a hard-sell campaign
through the media.,,162 He wanted the committee to consider ways to avoid replicating the
current situation with a "Congress that talks only to itself.,,163 Another representative
testifying before the committee urged the members to ask themselves "How do we make
our job more comprehensive, how do we get a better flow into us and a better flow out of
US?"l64 The question was not whether to open Congress to the media but how to open
Congress to the media. Television was an obvious solution and the Joint Committee
considered broadcasting floor debates. Floor sessions were a good choice logistically and
symbolically. While the lion's share of public legislative work is done in committees, the
161. Joint Committee on Congressional Operations, Congress and Mass Communications, hearings to
assess public knowledge of and satisfaction with Congress and to consider various methods for providing
full and accurate news coverage of the institutional role and activities of Congress, 93rd Congo 2nd sess.,
February 20, 1974, 2-3.
162. Congress and Mass Communications, hearings, 2.
163. Ibid., 1.
164. Ibid., 165.
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floor sessions offered advantages for television product. There was only one floor session
a day, while there may be dozens of committees simultaneously meeting in rooms spread
across the Capitol. In addition, floor sessions made sense because they are the
clearinghouse of legislation. Every bill passed by Congress is debated on the floor.
Floor sessions occurred at a set time every day and presented the best (i.e., most formal)
face of Congress. The biggest dilemma that the committee faced was balancing the
increased transparency provided by broadcasting floor sessions against the need of the
institution to manage the message going out. Broadcasters wanted full access to floor
sessions. This included the right to use their own equipment, to shoot whatever they
choose and to use as little or as much of the coverage as needed.
Legendary TV journalist Fred Friendly testified before the committee, offering
warnings about the reality of TV news: lifting the restrictions and allowing cameras into
the chambers would not guarantee coverage nor would it improve viewers' understanding
of Congress. Friendly spoke from a position of having intimate knowledge of network
public affairs coverage and also of having the courage of his convictions-in 1966 he
resigned as president of CBS News after the network chose to air reruns of I Love Lucy
instead of broadcasting live Congressional hearings on the Viet Nam War. Friendly stated
"The spectacle will always be in demand; what is required is the substance and content,
the unspectacular and sometimes dull ebb and flow of parliamentary dialog by which free
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men govern themselves. What you need is a plan of action, not just a removal of
restrictions." 165
This point was reinforced by the president of CBS, Arthur Taylor, who admitted
that giving the networks unfettered access "will not not guarantee coverage of every
congressional proceeding, or simultaneous coverage by all the networks, or any of the
other guarantees that some may wish."I66 Broadcasters continued to demand parity with
print journalists, who, because their equipment was being limited to pad and pencil, were
allowed to report from the chamber galleries.
The Congressional hearings revealed two positions: the Congressional members,
public broadcasters and media experts/academics/critics who sought gavel-to-gavel
coverage; and network broadcasters who favored ad hoc coverage facilitated by open
access to the chambers. Each side had something the other side wanted-the networks
wanted access, the members wanted coverage. It soon became clear that members of the
committee were not convinced that opening the floor chambers to TV news crews would
achieve the goal of improving the understanding of Congress.
In his testimony, media critic Ben Bagdikian simultaneously derided the members
and journalists by pointing out that "Congress institutionally has failed in a number of
critical issues, has lost the initiative to the Executive, and no policy of mass
communications or news coverage can overcome that" but that "the main fault in this lies
165. Congress and Mass Communications, hearings, 332.
166. Ibid., 88.
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with the media, most of which, in terms of individual newspapers and broadcasting
stations, accept this individual publicity from Members uncritically."167
Bagdikian's solution was familiar to anyone who had read the CRS report: "The
most immediate act Congress can take is to create a skilled, routine video recording of all
its sessions.,,168 This recording would be live, unedited, and available to anyone. This
was the process used by the United Nations with its General Assembly meetings in New
York. The UN contracted video production to an outside firm and the live unedited feed
was available to anyone willing to pay a subscription fee. Tapes were available for
purchase as well. A similar to a process was already underway at the state level. The
president of WJCT, Florida's public broadcasting station, testified that people were "sick
of one-way communication with documentaries giving a producer's thoughts-of news
on the hour, giving 5-minute capsules on such things as war, inflation, and energy-of
editorials and 3D-second analysis-of congressional action in the newspapers via Kiwanis
and Rotary speeches."169 WJCT was one of the first television stations to air gavel-to-
gavel coverage of a state legislature.
Gavel-to-gavel coverage was the preferred option of the committee going into the
hearings and network broadcasters eventually confessed that if there was a government-
produced feed available to them, they would make use of it. In the final committee
167. Congress and Mass Communications, hearings, 244-45.
168. Ibid., 245.
169. Ibid., 231.
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report, a one year test of gavel-to-gavel broadcasts was recommended. The test signal
would only be available to members via a closed circuit cable system in their capitol
offices. At the end of 60 days, if the committee found that the test to be a success,
network broadcasters would be allowed to tap the signal. It was suggested that PBS be
contacted to see if they would be interested in consulting in the system's construction and
running the test. Video tapes would be archived and made available to broadcasters and
educational institutions. The 93rd Congress adjourned before any action was taken on the
committee findings.
In retrospect, the 1974 Congress and Mass Communications hearings of the Joint
Committee on Congressional Operations brought up many themes that related to the
C-SPAN model. Senator Walter Mondale said if the goal was to create a public relations
effort that he'd be against it and the public would see right through it. He felt that the
public would "want to see the raw data, they want to see the raw truth, they want to see us
in action, they want to see what happens behind those closed doors, and then they want to
make up their own minds."170 The closest thing to "raw data" of Congressional action
would be gavel-to-gavel video. From the perspective of the committee, gavel-to-gavel
video provided a workable solution to avoid the perception of government propaganda-
if coverage was standardized, focusing on the person speaking, and only the person
speaking, (no "reaction" or "color" shots of members in the chamber), it would offer a
reasonable attempt at "objective" coverage.
170. Congress and Mass Communications, hearings, 38.
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The networks were adamantly against gavel-to-gavel broadcasts for many reasons.
Primarily, it was a first amendment issue-the press chaffed at the government requiring
their coverage take a certain form. They felt that the "color" shots of members listening,
or not listening, could convey the gist of the debate far better than a shot of a member
giving a speech. Just as Congress should not restrict print journalists' choice of
adjectives, Congress should not determine a broadcaster's choice of shots. By far the
most compelling reason why broadcasters were against gavel-to-gavel broadcasts of
Congress was having to give up valuable programming slots to Congressional coverage.
Broadcasters made their money by selling advertising time. Would Congress like their
debates sponsored by Chesterfield cigarettes? Even during the most dramatic hearings
(e.g., Watergate, Viet Nam), networks chose to forgo gavel-to-gavel coverage because it
cut into revenue producing programs. The CRS report held no illusions on this point,
explaining that the chance of an average work-a-day floor session making it to air on the
networks would be slim. The network heads promised the committee they would not air
meetings gavel-to-gavel, and explained they were only interest in brief highlights.
Even public-minded PBS had no interest in airing gavel-to-gavel sessions on a
regular basis. PBS president, Hartford Gunn testified about two of his major concerns
regarding the issue of televising Congress: 1) the need to lift the restrictive rules
preventing coverage by broadcasters and 2) the possibility of Congress enacting some
compulsory coverage mandate. Gunn cautioned the members about the unintended
results of mandatory coverage. "I, for one, would believe that such compulsory
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broadcasting might contravene the freedom of the press. Compulsory broadcasting might
produce a public backlash directed not only at the broadcasters but at Congress itself."l71
Gunn concluded his testimony not suggesting what PBS could do for Congress but what it
could not do. Gunn admitted that he could not "promise any specific coverage for the
future because our programming decisions are the collective judgments of 150 licencees
who own and operate the 245 public television stations across the country...."172 Though
PBS is a public (i.e., government subsidized) broadcaster, its structure was designed to
prevent direct control of its content by the government. The government does not directly
fund television, but provides funds through the Corporation for Public Broadcasting
(CPB). President Johnson created that the CPB before creating a public broadcasting
system in the U.S. The 1967 Public Broadcasting Act specifically states the CPB "will
not be an agency or establishment of the U.S. Government."m It was designed to operate
autonomously-although the nine board members are appointed by the President and are
subject to Senate approval. The CPB is largely a grant-issuing corporation that doles out
money to producers to create programming for the network of Public Broadcasting
Stations. In another layer of autonomy, PBS itself does not produce the programming but
is a distribution network and administrator of the CPB funding. All programming seen
on PBS is produced by local PBS stations, nonprofit organizations, or independent
171. Congress and Mass Communications, hearings, 184.
172. Ibid., 184.
173. Public Broadcasting Corporation, "Public Broadcasting Act of 1967,"
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producers. e.g., Seasame Street is produced by the Sesame Workshop, a nonprofit
organization. Frontline is produced by WGBH in Boston. Even if the government
wanted PBS to carry gavel-to-gavel telecasts of Congress, it could not legally do so. It is
important to note that programming decisions are made at the local PBS station level.
These stations are "public" in that they are not commercial and receive government
support through subsidized programming, but they are not government stations.
The only other option if Congress wanted a channel would be to create a
government network. Testifying before the committee, Senator Hebert Humprey pointed
out "...there ought to be a channel, whether it is UHF, or whether it is regular television,
a channel for the Congress of the U.S., so the public can tune in anytime they want to, and
see what is going on there, and we in our offices can tune it to see what is going on.,,174
Humprey was referring to the fact many communities had low-power UHF television
stations, or available UHF licenses, which could be utilized alongside the high-power
VHF stations, which wre mostly commercial stations affiliated with the networks and
PBS. Not only would the government have to overcome propaganda criticisms, a network
of government UHF stations would need to be linked by a national system of microwave
transmission towers or leased telephone lines. Using these services (which were privately
owned) would cost millions of dollars. With the initiative to televise Congress coming
from the institution itself, not being driven by public demand, overcoming perceptions
that Congress was attempting a public relations makeover at tax payers expense would
174. Congress and Mass Communications, hearings, 47.
94
make fiscal appropriations politically difficult. Such an undertaking at a time when
public opinion of Congress was at an all time low was not prudent. However, fortunately
for Congress, a new technology was beginning to gain ground.
Cable Television
After he denounced broadcast journalism, Fred Friendly was eager to suggest that
using the broadcast networks was not the only solution. Friendly pointed out, "As the
new phenomenon of CATV [cable] develops, it will have a massive need and capacity for
relevant program material." 175 Private cable stations in local communities were using the
newly launched geosynchronous telecommunication satellites-a technology made
possible by enormous government subsidies and direct NASA research. The most
important aspect of using satellite/cable systems was that it would allow Congress to
avoid the network "gatekeepers," enable Congress to get its message out, and give local
cable systems the choice whether or not to take the signal. Such a solution served the
needs of Congress and the free market at the same time. Walter Baer, a research engineer
with the Rand Corporation, reiterated Friendly's comments, proposing that "Many cable
systems today have the channel capacity available and if Congress were to make available
the programming, I believe they would welcome this kind of programming available
relative to the benefits of a more informed electorate."176 Baer did not deride the
broadcast networks like Friendly, but advocated letting the free market decide if local
175. Congress and Mass Communications, hearings, 334.
176. Ibid., 406.
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systems were to pick up the proposed Congressional channel. However, this plan was in
opposition to the FCC's current policy requiring cable systems to set aside a local channel
for education, public access or government use.
Soon cable representatives had their day before Congress. Barry Zorthian, Vice
President of Time Inc., and National Cable Television Association (NCTA) board
member, reminded the committee that broadcasters had said their networks have neither
the time nor capacity for Congressional television. Five years before C-SPAN would
transmit its first cablecast, Zorthian said "CATV, with its vast channel capacity does not
have such limitations. It is not ruled by the tyranny of the single channeL In many areas
-including the yet unbuilt major urban centers-cable could have the ability to offer
gavel-to-gavel attention, if warranted, to virtually any congressional activity, either in the
two chambers of the Capitol or in any committee hearing rooms.,,177 While Zorthian
gushed over the potential of cable, when asked if cable systems would dedicate a channel
to Congress, he became evasive: "I'd endorse that, Mr. Chairman, I think the industry as a
whole would be very happy to be responsive"178 The cable industry was eager to gain a
leg up on the broadcasters, but at the same time did not want its hands bound by
programming agreements until channel capacity and customer subscriptions were
established. By bringing in cable television representative, the committee had switched
the focus of the hearings from editorial control involved with producing the signal to
telecommunications infrastructure-how the signal would be distributed.
177. Congress and Mass Communications, hearings, 412.
178. Ibid., 419.
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Ultimately the CRS study and the Congress and Mass Communications hearings
of the Joint Committee on Congressional Operations undertook the yeoman's work of
identifying potential technical and political problems in televising Congressional floor
sessions. Anticipating the impeachment trial of Richard Nixon, the Senate and House
voted, by overwhelming margins, to allow floor sessions to be televised when the
impeachment procedures unfolded in 1974. The Senate installed cameras in its chambers
in preparation. After Nixon resigned, the Senate cameras were used to broadcast the
swearing in of Vice President Nelson Rockefeller. But the cameras were promptly
removed after the ceremony. Cameras would not return to the Senate floor for twelve
more years. The House did not install cameras for the trials but within five years would
broadcast regular floor sessions.
The first phase of this process involved the the Joint Committee, whose work
largely revolved around feasibility and desirability of televising Congress. The next
phrase was the implementation of the proposals. It is at this stage that institutional
politics dramatically surfaced, as the Speaker's early tacit approval of the concept turned
to opposition. It took longer for cameras to come to the House floor because of the
leadership, not the rank and file members. As the debate continued, the focus shifted
from infrastructure back to editorial control and it became clear that there was a power
struggle between the Democratic Speaker, the powerful Democratic Chairmen, and the
Republican minority.
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Congressional Power Struggles
The Ninety-fourth Congress opened with two resolutions calling for televising the
House chamber: HR 110, submitted by Representative John Anderson, and a month later,
HR 269 submitted by Representative Jack Brooks. Brooks was vice-chairman of the Joint
Committee on Congressional Operations that had conducted the Congress and Mass
Communications hearings during the previous session. The committee's chair, Senator
Lee Metcalf, submitted an identical resolution in the Senate. Anderson's HR no
authorized the House Speaker to conduct a test, while HR 269 was more substantial,
calling for the House to accept the Joint Operations Committee's recommendations for a
test of a UN-style gavel-to-gavel system. Brooks was dubious about turning the broadcast
over to the commercial networks and favored a system controlled by the House. Within
the House, Brooks proposed to give oversight responsibility for the broadcasts, not to the
Speaker, but to his own Commission on Information and Facilities. HR 269 was sent to
the House Rules Committee where two days of hearings were held, and then moved to a
subcommittee created by the Speaker to specifically deal with the issue, and called the Ad
Hoc Subcommittee on Broadcasting, chaired by B.F. Sisko
Sisk's committee killed HR 269 and submitted a new proposal (HR 875) for
House Television. HR 875 rejected a system operated and controlled by the House,
favoring a network pool arrangement in which the House would contract out production
to the four networks. Chairman Sisk stated, "The cost of an in-house operation is one of
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the first things that I think caused us to move in the direction of a contract concept.,,179
Brooks rejected this claim, saying that HR 875 "elevates the commercial interests of the
networks above the interests of the Congress itself and of public service institutions like
the Library of Congress, depository libraries, and educational institutions.,,18o Brooks'
HR 269 had made provisions for supplying tapes to schools and to allow public archiving
of the proceedings.
This was not the first time that a member expressed doubts about corporate
broadcasters' dedication to public service. Previously, Senator Herbert Humphrey
expressed dismay that members were basing Congressional reform on the mantra of
"efficiency." Humphrey explained that efficiency is not an end, but a means to the real
purpose of government, which he claimed was more about "justice," "love," "sharing,"
"brotherhood" and "service." He reminded the members of the Joint Committee on
Congressional Operations that "...we are not a corporation, we are not a business. [...J
The purpose of business is to make a profit, provide service, or a commodity to make a
profit." 181 Whether or not those who wanted to keep the House telecasts in the hands of
the government were motivated by the high public-minded ideals expressed by Humprey,
or were acting out of fear of losing control of the information reaching citizens, the issue
of ownership was fundamental. Congressional members cared about who controlled the
179. The House Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Broadcasting of the Committee on Rules, Television and
Radio Coverage of the House, hearings on H. Res. 875 and related H. Res. 269, 94th Congo 1st sess.,
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signals. Brooks expressed concern that HR 875 "Grants to four networks a virtual
monopoly over the sale and distribution of the coverage of House proceedings" 182
Anticipating incidents such as ColbertlPelosi one mentioned previosly, Brooks worried
about who would own the telecasts. He wanted any tape or telecast of Congress to be
public property. Interestingly, this particular problem would be dealt with in a subsequent
amendment that made all ownership and rights to tapes and signal part of the public
domain.
In February 1976, the Ad Hoc Subcommittee drafted a version of HR 875 that
created a supervisory Broadcast Advisory Board within the House Rules Committee.
House leadership (Speaker Carl Albert and Majority Leader Tip O'Neil) had previously
offered no opposition to the idea of House television. However, they stepped in when it
looked like the committee's resolution would be accepted. 183 The Speaker believed the
resolution "did not adequately protect the Speaker's authority to control the House
chamber and that it gave too much power to the television network,,184 The subcommittee
learned its lesson, met with the House leadership, and negotiated a new version of the
bill. The revised version of HR 875 specified that the Speaker would appoint members to
an advisory oversight committee that would decide what form the broadcasts would
182. Congress and Mass Communications, hearings, 9.
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take. 18S When the resolution went before the full Rules Committee, however, it was
revised again. The newest version may have granted the committee authority to chose any
form of broadcast, but it clearly gave preferential attention to the network pool option.
The push for government controlled broadcasts may have been prompted by an
internal political battle, but proponents of public ownership emphasized important
political economic concepts, namely that ownership equals control. Opponents of the
pool plan attempted to frame the discussion in these terms: should such a resource be
controlled by the market or a public institution? Meanwhile, proponents of a private
network pool argued that a private contract would save taxpayer money.
When the revised HR 875 returned to the full Rules Committee, Ad Hoc
Subcommittee Chairman Sisk argued that the House should reject government run
broadcasts in order to avoid "...anything smacking in any way of censorship,"186
Representative Richard Bolling agreed that censorship was a concern and needed to be
avoided at all costs, "But the fact remains, however, that there is a difference between
private ownership of equipment and the public ownership of equipment and the private
control and the public control.,,187 So fearful of government produced video becoming
propaganda, members were eager to have the private sector take over responsibility for
broadcasting Congress, even after the industry made it clear that the market would not
185. House Committee on Rules, Television and Radio Coverage of the House, hearings to consider
recommendations of Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Broadcasting regarding H. Res. 875, 94th Congress, 2nd
Session. March 24, 1976, 10.
186. Television and Radio Coverage of the House hearings, 1976, 16.
187. Ibid..
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support gavel-to-gavel broadcasts, which was Congress members' preferred form of
coverage.
In a last ditch effort, the Ad Hoc Subcommittee once more revised the resolution
(now HR 1502), using language more in line with the speaker's wishes. However, House
Rules chairman, Ray Madden refused to move the bill forward and it died in committee as
the Ninety Fourth Congress adjourned. During the interim, the Architect of the Capitol
and the House Commission on Information and Facilities conducted experiments with
black and white security cameras.
The Ninety Fifth Congress began with the House electing a new speaker, Thomas
"Tip" O'Neil. As House Majority Leader in the previous session, O'Neil had ordered the
Ad Hoc Committee to kill HR 1502. This was prompted by political infighting among
the majority party more than a formal attempt to prevent televised floor sessions. Speaker
Albert and Majority Leader O'Neil had killed television efforts based on the committee's
continued pursuit of a professional pool arrangement where the cameras would be
controlled by the broadcast networks-something the House leadership did not want.
Two months into the 95th Congress, on March 2, 1977, O'Neil issued a press
release announcing that the House would conduct a 90 day test of television coverage of
floor proceedings. This move proved that leadership was not philosophically opposed to
television cameras in the chambers, but wanted control, above all else. In the release, the
Speaker made it clear that "...he felt it was most important the House maintain control of
the evolution of this process to assure that any disturbance to the nature and character of
102
the House proceedings be minimized...."188 The test would also form "...the basis for the
eventual video coverage of the House for dissemination to the public." The Speaker did
not open up the press galleries to broadcasters' cameras, believing the proposed system
would eventually " ...provide the quality of coverage that would meet existing commercial
television standards."189
The test used the same three black and white cameras utilized in the interim
experiments, upgrading the system by adding robotic pan and tilt mounts, a video
generator (to allow split screen) and a character generator for adding text information.
The equipment was installed and operated by the House staff. All equipment, except for
the video generator, was borrowed from other House applications. Broadcasting
magazine, lamented the House's use of an "unsophisticated system that falls short of the
quality that modern color cameras and monitors can provide," yet admitted, "it is at least
a start.,,190 The signal went to select offices via a closed-circuit system within the
Rayburn House Office Building. In his announcement to the House floor, the Speaker
made it quite clear that the signal was not to be transmitted beyond the building, and that
he expected Representatives to honor this request and not smuggle out tapes to
broadcasters.
188. House Select Committee on Congressional Operations, Televising the House, communication
from The Chairman, Select Committee on Congressional Operations, to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Transmitting the Report of the Select committee on the Conduct of the 90-Day test of
Broadcast coverage of they daily floor proceedings of the House. Together with recommendations for the
future of broadcast coverage, September 27, 1977. Committee Print 95-231,33
189. Televising the House, Communication to the Speaker, 33.
190. Profile. "Heavyweight on the Hill: Sen. Ernst C. Hollings," Broadcasting, March 28, 1977, 121.
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On March 15, 1977, the Select Committee on Congressional Operations, chaired
by Brooks in conjunction with the Architect of the Capitol, began the 90-day test. At this
point, televising the House came down to a partisan issue of who would control the
cameras. On one side were the Speaker and Jack Brooks, chairman of the Joint
Committee on Government Operations, both Democrats. On the other side was John
Anderson, a member of the House Rules Committee and a Republican. While the
Speaker had the power to authorize television coverage, the House rules would have to be
amended, a process that could only occur in Anderson's House Rules Committee.
Anderson opposed a House-run system and proposed HR 404, authorizing the House
Rules Committee, not the Joint Committee, to evaluate the 90-day test and decide
whether the signal would be made available to the public. However, this move was moot
-all House rules changes would have to go through the Rules Committee eventually but
Anderson wanted his committee, not Brooks Joint Committee, to get the first ShOt. 191 As
indicated by the fate of Anderson's bills in the previous session, the Democratic
leadership-who favored a House-run system-had the votes to implement the changes
they preferred. Anderson was playing the partisan spoiler, or perhaps, hoping to launch a
last ditch campaign for a commercial pool system.
After the 90-day period, the Select Committee on Congressional Operations
evaluated the test, paying particular attention to the Speaker's wish to determine the
191. Inside Congress, "House Begins Closed Circuit TV Test," Congressional Quarterly, March 19,
1977, 13.
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"suitability of a House television system for public broadcast purposes."192 As one of its
findings, the committee report states: "Television coverage of the House proceedings-
complete, uninterrupted, unedited-is inevitable: a large majority of the general public
desires it, and a substantial majority of Members of the House support it." The last
statement was accompanied by a formal survey of House members. It seemed the that
time for television in the House had finally arrived. The only limit that the committee put
on the footage from the floor was that it not be used for "commercial advertising or
political purposes." The committee recommended that the Speaker extend the 90-day test
to the remainder of the first session of the 95th Congress (through December 1977), and
that the House vote on a resolution to permanently televise the House beginning in the
second session of the 95th Congress (January 1978). The final matter of who would
control the cameras was clearly stipulated by one of the provisions of the proposed
resolution. Although those members surveyed preferred oversight by a House committee,
the Select Committee recommended that control of the coverage should be vested solely
in the Speaker. While the committee recommended both live feeds and tapes be made
available to any media outlet accredited by the House Radio-TV Gallery, there was no
formal plan to ensure that the public would be able to view the coverage. The House
would begin televising its floor proceedings, but distribution of the signal was to be
handled however the networks saw fit. This catch-as-catch-can distribution plan made no
192. Televising the House: Communication to the Speaker, 1
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mention of cable television. The House had what it wanted: a television signal controlled
by the House. Getting the signal to the public was not a priority.
The Birth of C-SPAN
During this time period C-SPAN's future founder, Brian Lamb, had moved out of
his job as the spokesperson for Nixon's controversial Office of Telecommunications
Policy and was reporting for cable trade magazines. As the test wound up and the Select
Committee made its recommendations, Lamb met with an Arlington, Virginia, cable
system owner, John Evans, who was Lamb's first interviewee for the cable business trade
magazine, CATV Weekly. The topic of Lamb's first article was "the importance of
Arlington Cable was going to be to the regulatory process here in D.C.."193 The magazine
editors recognized that having a vibrant cable system across the river from Washington,
D.C. would be useful in demonstrating the value of cable television to legislators and
regulators alike. Lamb had envisioned the need for an all-public affairs cable network,
but his original concept was quite different than the C-SPAN we are familiar with. His
proposed network was a place for long-form interviews and political analysis, but was
also open to other forms of programming. Evans, like most other cable operators in the
mid 1970's, was looking for ways to expand program offerings. Evans knew about the
black and white House cameras and mused out loud about how he'd love to tap that signal
193. Brian Lamb, interviewed by Jim Keller, September 26, 1998, transcript, The Hauser Oral and
Video History Collection, The Cable Center, Denver Co.,
http://www.cablecenter.org/education/library/oralHistoryDetails.cfm?id=132
106
and offer it on his system.194 Since many legislators lived in Arlington, the House
proceedings would have an audience eager to watch (assuming they subscribed to cable).
By adding the House coverage, Evans could expand his subscriber base and more
importantly, gain a higher profile among those who controlled his fate through
regulations. Lamb and Evans realized that the House telecasts would also have an
audience beyond the Washington D.C. area and began to make plans to raise money for
wider distribution. Lamb revised his original concept to feature live gavel-to-gavel
coverage of legislative debate, and Evans offered Lamb the use of his microwave
transmitter and cable "head-end" to get the signal from the Capitol to a satellite uplink.
House 90 Day Test
While Lamb began working on securing cable operator's support for the coverage,
the Select Committee's recommendations from the test were crafted into HR 821 and sent
to the Rules Committee, who held two days of hearings. During these hearings, the
committee watched tapes of the 90-day test and heard (again) from broadcasters. The
committee then amended HR 821 to HR 866, which included all the components of the
original resolution but added a clause that authorized the Rules Committee to conduct a
study of alternative ways to control the television system. The committee stated that the
amendment was for the Speaker's benefit but, in reality, it was a transparent attempt to
194. Stephen E. Frantzich and John Sullivan, The C-SPAN Revolution, Norman OK: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1996,31.
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force the issue of pool coverage one last time. 195 House leadership accepted the
amendment because, unlike Jack Brooks' Government Operations committee, the Rules
Committee (including several Democrats) was not overwhelmingly behind the concept of
televising the House in any form. The Rules Committee chairman, James Delaney, was
known to be "hostile" to the idea of House television. 196 Thus the "study alternatives"
amendment was mere postering-it was generally known that the committee would "bow
to the wishes of the leadership."197 Since the resolution still gave the Speaker ultimate
power over the telecasts (including the form they would take), there was no harm for
leadership to placate a small faction in the party.
Floor Debate
HR 866 was reported to the floor and debated October 27, 1977. Members
recognized that "Television coverage of the House proceedings-complete, uninterrupted,
unedited-is inevitable..."198 and the debate centered on the "how rather than the why."199
195. Ronald Garay, Congressional television: A Legislative History, (Contributions in political
science, no. 111, Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1984), 103.
196. Inside Congress, "Public Vote for Televising Set for Vote in Committee," Congressional
Quarterly, October 22, 1977,2281.
197. Ibid..
198. Providing for Radio and Television Coverage ofHouse Proceedings, HR 866, 95th Cong., 1st
sess., Congressional Record 123, (October 27, 1977): H 35428
199. Ibid., H 35432.
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Television in the House was now assured, and hyperbolic rhetoric was kept surprisingly
brief for such an historic action.
Nevertheless, the pro-pool Republicans gave it one last try. Anderson, whose ad
hoc committee had favored pool coverage, stressed that the resolution up for debate "does
not commit the House or the Speaker to one means of coverage or another...."200 The
chairman of the House committee on Rules, Representative Sisk, however, made it clear
to members that whatever their opinions on the form of coverage, HR 866
Directs the Speaker to develop a system of broadcasting and recording the
daily proceedings of the House, to make that coverage available to the
news media and the public, and to provide for storage of the recordings. It
authorizes him to delegate those responsibilities. It requires coverage to be
complete and unedited. And it prohibits the use of broadcast coverage for
political purposes and for advertising purposes20l
Sisk was reminding members, that whether or not they favored a commercially controlled
pool or a House-run system, this was the resolution that would eventually bring television
to the House, and that killing the resolution would kill house television until the next
session. Actually, HR 866 merely authorized the Speaker to develop a system, not to
implement one, but the resolution was passed, 342 in favor and 44 opposed.
Cable Opens the Door, C-SPAN Steps In
Near the end of this debate, Representative Lionel Van Deerlin asked how the
public-who had become a tertiary participant in this process-would actually get the
200. Providing for Radio and Television Coverage ofHouse Proceedings, 35432.
201. Ibid..
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signal. "Gavel-to-gavel coverage of the House and Senate proceedings, [... ] will be
available at times and to an extent that no commercial station, certainly no network, could
or would provide. It is not within their economic capacity,,202 Van Deerlin proposed that a
new distribution technology, satellite transmission to cable would allow the House to take
a step "toward restoring the Government of this land to its own people."
Interestingly, there was a direct connection between Van Deerlin and Brian Lamb.
When Lamb was a staffer for Nixon's Office of Telecommunications Policy he worked
with Van Deerlin, who was then vice-chairman of the House Communications
Committee. After becoming chairman, Van Deerlin made it a priority to rewrite the
Communications Act. Under Van Deerlin's leadership, the Communications Act of 1976
started cable's regulatory "thaw." According to an interview with Lamb, he had visited
Van Deerlin on the morning of October 27, 1977, to interview him for Cablevision
magazine. When Lamb entered Van Deerlin's office, the representative was watching the
signal from the House floor test cameras..203 After the interview, Lamb floated the idea
of cable television providing distribution of the House signal once a permanent telecast
was established. Van Deerlin loved the idea and asked Lamb to write him a speech when
HR 866 carne up for debate. That afternoon Van Deerlin called Lamb from the House
floor and informed him that the resolution had been moved up and was being debated at
202. Providing for Radio and Television Coverage ofHouse Proceedings, 35433.
203. Brian Lamb, interviewed by Jim Keller.
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that moment. According to Lamb, he fed Van Deerlin basic figures about the industry
and the Representative developed an impromptu speech.
This was far from a coordinated lobbying effort by the cable industry to win the
House telecasts because, at that point, Lamb was having trouble getting cable operators to
buy into his network. Lamb later recalled, "There was a tremendous amount of rejection.
People would pat you on the head, and say, 'Nice little boy, keep it up, Brian."204 One
early supporter of Lamb was Bob Rosencrans, owner of VA/Columbia CableVision, who
was looking for programming to fill satellite space and liked Lamb's idea for a meet-the-
press style political events network. As previously mentioned, Rosencrans promised
Lamb $25,000 and allowed Lamb to use his name to solicit additional industry support.
Also noted previously, Lamb was having difficulty selling his idea. Then, the House
voted to allow television. Lamb went back to Rosencrans and pitched the idea of a gavel-
to-gavel coverage of the House. Rosencrans loved the idea and so did many other
industry leaders. It's interesting to note that C-SPAN was a network started on
speculation. Lamb pitched the idea of cable transmitting House signal to Van Deerlin and
Van Deerlin pitched the idea of cable to the House of Representatives before cable
industry executives even thought about the idea, let alone gave their approval. Once the
House telecasts were obtainable, the cable industry warmed to the idea.
Meanwhile, after the debate, the House Speaker called Van Deerlin into his office
and quizzed him about the cable distribution. Van Deerlin referred the Speaker to Lamb,
204. James Lardner, Annals of the Media, "The Anti-Network," The New Yorker, March 14, 1994,53.
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who pushed to gain industry support before meeting with the O'Neil. One of his first
steps was to meet with Bob Schmit and Tom Wheeler of the National Cable and
Telecommunications Association (the industry's largest trade and lobbying organization).
It was actually Schmit who arranged for Lamb to meet O'Neil. In a brief meeting with
the Speaker, Lamb procured approval-through a handshake-for C-SPAN to take the
House feed and disseminate it to cable systems via satellite. Though O'Neil was not
excited about televising the House proceedings, he realized it was something "...he ought
to get out in front of, and not get run overrun by, so he could in fact control it.,,205 He had
been urged by his media advisor, Jerry Colbert, not to allow a network pool scenario
where he lost control and would "surrender to a few network individuals in New York.,,206
Years later O'Neil would write "the results of our broadcasting experiment have exceeded
my wildest hopes,,207 But it was clear at the time that he little understood little about
cable technology or the arrangement he was entering into.208 What he did understand was
that cable allowed him to bypass the broadcasters who consistently "demeaned and
humiliated" legislators in their Congressional coverage. If nothing else, C-SPAN was a
chance for Congress to finally "spit in the eye of the network news people."209 It seemed
205. John Aloysius Farrell, Tip O'Neil and the Democratic Century, (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 2001), 630.
206. Ibid., 629
207. Tip O'Neil and William Novak, Man ofthe House: The Life and Political Memoirs ofSpeaker
Tip O'Neill, (New York: Random House, 1987),289.
208. Farrell, 630.
209. Lardner, 53.
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that C-SPAN would deliver the best of all possible scenarios: the network was eager for
the footage, would run the telecasts in their entirety, would cost the legislators nothing for
distribution, and allowed Congress to do an end-run around the broadcast networks.
When he originally publicly announced the 90-day test, O'Neil told reporters that public
dissemination of the House television was "inevitable."210 It is possible to say that
C-SPAN made the inevitable, acceptable to most everyone.
House Rules Committee Study
Once HR 866 passed in October 1977, the House Rules Committee had until
February 1978 to complete its study. While the Committee studied the options,
Anderson and Sisk wrote editorials about their pool system proposal that appeared in the
Washington Post and New York Times. Broadcasters remained "disdainful" of a
House-run system that would only feature preset camera angles and attempted to
influence the chairman of the Rules subcommittee charged with conducting the test.
Chairman Long insinuated that a House controlled system was all but certain, and the
Speaker had already authorized the Architect of the Capitol to lay cables and set up
equipment for the system, even though cameras had yet to be purchased.2l1 The Speaker
made no secret of his intentions, stating "I think it would be a terrible mistake to take
210. In Brief. "House of Representatives Launches Closed Circuit TV Broadcast," Broadcasting,
March 21, 1977, 30.
211. Broadcast Journalism, "It looks like a fait accompli on House Cameras," Broadcasting,
December 5, 1977, 51.
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from the members of the Congress, from leadership and give to national broadcasting
control of the House.,,212
When the final Rules committee report was issued, it was clear that the Speaker
had been able to maintain his control. The report's first recommendation was that "The
House should operate its own broadcast coverage system following the example and
building upon the experience of the Canadian Parliament.,,213
The report also recommended that the Speaker delegate responsibility for
oversight and administration of the broadcast system to a committee. Van Deerlin and
Lamb had obviously made an impression on the committee because the report's final
recommendation was that the Speaker "develop a plan for satellite transmission of House
broadcast coverage." The reasoning: "Since cable television has an abundance of
channels, it would have the capacity to provide gavel-to-gavel coverage of congressional
floor proceedings." The report concluded by stating that cable television "presents an
exciting possibility to distribute the proceedings" and recommended that the Speaker
make cable satellite transmission "a high priority." Broadcasters were not pleased with
the report's preference for a House-run system and were hopeful the House would vote for
allowing network news cameras in the press galleries so they could shoot their own
212. Anne Cooper, Inside Congress, "No Sideline Shots: House Gets Set to Televise Sessions With Its
Own Hand on the Cameras." Congressional Quarterly, December 17, 1977,2605.
213. House Committee on Rules, report on "Broadcasting the Proceedings of the House," 95th Cong.,
2nd sess., February 15, 1978, Committee Print 95-881, 2.
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footage. 214 While the Speaker had the authority to implement the system, he had publicly
said he would allow the House members to vote on what system they desired.
On June 14, 1978 the House met into the evening to debate an appropriations bill,
which included half a million dollars for new color mini-cameras to be installed in the
chambers, replacing the black and white security cameras. Months earlier, during the
holiday season, O'Neil appeared on "Meet the Press" and "Face the Nation," stating that
he wanted a House-run system but would allow the members to vote on the issue.
Representative Anderson pointed out that by asking for an appropriation to buy color
cameras, the decision had already been made in favor of a House-run system. Any vote,
he felt, would be moot. To prove his point, he offered an amendment whereby no funds in
the act could be used to purchase color television equipment for the purpose of
broadcasting the House, except "by the prior approval of the House and in accordance
with the provisions of House Resolution 866."215 Since the Appropriations Committee
had already approved the Speaker's request and cameras had been purchased, Anderson's
amendment was meant to make the political point that the Speaker had overstepped his
authority. Anderson argued that by buying cameras the Speaker was violating HR 866
which allowed him to make a decision about broadcasting after the Rules committee
offered its report on February 15, 1978. The Speaker had made arrangements to buy the
cameras as early as November 1977. Because the Rules Committee report came out in
214. Editorial, "Better Way," Broadcasting, February 13, 1978, 130.
215. Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, HR 1293, 17657.
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favor of a House-run system, many members recognized that Anderson's efforts were "...a
thinly disguised attempt to obtain through an appropriations bill what the gentleman has
not been able to obtain for the past four years through his own committee..."216 It was
quite clear that the vote would be along partisan lines. The Republican preference for a
pool system as it was embodied in Anderson's amendment was roundly defeated.
The Democrats then used Anderson's own technique against him and his party,
immediately proposing an amendment wherein "No funds in this bill may be used to
implement a system for televising and broadcasting the proceedings of the House
pursuant to House Resolution 866, 95th Congress, under which the TV cameras in the
Chamber are controlled and operated by persons not in the employ of the House.,,217
The amendment was accepted 235 to 150.
Republicans had attempted to frame the debate in terms of the First Amendment
and government censorship. In their minds limiting television journalists to a government
controlled feed that only featured shots that the government wanted was the same as
telling print journalists what words they could use to report on Congress. One self-
described conservative member said he'd rather put his trust in the "left of center"
commercial network reporters because "...competition, giving both sides is their life
blood." It was a classic rephrasing of the marketplace of ideas concept begun with John
Stuart Mill's liberalism and integrated into American jurisprudence by Oliver Wendell
Holmes. Under the concept, false or misleading ideas will constantly be tested for
216. Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, HR 1293, 17658.
217. Ibid., 17661.
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veracity against competing truths in a free and open forum for exchange. In such a
system, censorship will never work unless one media source has a monopoly on the
outlets of information. Republicans were positing that the government, by controlling
the telecasts, would have a monopoly on the information and censorship would be
uncontested.
Democrats argued that an in-house system represented the House living up to its
responsibilities to make sure the public was informed. A commercial system of
journalism, they argued, was more conducive to selling products than informing the
public. One member succinctly told colleagues if they thought about the priorities of a
commercial media "they will vote for the House to control the time, not the dog food and
not the toothpaste.,,218
While there was plenty of concern about democratizing the production of the
House telecasts, there was little debate about the distribution. Almost half a year earlier,
in January, Lamb and O'Neil had reached an agreement allowing C-SPAN to carry the
telecasts on cable. Al Gore, a committee member on Van Deerlin's Communications
Subcommittee, was the only one to bring up possible distribution of the signal, saying he
was "familiar with the exciting new possibilities that cable television and direct satellite
broadcasting offer.,,219 Broadcasting magazine labeled Gore's comments as on outright
"plug" for cable Tv.220 Gore continued saying "...the important priority is to get the
218. Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, HR 1293, 17660.
219. Ibid, 17662.
220. Top of the Week, "It's Official: House Will Control Cameras," Broadcasting, June 19, 1978,34.
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proceedings of this house on television... ," and at that point, cable was the only game in
town.
Interestingly, while many representatives were concerned about private control of
the cameras, they were not troubled by private control of cable television. C~SPAN was
the ideal outlet, as far as the legislature was concerned. It was voluntarily asking for the
signal, would transmit the entire sessions gavel-to-gavel without editing or commentary,
was not charging for its services, and would reach a national audience. On top of it all,
since it was non-commercial, there was no risk of editorial decisions being made by
advertisers of dog food and toothpaste.
Legislators Promote Cable
In May 1978, the NCTA (Nation Cable Television Association) held its 27th annual
convention in New Orleans, with Speaker O'Neil was providing opening remarks. The
conference is a major venue for cable television equipment and programming sales, and
one of the new services being offered was C-SPAN. By 1978 the network went from a
fanciful idea to a viable programming service, promoted by the Speaker of the House.
The price to cable operators interested was estimated to be one cent per subscriber. Even
though the only programming Lamb had yet secured was the House live signal, there was
already immense interest in the network as most of the of the top ten cable MSOs had
singed up before the convention.221
221. Special Report: NCTA Convention, "From House to House," Broadcasting, May 8, 1978,49.
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In the remaining nine months before the House launched its first live telecast of
regular floor sessions, the Speaker charged the Speaker's House Advisory Committee on
Broadcasting to setup and test the new system. In what was most likely an attempt at
extending an olive branch, the House invited the broadcast networks to consult about
technical concerns. In what can only be described as an open grudge, the commercial
networks unanimously declined to participate. One network head was frustrated that the
House had been so "insensitive to the principle" of journalists' autonomy by voting for a
House-run system.222 Meanwhile, Washington D.C.'s PBS station, WETA, offered their
engineering services. Since the station indirectly relied on Congressional funding. A
move that might be viewed as politically expedient. The House also ended up contracting
camera, lighting and sound design to outside consulting firms.
From this brief history of Congressional television, it is apparent that C-SPAN
resulted from an existing movement to open Congress to television cameras. Congress
did not enter into any sort of contract with C-SPAN to distribute its signal, but the House
provided the televised floors sessions and the cable industry (through C-SPAN) was there
to pick it up. This voluntary action by cable would form the cornerstone of the industry's
concept of the network and the industry's future lobbying efforts. From the perspective
of the cable industry, C-SPAN was the product of the market, not government
interference.
222. Closed Circuit, "They Won't Play," Broadcasting, October 9, 1978,9.
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Conclusion
The creation myth surrounding C-SPAN highlights the efforts of the cable
industry and diminishes efforts of Congress. As has been established, C-SPAN was
specifically created to take advantage of the House television signals begun in 1979. It is
an unavoidable fact that without C-SPAN, the general populace may not have had any
sustained exposure to unedited footage of the House floor sessions. Broadcasters did not
want to air lengthy segments and Congress was not interested in forming a government
controlled system of television stations. Cable operators stepped in an relieved the House
of the burden. C-SPAN was an ideal solution, because it was eager for the
government-controlled footage, would not charge the to distribute the signal, and would
show the entire sessions. It becomes clear, Congressmen and women, even if they held
doubts about private control of distribution, were not going to look a gift horse in the
mouth. From this position, the cable industry was able to present its self as providing a
service, and would not take long in exploiting this fact.
The following chapter explores the cable industry during the late 1960's through
the mid-1970's. The chapter reveals how cable television had been artificially restricted
by federal regulations. These regulations were in place to promote broadcast television,
and the broadcasters were not going to give up their powerful position without a fight. At
the same time, technological advances enabled cable systems to offer telecommunication
services beyond even what the telephone companies could manage. The concept of
"information societies" and "wired nations" began with cable systems in the 1960's.
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These capacities represented potential for social advancement. Soon, a social discourse
around cable technology developed. These so called "Blue Sky" initiatives saw cable as
an agent for social change and sought to maximize its potential. The chapter
demonstrates how these potentials were mostly based on technology and end-uses, not on
questioning models of communications infrastructure ownership. Many of the Blue Sky
advocates presumed cable's evolution through free market practices, an only a few would
bother to question ownership of cable systems. Because cable had been retarded by
regulations, the most common solution presented to allow cable to achieve its potential
was to free it from its regulatory shackles. This position will be shown to be roundly
supported by the cable industry and, eventually, would overtake any discussion of cable's
social potential. C-SPAN, with its public affairs content and private ownership structure,
would become the only real effort the industry would make towards the Blue Sky ideals.
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CHAPTER V
CABLE AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT
An almost religious faith in cable television has sprung up in the United
States. It has been taken up by organizations ofblacks, ofconsumers and
ofeducational broadcasters, by the Rand Corporation, the Ford
Foundation, the American Civil Liberties Union, the electronics industry,
the Americans for Democratic Action, the government ofNew York City
and-a tentative convert-the Federal Communications Commission. The
faith is religious in that it begins with something that was once despised-
a crude makeshift way ofbringing television to remote areas-and sees it
transformed over the opposition ofpowerful enemies into the cure for the
ills ofmodern urban American society. The intriguing thing about cable
television is that this faith may be in no way misplaced. 223
-Journalist Brenda Maddox describing cable's possibilities in 1972
Before analyzing an individual cable network, it is important to contextualize the
network within the historical development of cable television. In the late 1960's and
early 1970's, cable was not simply the hope of more channels; it was thought to be a
technological messiah, ushering in revolutionary new forms of social relationships.
Indeed, the hyperbolic discourse surrounding the Internet-from its wide-spread takeoff
223. Brenda Maddox, Beyond Babel: New Directions in Communications, (London: Andre Deutsch,
1972),145.
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in the late 1990's to its current "Web 2.0" phase-was predated by speeches made by
cable advocates. Cable was the beginning of the "wired revolution" in communications,
uniting land-based infrastructure with orbiting geosynchronous satellites and marked the
true beginnings of the "information society." A 1973 Rand report, funded by a grant from
the National Science Foundation, informed readers that it was important to pay attention
to cable because"...cab1e television is no longer a modest technique for improving rural
television reception. It is on the brink of turning into a genuine urban communication
system, with profound implications for our entire society.,,224
Blue Skies: Cable in the Late 1960's
The Rand report came at the end of what has been labeled the "Blue Sky" period of
cable. During this time the promise of cable's possibilities was taken up by "...a New
Deal [style] coalition, made up of professional groups, corporations and their intellectual
allies, and progressive political groups seeking ways to foster social change by working
'within the system.'''225 From about 1968 to 1972, a loosely organized, yet ideologically
cohesive, discourse was taking place around the role of cable in society.226 The central
tenant of the Blue Sky initiatives that was cable television represented new hope for
224. Steven R. Rivkin, Cable Television: A Guide to Federal Regulation, (Santa Monica, CA.: Rand
Cable Television Series, R-1l38-NSF, March 1973),
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social change through technological and economic innovations. And something that
far-reaching demanded deliberative analysis on how best to achieve its fullest impact.
In 1966, President Johnson appointed Nicholas Johnson (no relation) as FCC
chairman. Johnson's priority was to make the commission more "business friendly,"227
but his new chairman proved keenly interested in the public's role in cable television.
Soon after taking office, Chairman Johnson authored one of the first pieces associated
with the Blue Sky initiatives-an article for Saturday Review magazine titled "CATV:
Promise and Peril.,,228 Johnson began by stating the obvious: by the late 1960's
television's power was only matched by its ubiquitousness. Unfortunately, two groups
had been excluded from the television revolution: 1) those who lived in geographic areas
that precluded over-the-air signals, and 2) those of certain "social and intellectual
classes" whose tastes in programming were not economically viable for the mass-
marketed networks. In both cases, Johnson saw cable television as the solution. For the
geographic pariahs, pioneering community antennas solved the problem of reception. For
the intellectual pariahs, modern cable television offered the best potential for realizing
niche programming to serve the needs of individual communities and specific classes.
The "promise" of cable television, as Johnson saw it, was a vast and diverse array of
television channels to serve all viewers' needs, coupled with the potential for two-way
communication.
227. Patrick R. Parsons, Blue Skies: A History of Cable Television, (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 2008), 252.
228. Nicholas Johnson, "CATV: Promise and Peril," Saturday Review, November 11, 1967, 87.
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The "peril" of cable television was the FCC itself, according to Johnson found the
agency's regulatory structure outdated and in need of overhaul. During a time when the
"division of labor" between wired and broadcast technologies was evolving the FCC's
model of regulation, based on the Communications Act of 1934, was ill-equipped to deal
with the issue. New policies were needed. Johnson argued that, if outside voices were
not heard, (i.e., the general public), decisions about the shape of cable television would be
formed by corporate interests. Johnson clearly understood the drawbacks of pitting social
values against the economic needs of the communication industry.
It is unlikely, however, that the future of cable television will turn out to be
as splendid as all this, either in terms of economic reward for the industry,
or, more important, in terms of social gain for the public. Its fate is now
being determined in a grim political and economic struggle with the giant
interests whose prosperity and power it has challenged-the broadcast
industry and the telephone companies. As this battle unfolds, only the
CATV industry is there to speak for its own economic interests. Almost no
one speaks for the public.229
Without public guidance, Johnson lets readers know it will be a "grim political
and economic battle" between competing industrial corporations. All Blue Skies reports
and articles share the common goal of bringing about the most social good from cable.
The authors, however, diverge on the best way to achieve this goal. Johnson seemed to be
asking for both assistance and patience from the public but offers little in the way of
substantial policy positions or promises. He regularly criticized the agency's attempts at
regulating communications and acknowledged that the FCC's long standing policies were
in sympathy with broadcasters. The commission, Johnson wrote, has based its public
229. Johnson, 87.
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interest around building up lower power (and quality) UHF broadcast television stations
in communities and was having trouble integrating cable into this goal. The article was a
public relations effort by a newly appointed chairman who was careful to ask more
questions than to provide answers. Johnson was clearly trying to gain public support,
while not scaring off business interests.
One Blue Sky proposal that did scare business was to classify cable as "common
carriers." Since cable systems are natural monopolies (like telephone service), some
thought they should be regulated like these industries. Cable loathed the idea of being a
common carrier because it would entail more regulations, price controls and having to
deal with state public utility commissions. Telco's were opposed to cable being seen as a
common carrier because as a Telcommunications system, not television service, cable
could offer voice and data serVices-something Telco's had a monopoly on. As common
carriers, the cable companies would be forced to lease their cable infrastructure (via
channel space) to other entities who would supply the programming. Johnson was careful
not to place his goals before the needs of the marketplace. He wrote that the FCC would
regulate cable as a common carrier "if" the dominant Telco (AT&T) acquired a
communications monopoly through acquisitions of cable companies. He did not,
however, consider declaring cable as a common carrier through legislative fiat, but only
as a corrective to unfair market practices of telephone corporations owning cable systems.
By stating that the FCC, with its small budget and limited staff, would not be capable of
governing such a large communication system, Johnson dodged the social issues around
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what common carrier status really meant. Cable corporations would lose control of
channel capacity, either in totality or select channels set aside for public leasing. In a
capitalist communications marketplace, placing channel space under public control means
the loss of private property rights. As a political appointee, we can understand why
Johnson was not advocating complete socialization of cable systems and recognize his
efforts in presenting discourse about the dangers of industry concentration. If nothing
else, Johnson's piece served as a warning about what would happen to cable's potential if
the industry influence led the debate. "If moves are not made very soon to channel the
future growth of CATV along lines responsive to social needs, it will likely be too late.
CATV will grow in whatever direction it pleases.'mo Many would argue that cable has
done exactly that. It may be encouraging to read about a government bureaucrat warning
the public about the dangers of a private communication system but it is disheartening to
hear about his agency's political impotence against the economic might of the industries
it regulates.
Johnson's article was a sign of a social awakening to cable technology and more
importantly, how to harness communication advancements for social good. This
sentiment coincided with the spreading global protests against capitalist values occurring
in the late 1960's. And while Johnson was not advocating an overthrow of capitalism, his
hope was that "outside forces" beyond the communication industries themselves would
enter the debate.
230. Johnson, 96.
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One of those outside forces was the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. Founded in 1934
by a General Motors Vice President, who believed that science, technology, and economic
institutions' could change society. In 1970 the foundation, sensing a communications
revolution on par with the printing press,commissioned a report called On the Cable: The
Television ofAbundance.231 Typical of Blue Sky studies, the report was on cable's
potential rather than its current state, which the commission accurately summarized as
"not remarkably impressive." The analysis of possibilities of cable was a common theme
in Blue Sky writings. At the heart of the Blue Sky discourse was the issue of how to
facilitate the fastest and widest development of a technology. This was reflected in the
commission's first recommendation: "it is in the public interest to encourage the growth
of cable television."232 As Johnson recognized in 1966, market forces were already
working to control of cable's future, and the commission's report clearly favored a
marketplace model. A close look at the report "...reveals a fairly conservative, private
enterprise-minded approach to cable's development."233 The uses of cable television,
according to the commission, would be determined "by entrepreneurs, public and private,
who are willing to take the responsibility for risking money and career on the promotion
of an idea.,,234 The public has been turned into "users of the system" who "respond" to
the options provided by entrepreneurs. The report describes a market democracy where
231. Sloan Commission on Cable Communications. On the Table: The television ofAbundance;
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citizens voted with their dollar. Futhermore, the commission concluded, "wherever it has
proved possible we recommended deregulation" and "unless [a] clear case has been
made we have consistently cast our vote in favor of the operation of the marketplace."235
They further argued that, "Cable television must grow, if it is to grow at all, by its own
efforts, and it is perhaps not too much to request that government take no extraordinary
steps to hinder it." 236 The report, written seven years before the evolution of the
neoliberal political movement, encapsulated what would become the major tenets of
neoliberalism: privatization, liberalism, and re-regulation. By the time the political
movement was underway, cable had been groomed as an ideal case study of neoliberal
projects.
The commission did not favor elimination of all regulations, but argued that
regulations should only be considered "where necessary." There were many areas where
the commission determined the that regulatory "chaos" created the necessary conditions
for government intervention. During cable's growth, "the federal government has been
rudderless, the municipalities inept, and the states inactive."237 The report concurred with
Johnson's conclusion: the real flaw in cable regulatory practices up to that point was that
cable had been governed by legislation predating cable technology-the Communications
Act of 1934-which did not clarify the boundaries of the FCC's authority or
responsibilities. The report enumerated several recommendations for cable regulation,
235. Sloan Commission on Cable Communications, 6.
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including revised copyright laws allowing cable to purchase programming, protections
from cable for PBS, allocation of public access channels, defined minimum technical
standards, nondiscriminatory access to leased channels, limitations on ownership to
avoid concentration, and federal limits on the powers of states and municipalities to
impose taxes.238 Above all, the report favored rapid growth of the medium. To this end,
it concluded that common carrier status would be "unrealistic and an impediment to the
desirable growth of cable." In an argument that echoes Telcommunication corporations'
current arguments against net neutrality legislation, the Commissioners did not feel
"investors would be willing to undertake the substantial capital expenditures of laying
cable if they had no control over the use of the channels in the formative years and so
were powerless to control the financial destiny of the system.,,239 But the decision to
make cable a common carrier was not completely abandoned. It was simply put off until
there was ample programming was available and the infrastructure was well developed-
a time when the industry would no doubt have the political economic power to resist such
a move. By delaying the debate around common carrier status, the commission
demonstrated its naivete about capitalist communication systems. Driven by an
ideological belief that the market is the most efficient force for technological innovation,
it remained hopeful that the cable industry was not going to follow the path of all other
forms of capitalist communication systems (e.g., telegraph, telephone, broadcast radio,
television).
238. Sloan Commission on Cable Communications, 154-55.
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The commission was not phased with broadcast television's programming at the
time, but found a way to excuse the broadcasters. The commission argued that the
technology limited the number of channels, so the commission reckoned, content had to
appeal to the widest possible audience. The constant pressure to create non-offensive
entertainment resulted in a constant middling of programming quality. While media
critics might make much of the report's assessment that broadcast television "has been, in
general, a vehicle for personal expression only when that expression is generally
acceptable," the commissioners saw this as an unavoidable byproduct of technological
limitations (i.e., limited bandwidthlchannels). On the whole, the report would rather light
a candle (cable) than curse the darkness of broadcast television: "None of this is intended,
per se, to be critical of conventional television: it has performed as it has been obliged to
perform, and on the whole done so with surprising efficiency and skill.,,240
Overall, the commissioners pinned their hopes on cable as a "television of
abundance." The report also recognized the social value of cable television and feared
that "vested interests" would take over the new medium. Ironically, the commission's fear
of vested interests unduly influencing government regulations would be alleviated by
deregulation and free market control of cable-allowing a different set of vested interests
to determine the fate of cable.
Another Blue Skies proponent was not as eager to let the market determine cable's
future. Ralph Lee Smith's well-known article, "The Wired Nation," appeared for The
240. Sloan Commission on Cable Communications, 43.
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Nation magazine, serving as a primer on cable television for the public and government
officials. Smith's biggest fear, like Johnson before him, was that the information being
used to make decisions about cable television was coming from industries with vested
interests. Unlike the Sloan Commission, Smith did not favor revisiting the issue of public
control of cable after giving the market free reign to develop programming, and was a
voracious proponent of common carrier status. Smith felt that attempts to regulate cable
by the federal government had sublimated social values in favor of "...the short-range
struggle for economic advantage.,,241 Smith's solution was a separation of infrastructure
system providers and programming. As common carriers, cable companies would be
prohibited from deciding what programming would be offered on their systems. Smith
pointed out that if cable companies offered programming, they would be hesitant to allow
programs that directly competed with their own shows. Under common carrier status,
access for new programmers would be guaranteed. The classification also would provide
additional standards of performance while ensuring uniform technical standards. Smith
felt that the two legal conditions for common carrier status-a natural and unavoidable
monopoly and an essential service-were both applicable to cable. Interestingly a year
before Smith published his piece, the cable industry (represented by NCTA) publicly
claimed its service "was not a necessity.,,242
241. Ralph Lee Smith, "The Wired Nation," The Nation, May 18, 1970,599.
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Smith, more than any other Blue Sky proponent, recognized that a free market and
Blue Sky ideals were not compatible. "Americans are so accustomed to their system of
broadcasting that it probably occurs to only a few that different arrangements exist in
every other country in the world. And if they do notice the difference they assume, not
doubt, our system is the result of clear national choice. Quite the opposite is the case.,,243
Smith's article, and later a book on the same topic, are best known for the prescient
envisioning of an "electronic highway" that would connect the nation to a system of
Telcommunications infrastructure, enabling users to communicate with each other, shop,
do research and watch programming.
All of the Blue Sky reports favored regulation, which aimed to level the playing
field against the entrenched broadcast interests. However, such regulation did not include
provisions for public control. Most Blue Sky reports assumed that the market was the
normative arbiter of technological innovation, and ignored the fact corporate driven
media was increasingly becoming more concentrated. By 1975, the top 50 cable
companies accounted for 72% of cable subscribers. More importantly, 30 of these 50
companies were subsidiaries of diversified corporations that thought "cable provided an
outlet for cash flow" that could offer higher returns than they were currently receiving in
their own oligopolistic marketplaces.244
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Blue Skies hyperbole was based on promoting two aspects of cable technology: 1)
CATV's ability to expand programming options and 2) future two-way electronic
communication. Programming had already been established, particularly with the
inclusion of pay channels. However, the infrastructure needed to support an "electronic
highway" on cable systems was considered too capital intensive for the commercial
systems. Generally the cable industry executives generally found the Blue Sky discourse
to be "pie in the sky." While they may have appreciated and exploited the publicity, they
did not want to be tied down to any promises about service or, worse, public obligations.
Cable television was a business first and foremost. To them, cable entrepreneurs
corporations were looking for a good return on investment and not interested in social
engineering.
Cable operators used blue Sky arguments "as a strategy in the small-market
television battle with broadcasters, particularly as that struggle was carried out through
the FCC. By describing their businesses, not as a mere ancillary community service, but
as new technology, the cable operators could gain new leverage against their commercial
opposition, the broadcasters."245 Utlimately, the model favored by the cable industry-
limited regulations coupled with marketplace control of content-was adopted. However,
there was one tangible response by the cable industry to the Blue Sky debate: C-SPAN.
In here study of cable programming, Megan Mullen concludes that
245. Thomas Streeter, "The Cable Fable Revisited: Discourse, Policy, and the Making of Cable
Television," Critical Studies in Mass Communication 4, no. 2 (June 1987): 174.
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Agreeing to finance C-SPAN (and later C-SPAN 2) represented the only gesture
the cable industry would make voluntarily toward fulfilling the public service
goals of the various Blue Sky studies and artic1es.z46
Satellites: Beyond the Blue Skies
The cable industry was made possible by another technology-geosynchronous
communication satellites. Without orbiting communication satellites, a nationally
connected cable television network was neither technically, nor economically, feasible.
When registering the non-profit network in 1978, it should be noted Lamb that did not
choose to name it the Cable Public Affairs Network (CPAN), but the Cable-Satellite
Public Affairs Network (C-SPAN), acknowledging the pivotal role that satellites played in
cable's development. The importance of satellite technology on cable television's
development is hard to overestimate. Parsons states that " ..the history of the industry and
its technology can be distilled into two simple eras-the period before the satellite and
the period after it. It is not too far a stretch to describe them as two completely separate
industries."z47 Without satellites, the "television of abundance" would be limited to large
cities, where large subscriber bases could justify locally produced specialty programming
or distant programming using expensive terrestrial transmission methods.
Until communication satellites were launched, the only way for electronic
information to be transmitted across the nation (and globe) was by land lines and
microwave towers owned by companies like AT&T. Satellites would allow cable not only
246. Mullen 2003, 125.
247. Parsons, 320.
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to bypass AT&T's lines, but to send programs from a single point and then broadcast
them to any number of earth-based receivers, where they could then be distributed by
cable to households.
But cable television was only one use for communication satellites, as they offered
other important government and military uses.
In a special message to Congress, in 1967 President Johnson stated "No
technological advance offers a greater opportunity for [achieving world peace] than the
alliance of space exploration and communications."248 Satellites were presented as a
technology that could unite the world through a core human activity-eommunication.
But satellites had been part of a national strategy since Eisenhower. At the height of the
Cold War, communication satellites were seen as a tool in the race to beat the Russians-
both technologically (the Space Race) and imperially (to spread the US empire to
developing nations).
In 1962, five years before Johnson spoke about satellite-sponsored world peace,
Congress had passed the Satellite Communications Act, a cornerstone of Kennedy's
administration. The act created a private corporation-the Communications Satellite
Corporation (COMSAT)-to oversee all U.S. satellite communications. Still reeling
from Sputnik, the U.S. Congress's main concern in the early 60's was to beat the Soviets
in establishing a global communications system. Satellites represented the fastest and
most cost effective way to expand global communication networks. Soon the
248. Lydon B. Johnson, "Special Message to the Congress on Communications Policy," August 14,
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international communications common carriers (AT&T, Western Union International,
ITT and RCA) began to convince Congress that they were best positioned to get a satellite
communication system running and that they who should have control of satellite
communications for the US.249 The common carriers argued for a complete privatization
of satellite services, and they had considerable backing in Congress and Kennedy's White
House.25o Kennedy was following the same path as Eisenhower, who had made it clear
that he preferred a private satellite option. His rationale was based on the fact that U.S.
private enterprise had managed to build the world's premier communication system. For
Eisenhower, there was no doubt that "the government should aggressively encourage
private enterprise in the establishment and operation of satellite relays for revenue
producing purposes."251 A few congressmen and women would later express doubts,
reminding other legislators that the reality of capitalism was monopoly, not competition,
and allowing private market control would undoubtedly result in satellites being
controlled by a single Telcommunications corporation-AT&T. The issue of satellite
ownership opened "...an unbridgeable political gap between those who felt that satellites
should be absorbed into the private Telcommunications industry and those who felt that
satellites should be owned by a public corporation because they were an offshoot of the
249. Michael E. Kinsley, Outer Space and Inner Sanctums: Government, Business, and Satellite
Communication, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976), 4.
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space program, paid for by $60 billion in taxpayers' money.,,252 The gap, however, was
bridged.
In the tradition of legislative compromise, COMSAT became a public-private
corporation. Half of its stock was set aside for the common carriers, and half for the
general pUblic. The board would be composed of six representatives of the common
carriers, six were be elected by the general stockholders and three were to be appointed
by the President on behalf of the public. It was quite clear that the compromise favored
private interests. Senator Estes Kefauver, testifying before the Senate Commerce
committee, presented his views of the arrangement:
It is in my opinion, Mr. Chairman, the biggest giveaway that we have had
in the history of our Nation. All this stuff about taxpayers can get benefit
by buying a share of stock is window dressing. We know that there won't
be one-hundredth of 1 percent of the taxpayers who will be buying stock,
and that they will not be buying stock in any event in proportion to the big
investment by their tax money that they have made in research and
development of this making possible the space communications satellite.253
Progressive, public-option senators (e.g., Wayne Morse, Ralph Yarborough, Russell Long,
Estes Kefauver, Maurine Neuberger, Ernst Gruening, and Albert Gore) mounted a
sustained attempt to kill the bill on the Senate floor using filibusters, but were ultimately
outmaneuvered and resoundingly lost. Senator Yarborough asked "Mr. President, is this
the council hall of the States, or has the Senate become the council hall of the
252. Brenda Maddox, Beyond Babel: New Directions in Communications, (London: Andre Deutsch,
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corporation?"254 The administration and Congress had little choice but to pursue a
simplistic utilitarian-consequentialist policy that bypassed the very question of ownership.
As it stood, it was hard to argue with the results; the U.S. would have a satellite
communication system that worked. For President Kennedy, the ends-beating the
Russians and gaining dominance in global satellite communications-justified any
means.255 Unfortunately for the dozen senators who fought for public ownership, the
creators of the Act had "determined that the communications giants role in satellite
development was inevitable and desirable."256 Kennedy's assistant attorney general,
Nicholas deB Katzenbach, had already stated to the US House Committee on Science and
Astronautics that "We are talking about a system of achieving various ends, and not about
the worth of an abstract concept. To put it bluntly, who 'owns' a satellite is far less
important than the consequences which we attach to that concept of 'ownership' and the
controls which accompany it."257 .The public testimony reveals that even the progressive,
pro-public, Senators were less concerned about ownership than they were about the effect
this act would have on AT&T's market power. AT&T had circumvented federal
regulations prohibiting it from owning communication satellites by paradoxically
becoming the single largest controlling interest on COMSAT's board. By putting
254. Michael E. Kinsley, Outer Space and Inner Sanctums: Government, Business, and Satellite
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satellite's biggest competitor in charge of the new technology's fate, opponents to the act
felt that Congress had appointed the fox to guard the hen house. It was felt that AT&T
had little incentive to create an alternative to its land-based system of cables and
microwave towers. Thus, cable television would have an uphill struggle to gain
transmission time on communication satellites because its potential for Telcommunication
applications represented competition to AT&T's terrestrial infrastructure.
In 1964 the US was instrumental in negotiating the creation of an international
satellite organization-Intelsat-on the market-based model of COMSAT. Intelsat's
creation was based on a set of interim agreements that were open for renegotiation in
1969. In the quote at the beginning of this section, President Johnson was speaking to
Congress about world peace and satellites because he wanted the U.S. to enter into a
permanent arrangement with Intelsat. The overall tone of his message was that the U.S.
could take the lead in supporting "...a global system of commercial satellite
communications which is available to all nations-large and that small, developed and
developing--on a non-discriminatory basis." Johnson expressed concern small nations
might become "orphans of this technological advance" and told Congress that his
administration would consider financial assistance to emerging nations. Johnson's
comment that "Some nations may feel that the U.S. has too large a voice in the
consortium," alluded to an intent beyond benevolent technological patronage. As Herbert
Schiller documented in his book Mass Communications and American Empire, U.S.
satellite communications policy's "main concern is to win communications markets in the
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well-to-do world as it exists today"258 not with giving developing nations a helping hand.
Schiller summarized the U.S. efforts to bring in international (i.e. European) partners as
an attempt to spread costs, while ensuring US control over a global communication policy
and infrastructure.
The Marriage of Cable and Satellites
The movement to keep mass communication systems within the marketplace and
not publicly controlled also spilled over into cable television. When Congress was
debating COMSAT and Intelsat, Johnson commissioned a task force, chaired by the
Undersecretary of the State, Eugene Rostow. The taskforce was charged "to make a
comprehensive study of communications policy."259 The primary subject was
communication satellites, but the task force covered all forms of mass communications.
At the same time that advocates and academics were touting the Blue Sky initiatives, the
federal government saw cable television as the best way to utilize a global communication
system that was the cornerstone of the U.S. global geo-political position. The President's
Task Force on Communications Policy released its study in 1968, concluding that
the most attractive near-term possibility for a domestic satellite system is a
method for the distribution of television programs from point of
origination to local outlet for rebroadcast at a lower cost than is the case for
terrestrial distribution. 260
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In conjunction with this conclusion, the report sought ways to improve television
program diversity through expanded channels. The answer was to distribute
programming from communication satellites via cable systems. Known as the "Rostow
Report," the influential study created a stir by stating, "Although a number of methods
can be imagined for expanding the number of [television] channels, the most promising is
cable television ."261 This promise, the report recognized, was in direct conflict with the
interests of broadcast television networks. Since FCC regulations governing television
were created before the invention of cable television, it is little wonder that the agency
drafted rules favoring over-the-air television. For decades the FCC's main goal was to
encourage local broadcasting through promotion of low powered UHF stations. UHF was
seen as a low-cost way to foster local programming in order to offer competition to the
higher power VHF stations which were the major networks. The report succinctly stated
"In pursuit of this important policy the FCC has sometimes found it necessary to impose
restrictions on a rival mode.,,262 The report did not advocate complete deregulation of
cable television, but did suggest that cable would best develop "without governmental
assistance, promotion or other intervention."263
Like the Sloan Report before it, the Rostrow Report openly proposed a market
solution, based on encouraging the "entrepreneurial spirit" to solve the problem of
261. Rostow, 316.
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expanding television diversity. It did not completely, however, remove all public service
obligations from cable television. Economically, the report found that cable systems,
with their current channel capacity of twenty plus channels, could easily set aside
channels for public service programming. Cable required a large initial outlay of capital
(e.g., stringing cabling from "cable head end" to homes, launching a satellite, etc.) but
operating costs of distribution were small. More importantly, the costs of distributing
television signals over a satellite-cable system were inversely proportional to use. The
more channels being offered, the more advertising could be sold. The taskforce also
noted that advertising dollars were not the only source of revenue for cable television-
the subscriptions that viewers paid cable providers could subsidize less popular type of
programming. They pointed out that cable providers would want a diverse channel lineup
because expanding channel options is what separated cable from over-the-air stations.
The report noted that a customer may not pay for cable based on one specialty channel,
but two or three might be enough to get her to sign up.
This section of the report marked a turning point in cable television. Cable
television was now seen as a potential source of programming. Interestingly, the Rostow
Report recognized how non-profit channel1ike C-SPAN could also benefit the cable
operator's bottom line. The report's conclusions are worth quoting at length:
It is not necessary for the cable operator to sell time on every channel to
advertisers, or even charge for the use of every channel, in order to defray
his expenses and make a profit. On the contrary, he has a positive
incentive to offer a varied programming mix, including items which would
not attract a commercial sponsor, even if that required him to shoulder a
portion of the programming costs. Many individuals may only be
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persuaded to subscribe to the cable service if it provides programs of
particular appeal which they would otherwise be denied, for some, a series
of local college plays or a foreign film festival; for others, a continuous
stock ticker; for yet others a college-level lecture series, or a channel
dedicated entirely to the problems and talents of one of the particular
subcommunities of the city-an ethnic, religious, or service group.
Having an abundance of channels, the cable operator will be motivated to
provide such programming. For the costs to him ofa modest studio and
simple camera equipment are moderate, while the additional options may
attract additional subscribers to the cable [emphasis added].264
While the report did not specify a Congressional television network, it leaves space for
such an endeavor. At the time the report came out (1968), the marriage of cable and
satellite was seven years away and cable television's programming-due to technical,
economic, and (mainly) regulatory reasons-was sparse. Cable television did not look
like it does today nor as the report envisioned it, but it is clear that the political economic
circumstances paving the way for C-SPAN's acceptance by the cable industry were in
place ten years before the network was founded. While the Rostow Report may have
provided the justification for a national public affairs network, it was from the policy-
based perspective of the government. The cable industry, however, did not take long to
capitalize on the concept and presented its own plan.
Cable Embraces "Public Service"
Flying in the face of the long standing perception that the policy positions of
broadcasters and cable operators were incompatible and intractable, staff members from
264. Rostow, 321-22.
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NAB and NCTA met during May 1969 and drafted tentative compromises over cable
regulations. As one participant put it, "It got to the point where we decided there was no
sense in continuing to holler at each other.,,265 The overarching goal of the secret
meetings was to establish a united legislative agenda which would simultaneously protect
the copyrights of broadcaster programming, while allowing cable to expand more than it
could under FCC rules. The agreement would require cable operators to pay copyright
fees for material on broadcast television, and honor any "exclusivity" agreement that a
broadcaster arranged with a programming provider (i.e., if a network signed an agreement
with the baseball league to be sole outlet for a game cable operators could not retransmit
it). Cable also would be prevented from interconnecting. It also would have to carryall
local broadcast stations, but would be prevented from importing distant signals. All of
these restrictions were trade offs to enable future cable systems to originate one channel
of entertainment and one advertising-subsidized channel. (At the time, cable was
prevented from originating entertainment programming and from offering advertising.)
Existing cable systems would be grandfathered and allowed to continue their existing
services. The agreement clearly favored broadcasters' needs and even pro-broadcast FCC
commissioner Kenneth Cox publicly chided the cable operators for giving up too much.
Despite all of this, the compromise was roundly rejected by NAB's board whose
membership wanted absolute "economic protection against cable development."266
265. Broadcasting, "Chance for Accord on Cable's Future?," June 2, 1969, 23.
266. Broadcasting, editorial, "Trouble on the Cable," June 23, 1969, 142.
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A week after NAB rejected the compromise, cable operators met for the annual
NCTA convention. According to Broadcasting magazine, the meeting marked "the time
when cable TV operators stopped thinking like faceless transfer agents for broadcast
signals and started planning a future as full-fledged TV programmers."267 It was a sea
change in the way cable saw its future. NCTA president Fredrick Ford was fed up with
being shut out of program origination and developed a plan to circumvent the regulatory
restrictions. It was at the "CATV via Satellite" panel that Ford announced his innovative
plan to perform an end-run around the broadcasters and achieve independent
programming.
Far from seeing cable's defeat, Ford explained how cable could benefit from the
restrictive limitations proposed by the NAB. By preventing cable from originating
entertainment programming, the NAB had opened up a programming niche for cable-
non-entertainment programs. NCTA president Ford was excited about his plan for two
reasons: 1) it circumvented the entertainment ban, allowing cable to become active
programming producers and 2) it would "scor[e] vital public-service points with the FCC
and Congress, among other influentials."
The Rostow Report had earlier presented sound economic arguments why diverse
programming would allow cable to subsidize less popular types of programming, which
in turn, would draw in more subscribers who might not otherwise purchase fee television.
Ford took this one step further. Not only would supplementing over-the-air programming
267. Broadcasting, Special Report, "Scratching the Itch to Originate," June 30, 1969,69.
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with public affairs/service programming produced by cable increase direct revenue
through selling cable subscribers, it would gain the cable industry valuable influence in
Washington D.C.. It was as simple as it was tactical. Based on NAB's success up to that
point, broadcasters had the political power to kill any efforts by cable to expand into
entertainment programming. It would be considerably more difficult for the NAB to kill
cable's efforts to start public service programming. Ford's proposed programming tier
consisted of six public-service channels:
• Two channels given to PBS
• 24-hour weather channel with local reports
• Medical/health programming for public and hospital professionals
• Selected reruns of over-the-air "nonmass-entertainment" documentaries
• Capitol Hill activities including live congressional hearings268
Ford's proposal has yet to be mentioned in any research or writing on C-SPAN. Ford saw
his plan as a way to appease regulators, gain public support and most importantly "the six
channels, would, in the aggregate be of sufficient diversity and value that we believe the
metropolitan television viewer would be prompted to buy the CATV service." A
congressional channel was seen as the ideal platform to achieve both political and
economic goals of the cable industry. Ford did more than pitch the idea, his staff had
researched the technical and labor requirements, determining the channel would cost
around $2.2 million to operate each year. 269
268. Broadcasting, Special Report, "Cable Opts for Networking Role," June 30, 1969, 71.
269. "Cable Opts for Networking Role," 72.
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NCTA's director of engineering, G. Norman Penwell, pointed out that this type of
programming would not only gain cable a foothold in the larger markets, it would appeal
to niche audience interests. The latter effect was something the FCC had been trying to
accomplish with UHF broadcast television for years and ostensibly the reason the agency
was protecting broadcasters at the expense of cable. More of interest to cable operators,
this type of public service programming "would be amazingly cheap to set up and
produce.'>27O It was a win-win solution for cable. Cable would have six channels to
promote to subscribers in the biggest television markets in the nation and it forced NAB
into the uncomfortable position of having to oppose incontestably public-service minded
television programming.
Ford presented his idea as the outgoing president of NCTA, so the campaign went
nowhere for ten years. As discussed previously, C-SPAN-the network-began in 1977
when Brian Lamb met with a Virgina cable system operator who mentioned that he
wanted to tap into the House of Representatives' trial television signal. However, the
idea of a cable channel featuring live coverage of Congressional hearings began eight
years previously, at the 1969 NCTA conference.
Conclusion
At the end of the 1960's and beginning of the 1970's, Blue Sky advocates had high
hopes for cable's ability to instigate broad social changes. Cable was seen as
270. "Cable Opts for Networking Role," 71.
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revolutionary new way to communicate because of its ability to transmit more electronic
information than the older telephone networks. The capacity of coaxial cable was soon
joined with geosynchronous communication satellites. Satellites, coupled with local
cable systems, allowed the possibility of a national two-way system of electronic
communication. Without satellites, cable would never have encouraged such sweeping
claims. Satellites were developed using public funds and there was a hope this investment
could be returned to the citizens. Blue Sky debates were judged using social values (e.g.,
democracy, education, etc.) but were never uncoupled from the free market. It was hoped
that by freeing cable from the broadcaster-favored regulations, the industry could fulfill
its wonderful potential. As the chapter revealed, this did not happen. Blue Sky ideals
quickly ran up against the hard truths of a capitalist communication system, that cable
providers were not interested in social values but in bottom lines. During this period
cable companies became conglomerated, concentrated, corporations. Blue Sky's main
downfall was in the fact it did not uncouple social values from cable from private
infrastructure ownership.
C-SPAN is typically analyzed separately from the cable industry and seen as the
personal passion of a handful of people dedicated to private enterprise providing a public
service. By considering C-SPAN within the context of the development of cable, it is
possible to more fully understand why and how C-SPAN came about. Previous research
on C-SPAN fails to acknowledge conditions facilitating the acceptance of a C-SPAN type
of network occurred during the time called "cable's freeze." It was a time when cable
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was desperate to make any sort of inroad into the television market. These developments
will be discussed in the next chapter. The chapter will offer C-SPAN could not only
retain some of the older Blue Sky hopes but how it also proved that cable needed to shed
the vestigial regulatory bonds broadcasters had placed upon it. In the latter part of the
next chapter the beginnings of a "neo-natel" neoliberalism is identified and related to
C-SPAN.
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CHAPTER VI
CABLE'S FREEZE AND THAW
The leaders of the various [communications] trade associations-who
rank among the most highly paid in Washington-could feel secure in
taking a hard line to promote the unalloyed policy interests of their
members. Their strategy was straighiforward: use the legislative and
regulatory process to preserve their own markets from competition and
even to saddle others with new regulations while gaining new rights and
new markets for themselves. 271
-Kirk Victor, Journalist
The Blue Sky and communication satellite policy debates, culminating in the
Rostow Report, created an image of cable's glowing future. The report advocated for
federal rules that assisted the expansion of cable television. In May 1969 the House of
Representatives' Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce held a series of
hearings on bills freeing cable to compete with broadcast television. Despite the
apparent shift in social and legislative discourse in cable television's favor, the FCC
continued to adopt rules that made cable operators feel as if the agency was"...out to
271. Kirk Victor, "Shifting Sands," National Journal, November 20, 1989, 2776.
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emasculate CATV."m And those feelings may have been justified. This chapter explores
the cable industry's regulatory experiences.
Cable's Freeze: 1968 - 1972
In 1968, while publicly parroting the Blue Sky ideals of cable's possibilities, the
FCC was pressured by the broadcast industry to tighten its rules on cable. Any existing
cable system in a top 100 television markets would be allowed to operate as they had
been, but all new applications for franchises in large cities were denied wholesale. Those
grandfathered systems in the large markets were severely handicapped. In an attempt to
retain a sense of "localism," the commission forced cable systems to carry the nearest
independent broadcast station. The rule was designed to prevent "leapfrogging"-when
a cable system opts to carry a popular larger station far from its community. Perhaps
most restrictive of were the retransmission requirements. Under the new rules, the FCC
required cable systems operating in one of the top 100 television markets not only to seek
permission to carry a network station on its system, but to obtain permission for every
program featured on the network. This would have been onerous enough but the FCC
also required a cable system to seek permission from every party that had a property
interest in a program, including the local station, the affiliated network, the distributor
and the producer of the program.273 Logistically, it became impossible for a cable
272. House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, "Regulation of CATV, 1969," 9lst
Congress, 1st sess., May 19-23, 1969, Committee Serial 91-91, 111.
273. Patrick R. Parsons, Blue Skies: A History ofCable Television, (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 2008), 255
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system in a large city to carry network programming. Between denying new applications
for large city franchises and hamstringing existing systems through burdensome
permission filings, cable's growth was effectively stymied.
It is clear, however, that while the commission tightened its control of cable as a
community antenna system (retransmitting broadcast stations) it was moving towards
viewing cable as a source of programming-something that the Blue Sky ideals had
promoted. In 1968, against the wishes of the broadcasters, the FCC lifted its longstanding
ban of advertising on local cable channels featuring original programming. But this gain
for the cable industry was offset by another requirement. Cable systems over 3,500
subscribers were to create one channel of original programming and provide studio space
and equipment for local programming.
Initially, this stipulation seems to give cable exactly what it wanted: the right to
originate its own programming. However, cable operators were no longer small
independent operations but large scale corporations controlling large and small systems
around the nation, and they were not interested in creating amateur-produced local
programming. They wanted professionally produced shows that could compete with
broadcast shows, as well as be marketed to the rest of the country. The language of what
"locally produced" meant also was loose and many operators showed old movies and
television shows in syndication. Generally, then, these mandated channels were not the
haven of locally produced community-specific programming that a Blue Sky advocate
would have hoped for. The mandated stations proved to be economically unfeasible (not a
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large enough market to support local advertisers), so they were often used more as a tool
to obtain local franchise agreements than produce a profit. It became clear " ...a 1960's
style, locally produced, local origination program channel existed largely as a public
service and public relations too1.,,274
Cable's ability to provide public service programming was key to the industry's
relationship with Congress. Because the cable industry was economically struggling in
the late 1960's, it would have to leverage all of its political power to fight the
broadcasters. This meant forming strategic alliances with Congress, which in turn could
shape FCC policy. Broadcasters had decades of lobbying experience and had insulated
themselves against competition using legislation and broadcast-friendly FCC chairmen.
Sol Schildhause, who headed the FCC's CATV Taskforce during this time, lamented that
no one in the agency was inclined to question the broadcasters obvious influence on
public policy. No one asked "Is this a violation of the Constitution? Is this an
encroachment on peoples' First Amendment rights? Nobody ever raised that. This was
something the institution [FCC] had to do because it was urged on by the principle clients
-the broadcast industry. '>275
The major networks not only had more money than the cable industry, they also
controlled legislators' access to national television. As Robbins has observed,
274. Parson, 305.
275. Sol Schildhause interviewed by E. Stratford Smith November 7, 1991, The Hauser Oral and Video
History Collection, The Cable Center, Denver Co.,
http://www.cablecenter.org/education/library/oralHistoryDetails.cfm?id=256
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"Broadcasting, and television broadcasting in particular, is widely regarded by both
elected and non-elected politicians, as the most powerful of the celebrated Washington
lobbies. Some evidence to the contrary notwithstanding, few politicians are willing
gratuitously to assault the television establishment and thus, conceivably, jeopardize the
most important of individual objectives-reelection, reappointment, or future
employment by the industry."276 If the cable industry was to tackle the broadcasters on
their home field (Congress) it would have to distinguish itself from them. The best way
to do this was to differentiate its programming from the overwhelmingly entertainment-
driven fare on the networks. Public service programming offered the ideal way to show
how cable was not only different, but more public-minded than broadcasters. Irving
Kahn, president of Teleprompter Corporation, told committee members that the issue of
program origination by cable was not about "... 'pay TV' that will strangle other
entertainment media. At stake, instead, is the opportunity to do an inestimable amount of
good-through public service programming..."277 The message was clear: unless
Congress reigned in the FCC it would be responsible for killing the potential to develop
public service programming on television. Even at the height of the Blue Skies debates
and with a system of domestic communication satellites imminent, the cable industry did
276. Kenneth Robbins, "Ford Administration Papers on Regulatory Reform. Studies in Government
Regulation," in Deregulation ofCable Television, ed. Paul W. MacAvoy (Washington D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977), 95.
277. House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce 1969,43.
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not have enough political power to stop a federal regulatory freeze period, and "cable
growth had virtually ground to a halt in major cities.,,278
Cable's Thaw: 1972-1975
While the Blue Skies debates did not result in significant gains for the cable
industry, they did draw attention to the FCC's role in shaping cable's future. For decades
the commission was in an awkward position of having to regulate a technology not
imagined by the legislation that outlined the FCC's charge-the Communications Act of
1934. Initially, the FCC tried to shirk the responsibility of regulating cable but was
pressured by the broadcast industry to step in.279 Because the FCC was positioned
between one of the most powerful industry lobbies on one side and a new, and possibly
society-altering technology on the other, the agency was neither able to kill cable
television nor develop long-term policies for its growth. A Rand report determined,
"Economic rivalries over cable's future role impeded the resolution of policy issues; and
doubts about the scope of FCC authority embroiled Congress, the Executive Branch, and
the courts in the controversy."280
278. Steven Rivkin, 1974. Cable Television: A Guide to Federal Regulation. Rand Publication: R-
1138-NSF. (Rand Corporation: Santa Monica, CA, 1974), 1.
279. Stanley M. Bensen, "The Economics of the Cable Industry: 'Consensus,''' The Journal ofLaw
and Economics 17 no. 1, (1974): 39.
280. Steven R. Rivkin, Cable Television: A Guide to Federal Regulation. (Santa Monica, CA.: Rand
Cable Television Series, R-1138-NSF, March 1973), 1.
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Publicly the commission advocated expanding cable television and formed the
CATV Task Force. The task force's head, Sol Schildhaus, encouraged cable's rise by
lobbying the commission to grant waivers to applications of cable operators who were
frozen out of a particular market. Behind the scenes, it was clear that the task force was
meant to be a gesture not a substantive body. At one point, FCC commissioner Cox (a
long time opponent of cable) came to Schildhause and reminded him "You're supposed to
look busy not be busy."281 Despite open threats and veiled pressures, cable persisted. In
1971 a new tentative consensus agreement was drafted among the various parties and sent
to Congress as a non-binding letter. But before any action was taken a new participant
began to exert influence-Richard Nixon.
In 1970 President RichardNixon made it clear that he intended the Executive
branch to be active in national communications issues, releasing a memorandum outlining
the White House's position on domestic communication satellite regulations. The memo
concluded government policy should encourage and facilitate the
development of commercial domestic satellite communication systems to
the extent that private enterprise finds them economically and
operationally feasible, but that there is no reason to call for the immediate
establishment of domestic satellite systems as matter of public policy nor
to promote uneconomic systems or dictate ownership arrangements.282
In other words, the White House reinforced a market solution for U.S. communication
systems. The next month Nixon formed the Office Telecommunication Policy (OTP),
281. Sol Schildhause, np.
282. The White House, Announcement, "Communication Satellites for Domestic Telecommunications
Service," Weekly Compilation ofPresidential Documents 6, no. 4, January 23, 1970, 66.
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appointing the memo's author, Clay T. Whitehead, as the first director. In a message to
Congress, Nixon stated that he had created the office to advise the President about
communication issues and coordinate federal government's use of communication
systems for national security. In addition, "the new Office would enable the executive
branch to speak with a clearer voice and to act as a more effective partner in discussions
of communications policy with both the Congress and the Federal Communications
Commission."283 Whitehead had a masters degree in electrical engineering and a Ph.D.
in management from MIT and "was a technological innovator with a free-market
approach to the newborn information revolution ...."284 Whitehead became notorious for
being an eager foot solider in Nixon's war on the media. Most infamously, in a speech to
the Society of Professional Journalists' ethics foundation, Sigma Delta Chi, he accused
the network news programs of "ideological plugola" and pandering to, and passing along,
"elitist gossip" of Washington insiders. The phrases "were carefully chosen.,,285 Helping
Whitehead craft the language was his aide-Brian Lamb, who had been working as a
senator's press secretary and before that a reporter. According to Franztich and Sullivan,
283. Richard Nixon, "Message to the Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan 1 of 1970 To
Establish an Office of Telecommunications Policy," February 9,1970, accessed from: John T. Woolley and
Peters Gerhard, The American Presidency Project, Santa Barbara, CA: University of California (hosted),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2735
284. Dennis Hevesi, Obit., "Clay T. Whitehead, Guide of Policy That Helped Cable TV, Is Dead at
69," New York Times, July 31, 2008. http://www.nytimes.coml2008/07/31/washington/31whitehead.html
285. Fred C. Esplin, "Looking Back: Clay Whitehead's OTP," Public Telecommunications Review 3,
no. 2, (March/April, 1975): 20.
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it was during his job as OTP's spokesperson that C-SPAN's future founder "...refined his
preference for the private enterprise basis of the media...,,286
The OTP did not take long to develop a position on cable television. After the
FCC brokered the tentative consensus agreement, the OTP intervened and offered its own
plan for cable's controlled growth. Ironically, the OTP plan was more restrictive than the
commission's. The White House threats, coming so close to Nixon's 1972 bid for a
second term, were perceived by the cable industry as an effort to remind broadcasters they
needed a friend in the White House.287
Although the OTP was a late comer to cable television regulation, it had the
political power to issue the cable industry an ultimatum: sign on to this plan or be
prepared for lengthy delays as new legislation is developed by Congress. By this point,
all parties understood that without regulatory limitations, cable television could meet, and
perhaps beat, broadcast television in a competitive market. It was federal regulations, not
the will of the public nor any economic restrictions, that was holding cable back. The
gambit fit within Nixon's well-known disdain for the media-particularly the networks.
The OTP's cable plan was eventually accepted and became the FCC's 1972 Cable
Television Report and Order. While the new rules did not completely free cable, they
allowed cable to import distant broadcast signals. The trade-off for import rights was a
requirement to provide local cable access channels and make all other unused channels
286. Stephen E. Frantzich and John Sullivan, The C-SPAN Revolution, (Norman OK: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1996), 28.
287. Christopher Lydon, "Cable TV Conferees See Wide Gains but a Delay," New York Times, July
12, 1971, ASS.
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available for lease. It was during this period that the industry begun to shed its older
CATV label and became known simply as cable television. Not surprisingly, the cable
industry recognized the change long before it was recognized by others. Reflecting its
new attitude, NCTA had changed its name from the National Community Television
Association to the National Cable Television Association in 1967. After the 1972 Report
and Order the FCC caught up, promoting its underutilized CATV task force to a
permanent bureau dedicated solely to cable television. Cable was beginning to be treated
as a peer to broadcast television. But,unfortunately for cable, its political gains were to be
offset by economic woes.
Cable's Financial Crisis: 1972 - 1975
Capitalizing on the Blue Sky frenzy beginning in the late 1960's, cable operators
and corporations were able to secure easy financing and had gone on spending sprees,
purchasing franchise agreements in cities and laying cable. In many cases operators made
promises to cities about services they were unable to keep. Before the 1972 rules, cities
could charge cable operators as high of a franchise fee as they could get away with. Many
municipalities reportedly treated the cable franchises like "open checking accounts"for
city coffers.2ss Cable operators put up with the exorbitant fees levied on them by
franchising authorities because they fully anticipated plentiful profits. Investment banks,
288. Parsons, 310.
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believing a potentially social altering product was on the horizon, fed this period of
capitalization and allowed cable operators to over-spend.
Cable systems had very little to offer in the way of programming and were
experiencing significant levels of "churn," when a subscriber signs up only to promptly
cancel the subscription. Because early cable did not feature diverse original
programming, the only selling point was better picture quality than over-the-air
broadcasts. This incentive only went so far; many consumers were not eager to pay for
something they could receive free over-the-air using an antenna. Cable operators spent
more time selling the idea of cable than subscriptions. Customer service problems
plagued the industry as operators dedicated more funds to acquiring new franchises rather
than producing a product (programming) or service. In the words of one cable executive,
"...cable television bombed in the cities and we will be a long time recovering from it.,,289
By 1975, the cable industry was averaging 3.1 % pretax income on revenues and a
debt-to-equity ratio of 2: 1.290 From 1972 to 1973 the stock of cable's largest company,
Teleprompter, plummeted to 8% of its starting value, and its CEO, Irving Kahn, was
arrested and sentenced for manipulating the company's books.291 By 1973, another cable
giant, Tele-Communications Incorporated (TCI), was effectively bankrupt,292 TCl's
289. Les Brown, "Cable TV, Overextended, Is in Retreat in Cities," New York Times, March 9, 1974,
A61.
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president, John Malone, cut spending to the bone, laid off many workers and delayed
capital investments. His greatest feat to stave off creditors was to orchestrate a byzantine
financial scheme involving restructured classes of stock between TCI and a subsidiary in
order to maintain voting control and take advantage of federal tax write-offs. The
situation created tax-sheltered cash flows that were leveraged to secure loans which
would then be turned back into the tax-sheltered cash flows. So precarious was this
financialized house of cards, that an office joke was: if the company ever reported a
profit, the accountants would be fired. 293 However, these schemes only made it possible
to pay the interest on TCl's loans. The heavy reliance on debt made the industry ripe for
consolidation. Much of Malone's time was spent fending off hostile take over bids by
larger media corporations. Cable television was no longer a mom and pop, entrepreneur-
driven, concern; it was a business dominated by publicly traded corporations that did not
want a 3% return on investment. In 1975 thirty of the fifty largest MSOs were
subsidiaries oflarger corporations.294 But it was clear that these companies could not
continue by relying on accounting tricks (or outright fraud). Something had to change.
The Political Roots of Neoliberalism
In February, 1973, Whitehead appeared on William F. Buckley Jr.'s "Firing Line,"
where he explained "we'll begin to see cable growing more rapidly and there will be this
293. Robichaux, 39.
294. Eisenmann, 13.
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opportunity for all manner of people to produce programming and make it available to the
public."295 While seemingly an advocate for cable television, cable operators were stung
by Whitehead's 1972 compromise requiring them to pay copyright fees to the owners of
programming appearing on broadcast networks. More than an advocate for cable,
however, C-SPAN's founder's boss was an advocate of "...good old free enterprise.,,296
Early in the interview, Whitehead made his position clear, saying "no one wants, you
know, a broadcasting system that is just an arm of the Federal Government. We've got to
have a private enterprise system." If this was not clear enough, Whitehead explained that
he felt the government should take Milton Friedman's advice and sell, not lease, broadcast
licenses to the highest bidders, enabling them to become private property, preventing the
government from intruding on commerce. This dedication to competitive capitalism
meant Whitehead would seek to protect broadcasters' copyright on their programming
(and force cable to pay copyright fees) but that he also supported cable's quest to produce
its own programming in order to compete with broadcasters. If cable created its own
programming, copyright protection would be applied to it as well. Whitehead realized
that capitalist media could not exist without the state protecting private property rights.
To deny broadcast programming these rights would be contrary to his belief in "free
enterprise." Likewise, Whitehead knew the networks "have been very upset at the threat
295. Clay T. Whitehead interviewed by William F. Buckley Jr. on Firing Line, broadcast February 18,
1973, "The White House and the Media," program #S0081, 8, transcript available from The Hoover
Institution at Stanford University, Firing Line Television Program Collection,
http://hoohila.stanford.edu/firingline/programView.php?programID=567
296. Ibid..
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to their profitability that cable represents" and were able to secure regulatory protection
from the FCC. During his interview with Buckley, Whitehead stressed that he wanted the
chance for cable's programming to compete with broadcasters. He begged when asked to
elaborate, explaining he was about to submit his recommendations to to the President and
needed to wait for the administration's approval.
In 1974, the Cabinet Committee on Cable Communications, led by the OTP,
issued its comprehensive recommendations for cable policy in its "Cable: Report to the
President." Whitehead clarified his preference for market-based solutions with dramatic
flair, as the report projected its findings ten years ahead to 1984; which provided the
committee with a literary opportunity:
Prediction is a perilous task in the rapidly changing communications field;
and the chilling vision of "1984" can never be far from any group studying
a new mass communications medium for an advanced technological
society. We would rightly be held derelict in our duties if we took no steps
to avoid the clear present and future dangers of government control of
communications technology, which have been foreshadowed in the literary
imagination.297
In other words, only free market model for cable television would avert the horrors of
Orwell's dystopia. The committee concluded cable "...should be given an opportunity to
prove its worth to the American people in the marketplace of goods and services in the
marketplace of ideas,,298 In short, the OTP was arguing to deregulate cable television.
297. Cabinet Committee on Communications, "Cable. Report to the President," (Washington, D.C.:
GPO, 1974), 3-4.
298. Ibid., 16.
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The OTP was Lamb's introduction to cable television and it made an impression.
Eighteen years later, after C-SPAN was well established, Lamb submitted testimony to
House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance stating, "I believe that 'free
market' access to cable channels best serves the public interest. When cable was
deregulated, C-SPAN's growth was in no way guaranteed. As you know, the federal
government did not mandate the creation of C-SPAN, nor did our network get any special
exemptions in a de-regulated cable environment. Cable operators were-and are-free to
choose to add C-SPAN to their systems.,,299
By the mid 1970's, it was not only the OTP that sought market solutions to cable's
future. As Nixon was forced out and Ford entered office, "various agencies of the
government debated cable policy, but the new contours of the dispute seemed not to be
over whether to deregulate cable but rather how best to do it.,,300 The trend to reshape
federal regulations to favor business interests was not limited to the telecommunications
industries. This was the era when the Civil Aeronautics Board deregulated the airlines
and the Interstate Commerce Commission drastically reduced its oversight
responsibilities over the trucking industry. The radicalism of the sixties, as exemplified
by FCC commissioners with public advocacy sympathies, gave way to new
commissioners, who "tore down, brick by regulatory brick" all the structures governing
299. House Committee on Energy and Commerce, "Cable Television Regulation," 102 Congress, 1st
sess., March 20, June 18,26,27, 1991, Serial no. 102-86,909.
300. Parson, 243.
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cable television developed over the past decades. 301 Like Whitehead, the FCC chairman
during this period, Richard E. Wiley, believed that cable operators were liable for
copyright payments, but "ultimately felt the marketplace was a better forum than either
the FCC or Congress in which to work out telecommunications issues.,,302 The genesis
of a new "cable friendly" FCC occurred in 1974 when the Cable Bureau created the
"Reregulation Task Force." The name "was a calculated misnomer, designed by FCC
Chairman Richard Wiley not to raise the hackles of Congressional and broadcast industry
proponents of regulation.,,303 The task force's main charge was to reexamine the
commission's 1972 Rules and Report with the goal of integrating the ideals of
deregulation to the cable industry.
By the mid seventies, the Presidency, the FCC, and Congress were all behind
regulatory reform of cable. President Ford made deregulating cable one of the platforms
of his office. It was apparent that broadcasters' political strength was being tested by the
resolve of both the executive and legislative branches. This regulatory rush to revisit
government's role in regulating industries would lay the groundwork for the rise of
neoliberalism as a political philosophy. Because its evolution was artificially retarded by
government interference, cable television was a perfect case study for free market
advocates.
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In 1975, staff for the House Subcommittee on Communications was charged with
researching the regulation of cable television. Their report, Cable Television: Promise
Versus Regulatory Performance, "...was clearly hostile to the protectionist nature of the
1972 rules. "304 Though the FCC was turning a new leaf, the report lambasted the
commission, stating its structure-with separate bureaus for broadcasting and cable
industries-results in a "partisan clash of bureaus ,"305 rendering policy decisions based on
whichever industry is politically stronger. This, the authors felt, did not yield anything
close to the public interest. To remain accountable to the public interest, the authors
believed "Wherever feasible, matters should be left to experimentation and the
marketplace; federal regulation should be resorted to only where clearly required in the
public interest.,,306 The subsequent House Subcommittee on Communications hearings
held over fifteen days in 1976, was dedicated to uncovering Congress's role in regulating
cable television and whether the FCC needed to alter its practices regarding cable. The
committee was chaired by Representative Lionel Van Deerling who later became Brian
Lamb's biggest ally by suggesting, on the House floor, that the Congressional television
signal could be transmitted to the public via cable.
Prior to the mid-seventies, it was not uncommon for cable operators/entrepreneurs
to produce their own programming. This situation came out of system owners' desperate
304. Stanley M. Besen and Robert W. Crandall, "The Deregulation of Cable Television," Law and
Contemporary Problems 44, no. 1, (Winter, 1981): 98.
305. House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, "Cable Television: Promise Versus
Regulatory Performance," 94th Congress, 2nd sess., January 1976, IV.
306. Cable Television: Promise Versus Regulatory Performance, 77.
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need to sell subscriptions when no one else was producing cable-only programming. The
price that cable television would pay for the new freedom to compete with broadcast
television would be a policy of "separation," which specified that "in no event should the
cable operator be engaged in programming or have any financial interest in entities using
leased channels on its system.,,307 In effect, the policy philosophically treated cable
systems as common carriers but legally they were not classified as common carriers,
allowing cable to restrict access access and offer tiered rates to programming networks
seeking distribution. It was a another compromise. In preventing operators from
producing programming federal regulators sought to curb the voice of anyone
corporation or individual, but by not making them common carriers cable companies
would not be subject to state Public Utility Commissions. Cable franchise agreements in
cities and rural areas would continue to be locally administered, but franchising fees
would be federally capped, subscription rates could not be set and local authorities could
not demand specific programming.
The only power that local municipalities had was to require the cable operator to
set aside channel space for locally produced Public, Education, or Government (PEG)
programming. This means that any cable subscription offering more than the "basic
service tier" (e.g., local broadcast stations, the public, educational, and governmental
channels required by the franchise agreement) would be controlled by the market, not
public commissions. Cable operators, not commissions, would decide the proper market
307. Cable Television: Promise Versus Regulatory Performance, 91.
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rate for channels and they could reject programmers at their discretion. The
mid-seventies marked the eve of the coming neoliberal dawn and cable was able to situate
itself to take advantage of the political changes.
The neoliberal shift towards deregulation was important because it freed cable
television to take advantage of changing market and technological circumstances
surrounding television in the US. First, consumer and regulator frustration with the
limited offerings of the broadcast networks opened up space for cable's product.
Secondly, allowing cable operators to utilize publicly-subsidized domestic
communication satellites allowed cable operators to connect to a network of original
programming. As early attempts at local origination of programming showed, there was
not the economic incentive for cable operators to produce a wide variety of original
programming. Cable in the seventies had became synonymous with reruns of "I Love
Lucy" and old Hollywood movies. Satellites would quickly change this arrangement.
Open Skies
Though the OTP became known for its position on cable television, the office was
created by Nixon, in large part, to promote the executive's long-standing preference for an
"Open Skies" policy on domestic communications satellites. Shortly after the FCC
issued its 1972 Cable Television Report and Order, the OTP was able to pressure the
commission into implementing an Open Skies policy.308 Based on the OTP's wishes, the
308. Megan Mullen, The Rise o/Cable Programming in the United States: Revolution or Evolution?,
(Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2003), 91
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FCC issued the 1972 Second Report and Order, which authorized any organization that
could demonstrate "financial and technical qualifications to provide service" could
establish a communications satellite system.309 Open Skies was rhetoric for a privatized
satellite system. Access to satellite networks was "open" because the market, not the
government, nor COMSAT, would decide who could develop a domestic communications
satellite system. If you had the money, you could build a satellite, launch a satellite, and
own and operate earth bound receiving stations.
Brian Lamb, who worked as OTP's spokesman, pointed to the Open Skies policy
as the single most important event to establish the cable industry.
They [Open Skies advocates] wanted to break down this concentration of
power in the communications business; they wanted cable television to
flower and to be able to expand, and they wanted satellites to be able to
expand. So this was a critical period. And that decision...Tom Whitehead is
almost single-handedly responsible, as an individual, for reversing the
Federal Communications Commission policy that they were headed
toward, of having a single entity control the satellite system. It became an
open skies policy, and that's why you have the flowering of all kinds of
communications today.310
Lamb described the cable perspective on Open Skies as preventing AT&T (the majority
shareholder of COMSAT) from restricting entry to a potential telecommunications
competitor (cable) by setting satellite fees above market rates. "AT&T executives
recognized that their rarely discussed but universally known quest to control a domestic
309. Broadcasting, '''Multiple-Entry' is FCC's Choice for Satellites," June 19, 1972,8.
310. Brian Lamb, interviewed by Jim Keller, September 26, 1998, transcript, The Hauser Oral and
Video History Collection, The Cable Center, Denver Co.,
http://www.cablecenter.org/education/library/oralHistoryDetails.cfm?id=132
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telesatellite monopoly by means of a state sanctioned arrangement [Comsat] was over.,,3ll
While the 1972 ruling diminished the monopolistic power of AT&T, it did so at the price
of public control. The domestic satellite system in the U.S., like the cable system, would
be entirely controlled by private interests, accountable only to the marketplace. The long
term effect of this arrangement would be to ensure that "those corporations that possessed
the finances and programming infrastructures necessary to launch satellite networks in
the late 1970's were able to establish positions of incumbency and power for
themselves."312
In 1974, Western Union launched the first domestic communications satellite-
WESTAR I, followed months later by RCA's RCA SATCOM F-l. In 1976 AT&T and
COMSAT proved they were still in the game by launching COMSTAR. In all, these
satellites had the capacity to provide up to 1,500 television channels.313
The Rise of Satellite Cable Networks
C-SPAN was historic for televising Congress to the public and also for being one
of the pioneering national satellite networks on cable television. A year after Western
Union launched WESTSTAR I, the Home Box Office (HBO) network reached an
311. Edward A. Comor, Communication, Commerce and Power: The Political Economy ofAmerica
and the Direct Broadcast Satellite, 1960-2000, (London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1998), 62.
312. Mullen 2003, 96.
313. David J. Whalen, "Communication Satellites: Making the Global Village Possible," NASA
History Division, Communication Satellites Short History, http://history.nasa.gov/satcomhistory.htm1
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agreement to transmit television signals via satellite. In order to gain cable operator's
interest in HBO, the network sought a suitably large event to demonstrate satellite
transmission's capacity. It found one in the Muhammad Ali and Joe Frazier heavy weight
championship. Held in the Philippines, the so-called "Thrilla in Manila" was transmitted
over nine thousand miles through a cobbled system of satellites, land lines, and
microwave relays to the Southeastern U.S. The trial run for cable-satellite was a huge
success.314 In addition to prominent one-off sporting events, HBO partnered with
Hollywood studios to distribute major films, without commercial interuptions.
Hollywood films had long been a staple of television, but up to this point, cable channels
were only showing low-quality "B" movies or films old enough to be in the public
domain. Broadcasters showed popular movies but interrupted them with advertising
breaks. HBO guessed, correctly, subscribers would pay extra to watch movies without
commercials. The following year, 1976, Ted Turner put his Atlanta, Georgia UHF station
on the satellite service and was receiving orders from system operators. A year after that,
1977, Pat Robertson realized the potential for niche programming and started the
Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN). In 1979 three networks were offered to cable
operators: USA, ESPN and C-SPAN. The first 24-hour news network, CNN, began
transmitting one year after C-SPAN's founding, in 1980. All these pioneer cable outlets
are around today. HBO blazed the trail, Turner proved it profitable and USAIESPNI
C-SPAN proved satellites and cable distribution waere the new trend in television.
314. FCC, Office of Manager Director, History, TV, "Wired, Zapped, and Beamed, 1960's through
1980's," http://www.fcc.gov/omd/history/tv/1960-1989.html
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C-SPAN's birth occurred as operators were eagerly seeking specialty
programming (e.g., sports, religious, premium movie, legislative). In one decade cable
subscription rates nearly quadrupled, from 4.5 million in 1970 to 16 million in 1980.315 In
the short three year period when most of the pioneering stations were started, (1976-
1979), cable operators' revenue jumped over 100%, while net income rose an astonishing
641 %.316 C-SPAN was not a sideline experiment in public service, it was one of the
foundational national cable networks, one of only a handful of national networks available
for cable operators to purchase in the late 70's. The network was part of the package that
cable operators were selling to potential customers.
C-SPAN appeared only after the industry had experienced structural changes and
"an increasing concentration of cable ownership during 1967-1973 began to transform the
cable industry from a confederation of 'mom and pop' operations to one of increasingly
large corporations which owned several cable systems.,,317 With concentration came an
increased need for national programming and with programming available, operators
were able to sell subscriptions. The industry's economic success then "permitted a
viable cable lobby to arise and enter into the regulatory fray."318
315. Television Factbook, vol. 50, no. 1, (New York: Television Digest, Inc., 1982), 83-a.
316. Ibid., 81-a
317. Horwitz, 252.
318. Ibid., 253.
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Conclusion
Beginning in the late 1960's, cable was seen as not only a better way to watch
television, but as a way to improve U.S. society. As newer digital technologies expanded
the capacity of coaxial cable systems, a variety of public-minded foundations, academics,
activists and policy makers, engaged in debate about what this new communication
system should accomplish. From these "Blue Sky" discourse came a diffuse set of social
initiatives that advocated expanding cable. Cable's potential was not only limited by its
technological capacities. As a communication system, cable was regulated by the FCC,
and the commission was restricting the growth of cable to protect broadcast television.
Broadcasters had years of political clout built up and used every thing at its disposal to
freeze cable's development. What is interesting to note is that cable's "thaw" did not
occur as a result of the Blue Sky debate but because of a larger political economic trends
within the U.S. Under the leadership of Nixon's Office of Telecommunications Policy,
the federal government solidified its preference for market solutions by presenting
policies favoring competition and privatization. The largest example of this was the
"Open Skies" policy that ensured the domestic communications satellite system, which
was developed and launched using tax-payer money, would be privately run, for and by
private interests. It should be noted, Brian Lamb, the founder and CEO of C-SPAN was
the spokesman for the OTP and has often expressed that his preference for private market
solutions to social issues was formed during his time at the office. Once the White House
embraced competition, cable's regulatory thaw occurred. Freed from burdensome
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restrictions and utilizing the newly privatized satellite system, cable was able to finally
expand.
In the next chapter the study examines how the cable industry was able to harness
this new political and economic power to its advantage. Within a few short years, the
cable industry was able to score a major political victory in Congress with the passage of
the The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984. This act would re-regu1ate the
industry, on its terms. Broadcasters, and the telecommunication industry, were not idle
and pooled their lobbying efforts to fight a mutual competitor. With its monopoly on
wired subscription television, the cable industry had increased prices and decreased the
quality of service. Capitalizing on consumers' ill-will, the broadcasters and telco's were
able to gain Congressional support for the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, which again placed heavy restrictions on cable operators. With
the rapid development of new communication technology it was apparent the original
Communications Act of 1934 was in need of major modernizing amendments. This time
all communication industries joined in the passage of the Telecommunications Act of
1996. The act gained support across industries because it represented a formal shift of
federal communication policy from public interest towards favoring the investment
opportunities of big business.
The chapter uses these acts as a way to demonstrate how C-SPAN was used by the
cable industry to assist in its goals, and also, how the network itself, became a symbol of
limited government interference in private business.
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CHAPTER VII
THE CABLE INDUSTRY: THREE DEFINING LEGISLATIVE ACTS
The skeptics were waiting. They had often predicted that C- SPAN would
only be around as long as the cable industry needed visibility in
Washington; that once deregulation came, C-SPAN would go the way of
news and public affairs programming on some deregulated radio stations.
Instead, Mr. Chairman, C-SPAN grew dramatically. Today, C-SPAN is
available in nearly 54 million homes-95% ofthe cable universe.
-Brian Lamb, written testimony to Congressional committee
It is impossible to separate C-SPAN's evolution from that of the cable industry
itself. C-SPAN's birth occurred when the cable industry became a major player within
the mass communications and media systems in the U.S. There is no denying C-SPAN
owes its existence to the fact the industry secured the ability to utilize communication
satellites for disseminating national television programming. What is less recognized are
the the ways C-SPAN benefited the industry. Within the first fifteen years of C-SPAN's
founding, the cable industry went from up-and-coming competitor of broadcast television
to full-fledged telecommunications powerhouse. Three legislative bills chart the political
and economic maturation of the industry: The Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984, the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 and the
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Telecommunications Act of 1996. The following chapter briefly outlines those pivotal
acts while offering evidence of C-SPAN's relationship to the social policy these acts
represented.
The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
The industry did not take long to marshal its collective lobbying power and within
five years of C-SPAN's founding saw a major regulatory victory. Under Regan's
administration, a concerted effort was underway to strip the oversight capacities of
government regulatory agencies. While deregulation was the de rigueur political policy
position since Ford's administration,319 reducing federal oversight was made socially
popular by the rising trend of neoliberalism in the early-to-mid eighties. During this time
the trucking, railroads, airlines and banking industries were deregulated through passage
of omnibus laws designed to shift regulatory power from federal agencies to the
marketplace. The only other piece of legislation remotely matching the scope and tenor
these bills was The Cable Communication Policy act of 1984.320
Prior to the act's passage, Congress conducted several studies into cable
deregulation. A 1981 Congressional report considered deregulation as a step in an
industry's natural evolution.
319. Martha Derthick and Paul J. Quirk, The Politics ofDeregulation, (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution Press, 1985).
320. Robert Britt Horwitz, The Irony ofRegulatory Reform: The Deregulation ofAmerican
Telecommunications, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989),244.
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Rules once imposed to guide cable in its early stages of development no
longer are necessary due to demonstrated expertise on the part of the
industry itself, and to increased under- standing about, and familiarity
with, the industry on the part of State and local officials as well as
potential cable subscribers. 321
The report concluded "the Committee believes that the marketplace forces, rather than
Government regulation, should prevail. ,,322
The act was a textbook example of federal regulation legislation as "re-regulation"
(showing legislative preference for one industry or special interest group at the price of
another) rather than actual "deregulation" (letting laissez faire reign free). From the
perspective of the customer, however, the measure was a deregulatory act. Before the act,
the subscription rates customers paid for cable were controlled by the state or local body
that granted the cable operator its franchise license. The act removed government control
of rates and subjected them to market control. As long as the cable company could
demonstrate its system was subject to "effective competition" it could charge whatever it
felt the market could bear. "Effective competition" could include a customer's ability to
receive a nearby broadcast television station.
As the industry shifted from local private ownership to Multiple System Operators
(MSO's), cable sought to routinize and centralize franchising procedures. On an
administrative level, filing procedures varied widely across the country-even within
states. The industry was able to impose a federally mandated uniform franchising
321. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, "Telecommunications
Competition and Deregulation Act of 1981," 97th Congress, 1st sess., July 27,1981, Report 97-170, 57.
322. Ibid., 58.
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procedure. More important, however, was the federal imposition of franchise caps. Prior
to the act many municipalities looked to cable franchising fees (essentially a tax), not as a
way to have the oversight agency remain self-sufficient, but as another source of revenue
for city or county coffers. Thomas Wheeler, NCTA President, testified in one case a city
used cable franchise fees not for maintenance of the regulatory commission but for a
stainless steel column and reflecting pool for city hall. 323 The act capped franchise fees to
5% of a cable operator's local gross revenue.
The act also protected the cable industry from the theoretical cornerstone of the
marketplace---competition. In a blatant example of re-regulation, the act outlawed cable's
biggest competitor, the phone company, from entering into the business of transmitting
television signals.
The price Congress demanded for these giveaways was small. Owing to a
minority group of "liberals" the act mandated cable become subject to equal employment
opportunities. More dear to the cable industry was the act's stipulation that franchising
authorities had the legal right to demand public, educational and governmental (PEG)
channels be part of an franchise agreement. PEG channels are channels set aside for
locally produced public affairs/educational content. While local authorities could not
demand cable companies carry a specific network (e.g., C-SPAN) they could require the
operator to give up several channel slots for locally produced public affairs content. The
requirement was not without precedent; many MSO's provided PEG channels as a way to
323. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, "Cable Telecommunications Act
of 1983," 98th Congress, 1st sess., February 16, 17, 1983.
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gain bargaining leverage. The requirement simply mandated what was a widespread
voluntary practice of the time.
The 1984 act sought to redress years of FCC favor towards broadcasters and
protect cable from the predatory practices of local franchising authorities. In short, cable
television was now a political economic player at the table. The irony of 1984 act is the
cable industry spent two decades bemoaning the monopoly of broadcasters over television
markets only to secure a monopoly for itself within the pay television market. A 1996
Brookings Institute study on cable regulation found cable would later use its monopoly to
raise rates and ignore customer complaints. The study concluded, largely due to the 1984
act, cable ".. .is widely considered a monopoly that has exploited consumers and is thus a
worthy candidate for government regulation."324 What this ignores is that cable had
regulations-regulations that suited the cable industry. While C-SPAN was not active in
lobbying for the act, there was a legislative issue occurring as the act passed its way
through Congress that C-SPAN was very much involved with.
As Congress debated the merits of deregulating cable television the Senate
considered televising its floor proceedings. This fact brought C-SPAN into direct contact
with the legislative process. Beginning in 1981, the Senate examined Senate Resolution
20; establishing television and radio coverage of proceeding in the senate chamber. The
concerns of televising the Senate were identical to those expressed by House
representatives two years earlier: members would grand stand, decorum would be
324. Robert W. Crandall and Harold Furchtgott-Roth, Cable TV: Regulation or Competition?
(Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1996),84.
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affected, speeches would lengthen, the cost would be too high, etc..325 The reasons to
televise the floor were redux debates the House had six years earlier: to increase
transparency, facilitate democracy, bypass unfriendly press and match the executive's
growing media power. In fact, the only new concern added by senators was the fear by
not televising its floor sessions the Senate "becomes a lesser body"326 when compared to
the House which did televise its floor proceedings.
In 1979 the House made its floor session telecasts available to any outlet that
wanted it, but only C-SPAN chose to transmit the signal on a daily basis. As House floor
sessions were the mainstay of its programming, it was natural that C-SPAN, represented
by its various board members, would take an active role in urging the Senate to open its
floor deliberations to cameras. At committee hearings, it was obvious board members
spoke not only as C-SPAN officers/supporters but as officers of cable corporations.
In hearing testimony from C-SPAN board members, Senator Charles McC.
Mathias pointed out if the Senate approved television coverage C-SPAN might suffer
from an embarrassment of riches. 327 With only one channel and both chambers' floor
sessions meeting simultaneously in the morning, the network would be forced to chose
one chamber for live coverage and one for playback. John Saeman, chairman of
C-SPAN's board, responded that if the Senate approved television cameras, it would be
325. Senate committee on Rules and Administration, "Television and Radio Coverage of Proceeding in
the Senate Chamber," 97th Congress, 1st sess., April 8, 9; May 5, 1981.
326. Television and Radio Coverage of Proceeding in the Senate Chamber, 183.
327. Ibid., 248.
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his board's "desire to go to a full channel of coverage.,,328 The following excerpt from a
1998 interview with Saeman demonstrates how critical the early eighties was for cable
television and how C-SPAN was perceived as a way to influence a successful conclusion
to regulation woes with passage of the act
Saeman: You felt good about it [C-SPAN], because it was contributing to
the cable industry in such a positive way as against its cost, given what the
industry was going through and the regulatory environment, harassment on
all kinds of issues--copyright, retransmission, and all of the rest of it, to
have something like that, that befriended us to the House of
Representatives.
Interviewer: Couldn't have a better lobbying effort.
Saeman: And it was so inexpensive and everybody [cable operators] could
participate in it.329
C-SPAN's original industry supporter, and first chairman, Robert Rosencrans, did not
miss the opportunity to shill for his industry's commitment to public affairs
programming, saying "Much of our industry has been well publicized recently, and
principally in the areas of movies and sports. Not as much publicity has occurred relative
to the public efforts that we have been making, and making, I think, successfully."330
Senate resolution 20 went nowhere and was replaced by Senate resolution 66. In
1983 (the same year cable's deregulation was being finalized) C-SPAN's chairman made
sure Senators knew the network "was the world's only 24-hour public affairs network,"
328. Ibid., 249.
329. John Saeman interviewed by Jim Keller, October 01, 1998, transcript, The Hauser Oral and Video
History Collection, The Cable Center, Denver Co.,
http://www.cablecenter.org/education/library/oralHistoryDetails.cfm?id==255
330. Television and Radio Coverage of Proceeding in the Senate Chamber, 204.
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and that it was "a creature of the cable television industry."331 More importantly, the
Senators needed to know, "With the inauguration of the C-SPAN programming four years
ago, the cable television industry's promise of enlightened and diversified programming
has now become a reality.,,332 After describing how his cable company, Comtel, served
155,000 customers, C-SPAN board member Jack Frazee stated "We are committed to
C-SPAN, and we have translated that commitment into action by adapting its systems to
offer wide subscriber exposure to the C-SPAN network and its quality programming."333
He is speaking as both a representative of a cable corporation as well as C-SPAN board
member; it is impossible to abstract the two roles for C-SPAN is the cable industry.
Kentucky Senator Wendall Ford pointed out cable was not a broadcast technology, where
you could listen or watch for free. Nor was C-SPAN controlled by the public.
We really do not have television here. We have C-SPAN-unless we change the
rules-and C-SPAN is limited to cable, and cable is limited to what they want to
do. Now, in certain areas in my State, you buy cable, and you get 13 channels
That is the first expense. Then you buy HBO. That is the second expense. And
the third expense would be another level which would take you to 43 channels. So
it begins to get quite expensive. And that third section is where C-SPAN is. So
you are talking about $30 to $35 per month to get C-SPAN in my area. So really,
when you get down to it, I am not sure as to what number of homes in which you
find cable you will find C-SPAN, and they do not have to carry it.334
331. Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, "To Establish Regulations to Implement
Television and Radio Coverage of Proceedings of the Senate," 98th Congress, 1st sess., April 14, 15, 1983,
53.
332. Ibid..
333. To Establish Regulations to Implement Television and Radio Coverage of Proceedings of the
Senate, 60.
334. Ibid., 88.
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Senator Ford's comments came the day after C-SPAN's board members testified. In a
letter following up on questions from the committee, C-SPAN's John Frazee began by
making sure the committee knew C-SPAN had leased additional satellite transponder
space and planned on creating a second channel exclusively for the Senate. Later in the
letter, Frazee seamlessly slipped from C-SPAN advocate to cable industry representative
by directly addressing Senator Ford's concerns. Frazee explained in Kentucky his
company served 40,000 customers in 25 communities and in these communities C-SPAN
was part of the $8.65 per month basic service package. Lest Senators missed the point:
"I would like to point out additionally, Senator, that the majority of these systems are 12
channel systems, which points out my company's commitment to public affairs
programming of this type.,,335 What Frazee failed to mention was by 1983, almost 80% of
cable systems had over 12 channels; in fact, over 50% of systems had 30 or more
channels.336 Frazee concluded his letter by writing more and more cable MSQ's were
moving C-SPAN to the basic tier of service everyday. This news was dual edged; cable's
commitment to C-SPAN was growing but C-SPAN could not be seen on many systems
across the nation. Senator Ford's original fears were not baseless.
The issue of C-SPAN's absence from many systems was something the industry-
as represented by C-SPAN board members-was keenly aware of. As part of its
additional material, C-SPAN submitted to the committee an editorial from the Nashville
335. To Establish Regulations to Implement Television and Radio Coverage of Proceedings of the
Senate, 70.
336. Television & Cable Factbook, vol. 50, no. 1, (New York: Television Digest Inc., 1983), 1726.
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Banner. The Banner's editorial board was joining with Representative Al Gore in urging
cable systems across Tennessee "to reconsider making C-SPAN available to their
subscribers."33? According to Gore, only 14 of 97 cable systems across Tennessee carried
C-SPAN. At first glance, C-SPAN's inclusion of an editorial that prods, and somewhat
chides, its supporting industry seems an odd choice. Once larger political economic
trends and influences are considered the editorial fits quite nicely with the industry's
overall needs. Firstly, the editorial demonstrates C-SPAN had the active support of a
Congressman. Al Gore was not supporting publicly controlled Congressional television
in the abstract, he was endorsing a specific, privately held, network. Gore's comments
were addressed to the Tennessee Cable Television Association's convention. This reveals
the second political economic fact-the decision to carry C-SPAN was priority for the
larger MSO corporations more than smaller, independent, cable operators and even
individual general managers of the large MSOs. Writing twenty years later, a cable trade
publication comments, "That's the enigma of C-SPAN: lots of powerful support at the
top, and tepid support from some GMs with an eye to the bottom line.'>338 In 1983, the
year of the committee hearing, C-SPAN had 16 million subscribers over 1,200 cable
systems. Compared to other pioneering satellite channels, it is apparent C-SPAN's
subscribers were concentrated across fewer (i.e., larger) systems. For example, another
pioneer satellite-cable network, The Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN) had 30%
337. "House Proceedings and Cable TV," Editorial, The Nashville Banner, November 8, 1982.
338. John P. Ourand, "C-SPAN Proves the Value of a Nickel," CableWorld, March 8, 2004, 16.
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more subscribers (23 million) but was on over 3 times as many systems (4,000). The
USA network had 21 million subscribers on 4,000 systems.339 This "phenomena" is easily
explained by examining the reality of the cable industry structure. General managers of
specific systems were under pressure to make their operations as efficient (i.e., profitable)
as possible. The easiest way to increase profits would be to dump a network that costs the
operator and prohibits him or her from selling any local advertising. The owners of the
large cable MSOs understood the political economic necessity of a network such as
C-SPAN and made long-term commitments to the network. By including the Gore article
into the committee's record, the industry let Senators know it was making Congress a
priority in its programming decisions at the same moment the Senate needed a partner to
disseminate its televised proceedings to the public. In doing so, the industry displayed its
desire to work with Congress to expand Congressional television. If the cable industry
was not a an eager partner, it would make little sense for it to promote the noncommercial
network. On a more empiricalleve1, the editorial pointed out all of Tennessee's cable
systems had "many" blank channels, putting even more pressure on local cable operators
to utilize those channels for public good. By the early 80's C-SPAN was clearly part of
the industry's overall strategy to achieve favorable relationship with Congress.
C-SPAN's private ownership drew only the most limited, and mild, consternation
from senators. Praise for private achievements of business was the norm. Around the
time Congress was deregulating various American industries, private ownership of
339. Television & Cable Factbook, Vol. 52, no. 1, (New York: Television Digest Inc.), 197-99.
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C-SPAN could be used as evidence the larger philosophical preference for market-based
solutions was yielding results. In terms of C-SPAN the lines between private and public
were becoming quite blurred.
By 1983 C-SPAN had been televising Congress for four years and the network was
becoming synonymous with television coverage of Congress. A New York Times
journalist, John Corry, demonstrates this phenomenon when he mistakingly referred to
the House of Representative's floor chamber cameras as C-SPAN's cameras.340 The
cameras were, as they had been since being installed in 1979, property of the House, run
by House employees. In the long run it mattered little. Congress wanted its televised
deliberations to reach as many viewers as possible at the same moment private sector
solutions were being favored to public options. C-SPAN fulfilled both roles.
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992
With the 1984 Act the cable industry had scored a major political and economic
victory over broadcasters and the telco's. The cable industry did not have long to wait
before its new found legislative protections were challenged. Beginning in 1989, NAB
began to actively lobby Congress to re-regulate the cable industry.34! Broadcasters found
a receptive audience in Congress, where it was recognized "Competition among
distributors of cable services did not increase, and, in many communities, the rates for
340. John Corry, "TV:Cable Ventures inside Congress," New York Times, March 14, 1983.
341. Mary Lu Carnevale, "Broadcasters Seek Cable Reregulation In New Legislation," The Wall Street
Journal, April 12, 1989.
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cable services far outpaced inflation."342 Broadcasters, who put up token resistance to the
1984 act, saw their opportunity to strike back. The final result would be the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992.
The omnibus act had three major aspects to it: 1) reinstitution of rate regulations at
the municipal level, 2) limits on horizontal ownership and 3) provisions to force cable
operators to carry local broadcast stations free of charge. The last stipulation, known as
"must carry" was the most controversial for C-SPAN. "Must carry" required cable
systems to carryall the local broadcast networks. Must carry had been part of the FCC's
regulatory practices since 1965 and was even part of the deregulatory 1984 act. Cable
had long challenged the rule and in 1985 was able to secure a court ruling striking down
the practice as unconstitutional. NAB never let the idea die and insisted, through
deciding whether or not a particular broadcast station appears on a system, "Cable
systems have their thumbs on the scales of competition within a local video market.,,343
Cable responds that must carry creates a preference for broadcast stations and cable
programming "would be mandated a second class citizen in terms of carriage."344 As is
the case with all industry regulation, must carry was defended and attacked in terms of its
effect on fair market practices. Both sides simultaneously stated they wanted only the
opportunity to compete on a level playing field.
342. FCC, General Cable Television Industry and Regulation, "Fact Sheet: Cable Television,
Information Bulletin," June 2000. http://www.fcc.gov/mb/facts/csgen.html
343. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, "Must Carry," WIst Congress, 1st
sess., October 25, 1989,41.
344. Ibid., 131.
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During debate of the 1984 act, C-SPAN was used as an example of what results
from unfettered free enterprise. For the 1992 act, C-SPAN was used as an example of
what happens when the government interferes with cable's marketplace. C-SPAN went
from the product of deregulatory free market practices to the direct victim of government
interference. The final bill stipulated every cable system with 12 or more channels must
dedicate one third of those channels to local broadcast stations (if there were that many
stations). Systems with less than 12 channels had to reserve at least three channels for
local broadcast stations. Lamb had largely stayed away from lobbying during the 1984
Act but the 1992 Act would negatively affect his network. Testifying before a House
committee in 1991, Brian Lamb states his case plainly:
If Congress imposes artificial requirements for carriage, cable operators
once again have to make hard decision about which satellite services they
can include on their system's remaining channels. And economic
necessity will force some cable operators to drop non-revenue producing
public affairs programming like C-SPAN and C-SPAN 2 in favor of
mandated local broadcast channels. 345
Lamb was correct; C-SPAN was dropped by cable system general managers in favor of
commercially viable cable networks. After C-SPAN began to be dropped from local
systems around the nation, angry subscribers contacted the FCC, who simply replied "the
decision to carry C-SPAN on a given system rests with the local cable company."346
345. House Committee on Energy and Commerce, "Cable Television Regulation," 102nd Congress,
1st sess., March 20, June 18 and 27, 1991, Serial No. 102-86, 906.
346. Bob Dart, "C-SPAN dropped in 95 cities pulls plug on Congress," The Baltimore Sun, September
7, 1994. http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1994-09-07/features/1994250155_L c-span-cable-operators-cable-
systems
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According to the Lamb, nine months after the act went into effect, C-SPAN and C-SPAN
2 were dropped from over 4 million households.347 Given figures Lamb provided the
committee, this constituted at least a 7.5% decrease in the number of households the
network reached. There are two problems with Lamb's claims about the act leading to a
massive hemorrhage of subscribers to the C-SPAN networks.
Firstly, using, the Television and Cable Factbook, it the cumulative loss of
subscribers-if it actually occurred-was temporary. The Factbook is considered the
"Bible" for information about the television industry and relies on networks and operators
self-submitting data to it. The 1994 edition of the Factbook listed the combined number
of subscribers to C-SPAN and C-SPAN 2-as of June 1, 1993-as 87 million. This
number represents the "pre-act" subscriber levels and provides a baseline (the act would
not take effect until 1994). Unfortunately, the 1995 edition-which would have used
figures from 1994-replicates the June 1, 1993 data. C-SPAN did not provide the
Factbook with 1994 figures. C-SPAN did update subscriber numbers for the 1996
Factbook, allowing a glimpse at a firmly "post-act" year. As of May 1, 1995, the C-SPAN
networks had 102.5 Million subscribers-a 17.5% increase from the "pre-act" 1993.
Given the Factbook's data, ifC-SPAN experienced a loss of subscribers during the 1994
year, it was temporary and easily made up for in the following year, 1995.
The second problematic assumption within Lamb's comments is based on his
notion of "economic necessity." Believing economic decisions are not "political" (i.e.,
347. Elizabeth Kolbert, "Some Cable Systems Are Cutting C-SPAN for Other Channels," New York
Times, June 20, 1994, AI.
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the product of human deliberation) is a prerequisite to being a free market thinker and
fundamental to the success of using C-SPAN as a symbol of capitalism's superiority. The
market provided C-SPAN and, if left fettered, the market would continue to provide
C-SPAN. The "market" only began to remove C-SPAN after "political" actions fettered
its normal functioning. According to Lamb, must carry forced cable operators to drop
existing cable networks in favor of mandated carriage of broadcast networks. As Lamb
and the industry had been stating from the network's beginnings, carriage of C-SPAN was
a voluntary decision made by local general managers. The decision to drop the network,
however, was framed not as voluntary choice to keep a revenue-producing network in
favor of the non-commercial C-SPAN; it was presented as inevitable result of regulations.
Even after the network was dropped from many systems "it ha[d] one of the largest
potential audiences in cable television."348 If economics demanded operators drop the
networks, why was C-SPAN not completely scrapped from all systems? Only 7.5% of
cable subscribers receiving the C-SPAN networks lost them. Economically speaking, the
larger MSO's would be in a better position to absorb the loss either because they had
larger revenue streams or because their systems had the spare channel space to
accommodate must-carry networks and C-SPAN. This explanation undermines the
premise the industry's support of C-SPAN is based on public service; or that the
industry's public service has a price. In speaking of C-SPAN, one pioneering cable
executive pointed out, "Cable has also undertaken national public service initiatives that
348. Kolbert.
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have no parallel in broadcasting."349 The industry provides it because it is the right thing
to do but more than that, the industry began to insist that C-SPAN was a prime example
of value.
The industry, it must be noted, was not in the habit of directly equating must-carry
to losing C-SPAN. It was understandable for Lamb to directly criticize the act; his
network was losing subscribers. The industry as a whole had to be careful using
C-SPAN's loss on a few systems as a stick to beat Congress. It made more sense to use
C-SPAN's presence on most systems as a carrot. During this time period, NCTA's
president Decker Anstrom broke his lobbying strategy into internal and the external
components. Internally, Anstrom attempted to get cable CEO's to scale back the rapidly
rising subscription fees. Rising cable rates was the fuel giving cable's competitors the
populist political leverage re-regulate the industry. History has shown Anstrom was not
successful at this tactic. Having to live with cable companies' addiction to rising rates,
Anstrom developed a plan to deal with this unfortunate reality. Externally (i.e., with
Congress) he let legislators know "prices reflected the increased value the consumers
were getting.,,35o Yes, cable might be expensive but it was worth it. Continually growing
subscriber rates attested to this fact. Under such a strategy, C-SPAN represented value for
the subscriber's dollar. The industry could not simultaneously argue value-for-the-money
349. Cable Television Regulation, 930.
350. Decker Anstrom interviewed by Tom Southwick, September 29, 2000, transcript, The Hauser
Oral and Video History Collection, The Cable Center, Denver Co.,
http://www.cablecenter.org/education/library/oralHistoryDetails.cfm?id=51
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and explain why overtly valuable services such as C-SPAN were dropped for such things
as the Home Shopping Network or another pay-per-view movie or sports channel.
Was the decision to remove C-SPAN from a small portion of subscribers made for
economic reasons? A Wall Street Journal writer thought not, believing some operators
bumped C-SPAN "To dramatize their unhappiness...."351 The overwhelming majority of
cable systems carried C-SPAN, enabling the industry to rightly say it continued its
dedication to public service. The few rogue systems dropping C-SPAN could be used as
a worst case scenario of what might happen systemically if unfavorable regulation was
heaped upon the industry. Additionally, if a legislator asked if the act had affected the
favored child, C-SPAN, industry representatives could honestly answer "yes;" even
though the network was quickly restored on most every system it was dropped from and
continued to gain an absolute number of subscribers from new systems adding the
networks.
While C-SPAN was centrally concerned with must carry, the industry as a whole
was concerned with restrictions to its rate structure. Must carry was a sidebar issue the
broadcasters were able to attach to the larger goal of the act: cable rate re-regulation. By
the early 90's, the cable industry had become a text-book case study in what happens
when a corporation gains a monopoly in a local market: prices rose as service quality
dropped. With the 1992 act, Legislators were "trying to respond to the continuing and
just complaints of millions of American families who have been repeatedly stunned by
351. Paul M.Barrett, "Cable Television Asks High Court for Freedom of Speech, The Wall Street
Journal, January 11, 1994, Bl.
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unfair rate increases, poor services, and virtually nonexistent competition."352 Legislators
recognized because of the regulatory protections Congress had given the industry in 1984
"we have the worst of both worlds: Cable is an unregulated monopoly."353 By this time
the cable industry was on par with broadcasters in terms of political economic lobbying
power but its perceived arrogance and greed caused the worm to turn. Sensing the social
tide was firmly against cable television, legislators drifted towards appeasing aggrieved
cable customers, allowing the broadcasters and teleco's to leverage their already
considerable power.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996
After sixty two years, the central law governing all mass communication systems
and media regulation-the Communications of 1934-was comprehensively amended.
The original act was written well before the advent of the Internet, and just prior to
television. There was a legitimate need to overhaul and update communication law to
reflect current technological realities. This technical need, however, provided the
opportunity for an capitalist ideological coup de grace. The 1996 act shifted protection of
the "public interest" from the government to the market. New Deal "liberalism" of
government regulatory control of communications was replaced with the "neoliberalism"
of limited government regulation of capitalist industries. Privately controlled, for profit,
352. Cable Television Consumer Protection Act, S.l2, 102nd Congress, 2nd sess., Congressional
Record 138 (January 27, 1992): S 421.
353. Ibid., S 413.
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media and communication corporations would be the arbiter of public interest and in
doing so, would shape the concept to fit their needs.
Public interest was based on perceiving the public as consumers within a national
media/communications marketplace, not as citizens of a democracy. This
consumer-centric intent was spelled out in the the final versions of the House and Senate
bills. The second-to-Iast version of the enrolled bill had this synopsis
To promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower
prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications
consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new
telecommunications technologies.. 354
The final version altered the synopsis to highlight the underlying goal of the Act:
...to provide for a pro-competitive prices and higher quality services for
American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid
deployment of new telecommunications technologies.355
Nowhere is there mention of enhancing democracy through expanding the diversity of
voices gaining access to the nation's mass medium outlets. The metrics for the 1996 act
were predicated on market, not social, values-low price, high quality goods and services
and fast implementation of new technologies. Above all, the act placed market
competition as the keystone policy. Even by these standards the act failed. "Instead of
the predicted nirvana of a free and open market with numerous options for consumers and
354. United States Congress, As Enrolled, 8.652, 104'h Congress, 2nd sess., February 5, 1996 (version
5).
355. United States Congress, As Enrolled, S.652, 104th Congress, 2nd sess., February 16, 1996,
(version 6).
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flourishing technology, we have concentration and little marketplace choice."356 Under
capitalism, we would expect the largest winners to be the smallest group-the capitalists.
This is exactly what happened. "It has come to pass that all communications companies,
not just telephone companies ("telcos") but all, including cable and wireless firms, have
returned to shareholders about three times their money from 1995 to the present." 357 The
act accomplished these ends by endorsing "concentration, conglomeration, and vertical
integration.,,358 Neoliberal ideology thrives on promoting "competition," but the reality of
neoliberal markets an elimination of competition through inter/intra-industry
concentration. The act demonstrates capitalism is not based on competition but on
concentration.
This is why competing industries buried the hatchet and came together to lobby
for its passage. "While these special interests disagreed among themselves, they all
wanted Congress to rewrite the rules to allow them more flexibility to get into each
other's businesses, and they wanted less regulation."359 As one Capitol Hill insider
356. Gene Kimmelman, Mark Cooper, and Magda Herrera, "The Failure of Competition Under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996," Federal Communications Law Journal 58, no. 3 (June 2006): 512.
357. Reed Hundt, "Ten Years Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996," Federal Communications
Law Journal 58, no.3 (June 2006): 400.
358. Patricia Aufderheide, Communication Policy and the Public Interest: The Telecommunications
Act of1996, (New York: Guildford Press, 1999),62.
359. Common Cause Education Fund, Special Report, The Fallout From the Telecommunications Act
of 1996: Unintended Consequences and Lessons Learned, May 9, 2005, 7, available from
http://www.commoncause.org/site/apps/nlnet/content2.aspx?c=dkLNK1MQIwG&b=4923423&ct=842539
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ruefully noted, "These guys don't believe in competition, [... ] We looked at the wrong
guys to compete.,,360
The act did not eliminate all the regulations chaffing the industry-must carry
was retained-but there was more than enough in the act for it to be declared "...both in
conception and execution, a qualified victory for major cable interests that had pushed for
deregulation."361 The cable companies were able to win back an important victory: rate
deregulation. These pale in comparison to two other victories: the right to enter the long-
distance telephone service market and a loosening of cross-ownership restrictions.
Despite telephone corporations vowing to fight it every step of the way, a cable
spokesperson summed up the industry's motivation to pursue this possibly litigious route:
"the $65 billion long-distance business 'is an awfully big carrot."'362
Five years after the act passed telephone corporations attempted to reopen debate.
NCTA's president indicated the cable industry was not interested in trying to renegotiate
the act, stating "NCTA is very reluctant to open the Act [because] once you open the Act
you never know what will happen."363 On the whole cable was not interested in risking its
substantial regulatory favors against minor losses. Must carry remained.
360. Amy Barrett, "Regulators Should Discipline Telecom Brats," Business Week, June 30, 1997, 40.
361. Aufderheide, 70.
362. Christopher Stern, "Cable has Uphill Road to Telco Entry," Broadcasting & Cable, February 19,
1996,58.
363. Patrick Ross, "Remaking the Telecommunications Act," CNET News, February 5, 2001,
http://news.cnet.comJRemaking-the-Telecommunications-Act/2l00-1033_3-252065 .htmJ
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Considering the vast give-aways to the corporations represented by this act, it is
easy to understand why cable was willing to let must carry fall to the wayside. The
industry had much larger political economic goals: telephony and loosening
cross-ownership restrictions.
Must carry brings out the dichotomous nature of the cable industry. The "cable
industry" is actually composed of two separate industries: cable networks and the
infrastructure owners. The networks provide programming to be distributed on cable
systems. If a cable network is dropped from a system the network owners lose the a
revenue gained from the affiliate fees the system operator pays it and is forced to lower its
advertising rates based on a lower audience reach. The networks, not the infrastructure
owners, were susceptible to economic injury from must carry. The system owners were
making money carrying the must carry broadcast networks. In fact, just prior to the
passage of the 1996 act-at the height of must carry's influence-a Business Week
article reported subscriber growth rates were steadying increasing and advertising revenue
was growing at "double digit" rates, making cable a good investment. Even hobbled by
must carry and rate regulation (from the 1992 act) "the future looks brighter than it has
for some time,,364 for the cable MSOs. Must carry was a non-issue for the system
operators because 1) large MSOs were already carrying the must carry broadcast
networks and 2) the MSO's wanted the must carry networks; they represented some of the
364. Michael Oreal, Ronald Grover, and Mark Lewyn, "Prime Time for Cable: More Customers, Cash
-and Deregulation May be Coming," Business Week, July 24, 1995, 74.
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most desirable programming. This is why the cable networks (including C-SPAN), not
the MSO's, took the lead in challenging must carry before the Supreme Court.365 Filed in
1992, it would take five years for the case to be decided, in 1997. Cable lost-must carry
was deemed constitutional. The cable industry dichotomy determined the reaction:
"Response to the Supreme Court's decision fell along predictable lines. MSOs are less
concerned than cable networks, saying that they already adhere to must-carry rules. Cable
networks, on the other hand, lost their last regulatory recourse with the decision."366
According to the New York Times, "even if the rules had been overturned, several cable
executives said it would have made little difference in the lineup of channels now
available to subscribers."367 On the MSOs side, the ruling caused little more than a slight
shrug.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996, concentrating on competition among
quickly consolidating corporations and converging technologies, was not suited to
highlighting the plight of cable networks. The act was an infrastructure and corporate
restructuring act. This is why Lamb and C-SPAN were not active participants in the act's
passage. It would make little sense for Brian Lamb to advocate for easing cross-media
ownership regulations or for the cable industry to enter long distance telephone service.
365. Turner Broadcasting, Inc., et a1. v. Federal Communications Commission, et al.
366. NAB 97, Where Things Stand: A Status Report on Major Telecommunications Issues, "Must
Carry" Broadcast and Cable. April 9, 1997,41.
367. Mark Landler, "Either Way, Lineup is Mostly Set," New York Times, April 1, 1997, D5.
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Instead, Lamb took his fight against must carry to the Supreme Court, the FCC, the FTC,
and the press.
Despite the MSOs general opposition to must carry and support of C-SPAN,
Lamb was forced to "...tread[] very carefully on this issue due to its singular position in
the industry."368 When must carry first passed, some cable systems broke existing
contracts with C-SPAN to drop the network. Responding to this situation, Lamb said
"Would you like to sue your own board members?,,369 When C-SPAN was being cast
aside by MSOs, Lamb openly voiced his frustration with his "sponsors," stating "To see
C-SPAN treated this way by its own industry continues to be difficult to take.'mo This
sentiment would be replaced by a disdain for federal regulators, but not immediately.
Between the passage of the 1992 act and debate around the 1996 act Lamb sought
to have more access to Congressional hearings and floor sessions. Specifically, Lamb
wanted to install his own cameras in the floor chambers so he might use "cut away" shots
of members reacting or listening to speeches (both chambers used fixed cameras shots
showing whoever is speaking). In addition to the floor sessions, Lamb wanted access to
conference committees, where the difference between the House and the Senate's desires
are hashed out. Lamb had sent a letter to the leadership of both the Senate and House
368. Carol M. Morrissey, "A Contemporary Endangered Species: C-SPAN," Law and Legal
Resourcesfor Legal Professionals, March 24,1997. http://www.llrx.com/congress/032497.htm
369. Elizabeth Kolbert, "Some Cable Systems Are Cutting C-SPAN for Other Channels," New York
Times, June 20, 1994, AI.
370. Christopher Stern, "FX Factor: C-SPAN Minus 200,000 Subs; Cable Systems Drop Public Affairs
Channels for New Fox Network; FCC Rules Cited," Broadcasting and Cable, May 9, 1994, 53.
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asking for these things.371 Lamb continued to protest must carry, but did so in the press
rather than the halls of Congress. Attempting to protest a law that was already passed
would not help him curry favor with the legislators. Within months of sending his letter,
leadership (e.g., Senate Majority leader Bob Dole) responded to Lamb's requests for
opening conference committees.372
Must carry was the largest of Lamb's concerns but it was not the only one.
Because the cable corporations were concentrating both horizontally and vertically, the
FCC was not the only regulatory body interested in cable. In 1995 Time-Warner bought
Turner Broadcasting, Inc.. Turner produced the 24 hour cable news network CNN. The
Federal Trade Commission was concerned Time-Warner would avoid competition by
keeping other 24 news networks off its cable systems. The FTC required Time-Warner
cable systems add a competing news network not owned by either Turner or Time-Warner.
Yet again, Lamb saw this intrusion into the free market by the government as "a
breathtakingly wrong-headed intrusion of the government into the news and information
business "373 His fear was C-SPAN would be dumped by Time-Warner MSOs to add the
additional news network. Because the ruling occurred while the Supreme Court was
considering if the federal government could require cable systems to carry types of cable
networks had not yet been made, Lamb used a First Amendment argument against the
371. "Lights, Camera, Congress!," editorial, Wall Street Journal, December, 21, 1994, A14.
372. Kim McAvoy, "Bob Dole Takes Action on Pledge for Better Access to Congress," Boadcasting
and Cable, January 2, 1995,50.
373. Rich Brown, "Lamb Slams FTC Plan," Broadcasting and Cable, December 2,1996,52.
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FTC: "Boiled down to its essence, you have the government commanding a speaker to
engage in a particular form of speech."374 By making it about free speech, the cable
networks neatly sidestep any question of self-interest. After the ruling Lamb admitted "It
is the law of the land, no matter how I feel about it, and you have to abide by it and you
have to understand it. In spite of what I may think, people who are a lot smarter than I
am decided that I'm just wrong." Now he was left with the facts: must carry caused cable
systems to drop C-SPAN. Authoring an editorial in the political insider magazine,
Washington Monthly, Lamb derided must carry legislation writing "With limited channel
capacity, a number of cable companies were forced to drop channels to comply with the
rule. Some chose to drop C_SPAN.,,375 The piece's title summarized the role Lamb cast
the network in: "An Accidental Victim." In another article, Lamb specifically quantifies
the damage, stating C-SPAN had lost 119,790 subscribers over seven cable systems in
1997.376
As has been established above, the loss of subscribers was reported by the network
itself and these figures appeared fluid. A year later, when digital technologies would
open up more channel capacity Lamb wrote a letter to key lawmakers, urging them to
discontinue must carry.377 The president of the NAB, Edward Fritts, was frustrated with
374. Brown, 52.
375. Brian Lamb, "An Accidental Victim," editorial, Washington Monthly, March 1997,20.
376. Paige A1biniak, "C-SPAN's Loss is Fox News's Gain," Broadcasting and Cable, January 13,
1997,128.
377. Brooks Boliek, "C-SPAN Can't Bear Must Carry," The Hollywood Reporter, May 29,1998,4.
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Lamb's trope that must carry was harming C-SPAN and finally wrote Lamb a letter
(which he carbon copied to the same key Congress members Lamb sent his letter to).378
As part of the must carry Supreme Court case, C-SPAN was asked to provide evidence
must carry directly resulted in the network losing subscribers. In his letter, Fritts
summarized the very evidence Lamb provided the justices, and wrote "...figures produced
under oath show that"
•
•
•
•
•
Cable operators continued to carry 99.8% of the programming they had
before must carry was passed.
Between October 1992 and March 1995, the number of systems carrying
C-SPAN subscribers rose by 25%.
Between September 1994 to March 1995, the number of cable systems
carrying C-SPAN 2 rose by 45%
From October 1992 to March 1995 the number of C-SPAN's subscribers
rose 16% while C-SPAN 2 rose 52%.
Out of 11,000 cable systems, C-SPAN's witness could only identify 8
systems that dropped C-SPAN, and 8 more that dropped C-SPAN 2.
Among these 16 systems, the witness was unable to equivocally provide
evidence that must carry caused the drop.
A cable trade magazine described Fritt's letter as "sarcastic and condescending" but
stopped short of calling his conclusions false. In written testimony submitted to Congress
about digital must carry, Lamb sidestepped the evasive figures, writing
this is not a numbers game. The [NAB] lawyers and the [NAB] lobbyists
can try to minimize the damage to our public service efforts by citing
overall carriage growth. [... ] But in doing so they miss the fundamental
point: there are thousands of real people who watch, vote, write, think and
care about their country who continue to have less television access to their
378. Edward Fritts, Letter to Brian Lamb, May 29,1998, available from: FCC CS Docket no. 98-120,
"Carriage of the Transmissions of Digital Television Broadcast Stations. Amendment to Part 76 of the
Commission's Rules," Reply Comments of the National Association of Broadcasters, Exhibit C, Letter to
C-SPAN, received December 22, 1998.
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government today than before the 1992 Act, no matter how many
subscribers we may have gained since.379
Lamb's "big picture" is that it does not matter how many homes do not get C-SPAN
because of must carry, the fact legislation takes his public affairs network off the cable
systems is the problem. Although it is not about the figures, interestingly, in his verbal
testimony the thousands of subscribers losing C-SPAN turned into millions and was even
underscored by an ominous threat: C-SPAN and other lesser viewed channels "...will be
gone, I guarantee you, in millions of homes. I can promise you that.,,38o Shortly after that
Lamb offered an specific number, 10 million. Whether must carry actually affected the
carriage of C-SPAN is a study onto itself. What is important to note is Lamb attempted
to use the threat of a disappearing C-SPAN to as leverage against legislation the cable
industry was opposed to. That is the true "big picture."
Lamb did not only vent his spleen before Congress. His frustration culminated in
a speech to the National Press Club. "There are very good people out there running these
cable systems today but they're under enormous pressure and under a very strained
system. All the touting of the fabulous telecommunications act from both parties is yet to
be realized." It is comments such as this, Lamb recognizes the pressures of a marketplace
but he continued to steadfastly defend the system that was doing this to his network.
379. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, "Transition to HDTV," 105lh Congress, 2nd sess., July
8,1998,22.
380. Ibid., 21.
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Lamb's main task with his speech was to publicly debunk the myths surrounding
C-SPAN. Lamb addressed federal regulations with myth number four: cable systems
have to carry C-SPAN. Lamb said "we've taken more hits in the last few years than
anybody in the business because of legislation that passed on Capitol Hill," but
diplomatically added "I don't think anybody [Congress members] did this
intentionally."381 The loss of C-SPAN due to must carry or other federal actions was
portrayed as an unintentional consequence of interfering with the free market. If
anything, Lamb was sardonically amused by the fact Congress could be responsible for
C-SPAN being cast aside because it was Congress that originally wanted an additional
media outlet outside of the broadcast network newscasts to reach the citizens. "It's early,
but wouldn't the irony be interesting if we're the ones that are getting kicked off all these
systems. That the Congress passed the law that resulted in the loss of C-SPAN around the
country."
As it turned out, Lamb was frustrated more with the intentional actions of the
industry more than the unintentional consequences of legislation. "Myth number six:
C-SPAN will always be around." This was perhaps the biggest myth Lamb wanted to
debunk and he spent considerable time disabusing the audience of the notion the citizens
of the U.S. had a right to have C-SPAN. "Don't ever think that anything is going to be
around forever. There are no guarantees in this business." At this moment Lamb switched
from critiquing government interference in the marketplace to the behavior of particular
381. Brian Lamb, "Debunking the Myths," Speech before the National Press Club, January 6, 1997,
transcript from: http://www.c-span.org/about/company/debunk.asp?code=DEBUNK2
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participants in the marketplace. "C-SPAN 2 just got bumped off 10 cable television
systems in the U.S. for Fox News. And this all happened because Rupert Murdoch."382
Lamb was referring to the practice, pioneered by Murdoch during this period, of cable
networks paying MSOs to carry their programming. Most cable channels incentivized
MSOs to carry their network by lowering, or delaying collection of, the per-subscriber
affiliate fee. In what amounted to a paradigm shift in cable network practices, Murdoch
offered to pay MSOs $10-11 per subscriber to carry Fox News.383 Murdoch would still be
able to collect advertising revenue and, once Fox News was established with a large
enough audience, start charging an affiliate fee. Lamb summarized the problem with
this practice by pointing out C-SPAN could not compete with this: "We don't make
money for anybody. We don't return a profit to anybody."384 If this is true the industry
provides C-SPAN for public service reasons-just as has been touted since C-SPAN's
inception. In another interview Lamb was asked whether C-SPAN was self-supporting.
Lamb responded "Yes. And we operate just like every other cable television channel does;
we get a percentage of the bill every month. [...] [W]e've been on our own for a long
time.,,385 Alone, just like every other participant in the market. This is born out by the fact
cable systems and C-SPAN never explicitly state the network's existence depends on
382. Lamb, "Debunking the Myths."
383. Albiniak, 128.
384. Lamb, "Debunking the Myths."
385. Brian Lamb interviewed by Don West and Sara Brown, "America's Town Crier," Broadcasting
and Cable, July 21, 1997, 70.
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"donations." C-SPAN is "provided" to viewers.386 In a set of advertisements taken out in
the political insider's paper, Roll Call, C-SPAN accurately-if diffusely-states the
network is "privately funded to serve the public by America's television cable
companies." This is opposed to public funding by the government or public nonprofit.
C-SPAN's programming is distributed to MSOs for a fee; its IRS 990 form lists the
networks' revenue specifically coming from "fees for programming."
On one hand Lamb demonstrates a level-headed assessment of the realities of
having a nonprofit network within a for-profit industry in a capitalist society. On the
other hand, Lamb paradoxically places his network above this political economic reality.
What's been going on is that we're trying to build a tradition. One, frankly,
that can't be taken away from the American people. And that tradition is
that this will be a place that can't be bought, can't be merged. can't be
traded. It will be a place that, when any of us leaves here, will continue the
mission of letting the American people see the political system as it is,
without comment or analysis. 387
Capital eschews tradition. Only through abstracting his network apart from the larger
market practices is Lamb able to state his network is a "tradition." As this chapter has
demonstrated, it makes no sense to remove the network from the industry's goals and
values. C-SPAN is stronger, more secure, because the industry made considerable gains
-some economic, some political. The three acts presented in this chapter demonstrated
how C-SPAN's existence is tied to the political economic goals of its sponsors. One fact
remains, C-SPAN is still around and the industry still needs visibility in Washington D.C..
386. C-SPAN Advertisement, New York Times, January 11, 1999, A6.
387. Lamb, "America's Town Crier."
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Conclusion
Because it was a product of the cable industry and because it featured Congress,
there should be little surprise in the fact C-SPAN was intimately tied into the cable
industry's lobbying efforts. At times, as this chapter reveled, C-SPAN was only indirectly
involved (eg., the 1984 act). But the chapter also demonstrated how C-SPAN was not
content to side on the sidelines and let the sponsoring industry speak for it when it came
to must-carry. Lamb went from observer to political participant when anti-cable
legislation came up that potentially affected his network. As the chapter found, claims
must-carry would ruin C-SPAN were not well supported given the network came out of
the period with substantially more subscribers than it had before must-carry. Every
citizen has the right to advocated and lobby for a political cause and for Lamb, his cause
is letting the free-market control the communication system in the U.S.
While this chapter looked at the political advantages of sponsoring C-SPAN, the
next chapter the study examines the ways the network supports the economic needs of the
cable industry. C-SPAN's board and executive committee are composed of all the major
cable company CEOs and presidents. C-SPAN does not represent the cable industry, it is
the cable industry. The next chapter clearly explains how the network is able to harness
public service to the requirements of business. Through analyzing documents produced
by C-SPAN and an interview with a C-SPAN manager, the next chapter reveals the ways
in which the values of business are interwoven into its public service initiatives.
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CHAPTER VIII
C-SPAN: MARKETING AN INDUSTRY, PROMOTING NEOLIBERALISM
We are not the big revenue generating ad sales, rating-driven...l know
where we fit in their mindset of their business plan. 1know which business
or policy objectives that their companies are pursuing that my company
might be able to help them get. 388
-Peter Kiley, C-SPAN Vice-President for Affiliate Relations.
When the term "public affairs" is used in connection with C-SPAN the natural
inclination is to think of the network's outstanding programming options. So
synonymous is the network with this type of programming, C-SPAN is know as "the
cable industry's public affairs channel.,,389 Public affairs programming is central to the
mission of C-SPAN and one of the three components setting it apart from all other
national cable networks (the others: ownership structure and funding mechanism). When
used in conjunction within the business needs of corporations public affairs has a
different connotation: public relations.
388. Peter Kiley, Association of Cable Communicators; Resources, ACC Videos, "Career
Connections," http://www.cablecommunicatOfs.org/resources_vid.php
389. David Zurawik, comment on "C-SPAN Turns 30 Today-and it's Getting Younger," Z on TV
Blog; Baltimore Sun, comment posted March 19,2009.
http://web1ogs.baltimoresun.comlentertainmentlzontv/2009/03/cspan_turns_30_today_and_its_g.html
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Marketing: The Other Public Affairs
Corporate public affairs is a type of public relations effort that
represents an organization's efforts to monitor and manage its business
environment. It combines government relations, communications, issues
management and corporate citizenship strategies to influence public
policy, build a strong reputation and find common ground with
stakeholders.39o
In other words, public affairs is "Specifically the work of the lobbyist."391 This particular
subset of public relations was developed in the mid nineteen fifties in reaction to
historically specific threats to capitalism. "The birth of the public affairs movement can
be related to two elements: (a) the growing power of organized labor, and (b) the record
of the Eisenhower administration."392 The practice, and use of the term, begun with the
establishment of the Public Affairs Council (PAC) in 1954. PAC (who provide the above
definition of public affairs) was created to activate Eisenhower's desire the federal
government become "a silent partner" to big business.393 Public affairs was meant to be a
set of practices and a philosophy energizing corporate CEOs to step up their companies'
efforts in Washington to counter the growing lobbying power of labor. "Public affairs,"
as a public relations effort, was bound to the goals of private capital from the very
beginning. As we shall see, this remains true today.
390. Public Affairs Council, FAQ, "What is Public Affairs?" http://pac.org/faq
391. Jonathan Groucutt, Peter Leadley and Patrick Forsyth, Marketing: Essential Principles, New
Realities, (London: Kogan Page, 2004), 382.
392. Raymond L. Hoewing, "Dynamics and role of Public Affairs," in Lesly's Handbook ofPublic
Relations and Communications. 5th edition, ed. Philip Lesly, (Chicago: NTC/Contemporary Publishing,
1998),62.
393. Ibid..
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Broadly speaking, public affairs/public relations is undergoing a radical
transformation. Not long ago PR professionals were spokespeople, those who spoke on
behave of the corporation. This is changing. With the faltering sales effort managers are
embracing a more holistic approach to increasing sales. Advertising's effectiveness has
plateaued-the victim of over-saturation and increasingly fragmented audiences.
Marketing, once thought to be a management function is being transformed into an
all-encompassing philosophy central to every aspect of a corporation.394 No longer is a
marketer exclusively someone who develops and brings a product to market, it is anyone
who can carry the corporate vision forward to the multiple constituencies (or in the
parlance of corporations, "stakeholders") while ensuring increased profits. Unfortunately
for this new breed of cross-trained marketers, "Only in a few organizations do executives
and peer managers view marketers accurately as generators of cash.,,395 CEO's are not the
only one's hesitant to label public affairs as a form of marketing-many PR practitioners
saw the role of spokesperson more akin to an ethical ombudsman than a salesperson
shilling the company's products. Two nationally known marketing strategists, sounding
remarkably like critical political economic scholars, fervently warn PR professionals to
admit what, ultimately, their job is about: "Too many PR professionals complain about
the PR industry having 'sold out' to marketing. Sold out? How can you sell out to the
most important function of a corporation, marketing? All other corporate functions exist
394. Groucutt, 8.
395. Roy A.Young, Allen M. Weiss and David W. Stewart,. Marketing Champions: Practical
Strategies for Improving Marketing's Power, Influence, and Business Impact, (London: John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., 2006), 16.
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to serve the marketing function. Marketing doesn't exist to support manufacturing, for
example. It's actually the reverse. Manufacturing exists to support marketing. It's brand
building, you can always 'outsource' things like manufacturing and distribution.396 The
idea seems counter intuitive-the physical act of production is secondary to the primary
goal of sales-until we recall the priority given to commodities' values within a capitalist
political economy.
Use-value matters little to exchange, and as we shall see, is socially constructed.
Use-value does help marketing professionals cling to a sense of worth of the work they
do. "We also believe that marketers have much to contribute to the welfare of society. At
their best, marketing professionals generate profits for their firms by providing relevant
products and service that meet real needs of human beings."397 This is a fundamental
explanation of capitalism's social value---capitalism rose the absolute level of material
wealth in the world. The problem with this simplistic notion (aside from ignoring the
growing extremes in relative wealth levels), particularly when marketing is being
considered, is it bypasses the fact use-value is not always inherent to a commodity. Utility
can be manufactured. Is a good really useful to humans if the use-value was created by a
marketer and then effectively sold to the consumer? How many goods does a human
need? As Marx pointed out, while physical needs may be quite limited for humans,
psychological need is limitless. This is fortunate for capitalist marketers. Marketers do
396. Al Ries and Laura Ries, The Fall ofAdvertising and the Rise ofPR, (New York: Harpers
Business, 2002), 278.
397. Young, x.
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not sell goods, they convince us a commodity has a use we would be unable to discern on
our own. From this ideological position, a good is not a good when it is created but
when it is marketed. In any case, the actual act of production-under what social
circumstances a good is created-is cast a tertiary role. In such a world, we are relegated
to being consumers, not citizens, not even the workers who produce the goods.
A commodity is a commodity because it has an exchange-value; a good produced
for no other purpose than to perpetuate the creation of capital. A commodity is not
brought into this world to do good, it was made to create capital (the goal of the capitalist
is not to consumer the goods his or her workers produce). It does not matter what a
capitalist makes as long as it can be converted into more capital. While each profession
represented by marketing may have slightly different ideologies to justify their self-worth,
advertisers, public relations representatives, lobbyists, financial analysts, and managers
must ultimately justify their existence to the corporation. Corporations are interested in
exchange-value. For this reason there is a turf war among marketing employees forced to
vie for credit of who increases an organization's bottom line the most. Even if a good has
unique social uses, if it is not sold in quantities to ensure continued growth of capital, it
will disappear. It is this context through which we need to analyze the cable industry's
need for public affairs (both public service and PR) and how C-SPAN is able to fulfill
these needs.
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Marketing Cable
The professional organization of public affairslPR professionals within the cable
industry is The Association of Cable Communicators (ACC). The goal of ACC's
members is "...to help achieve industry and corporate goals" of the cable companies.398
To this end, two ways the ACC determined it can accomplish this are: 1) to "Build a
market environment for increased public acceptance and use of the industry's products
and services, and 2) to "integrate social goals and their accomplishment with industry and
company business goals."399 The first goal reinforces the idea that public affairs is no
longer easily defined as lobbying but encompasses the broad concept of marketing where
advertising, public relations, and lobbying all come together under the general catch-all
term "image management." The second goal highlights the ideology that business goals
and social goals are separate. This conflict gives public affair professionals a role-to
marry society's values to business values. With the overall purpose of cable public
affairs being "to help achieve industry and corporate goals" there can be little doubt
which value is perceived to be the dominant "partner" in the marriage. The ACC as a
professional organizations is primarily interested in garnering respect for its practitioners
through professional development. The ACC Forum is the organization's annual
convention where trends are identified and the skills needed to exploit these trends are
learned.
398. Association of Cable Communicators; About Us, "Strategic Plan,"
http://www.cablecommunicators.org/aboutus_strategic.php
399. Ibid..
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The theme of the ACC's 2004 Forum was "Communicating Cable's Values.,,4oo
From the titles of the panels and sessions, it is easy to see what those in public affairs see
as their industry's main values. Sessions such as "Marketing is not the Big Bad Wolf-
Selling Through Public Relations," "Understanding the Importance of Financial
Communications," "Public-Private-Partnerships for Events, Projects and Special Events"
indicate values acutely attuned to the needs of business. Amid these events was a
luncheon keynote address featuring a familiar name.
On the third day, during the lunch break, Brian Lamb interviewed Time-Warner
Cable CEO, Glenn Britt. The event was sponsored by Time-Warner Cable and billed as
Lamb and Britt "go[ing] one-on-one about public affairs."401 Despite the oddly
confrontational tone to the title, the interview was a meeting of minds on how important
public affairs were to a cable operator's bottom line. Which kind of public affairs became
blurred. In the mind of business there is no difference between public service and the
practice of building your company's image. As we shall see, if a public service failed to
improve a company's image it may still qualify as a public service but it was not
something to be labeled effective public affairs. Lamb began the interview asking why
public affairs was important to the cable industry.
400. Association of Cable Communicators; Forum 2004 Program Outline, Forum, Forum Archives,
Forum 2004, "2004 Program." http://www.cablecommunicators.org/forum_archives.php#a2004
401. Brian Lamb interviews Glenn Britt, Association of Cable Communicators; Resources, ACC
Videos, Video Archives, "Career Connections," http://www.cablecommunicators.org/resources_vid.php
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Britt answered that public affairs is a marketing tool, one to be used by the public affairs
practitioners.
It's about marketing and it's very narrow minded to assume that marketing
is limited to direct mail pieces and advertising. It's the way the company is
presented. The things we do in the communities that, some of which are
subject of the awards that are given here, are all a part of this image.
They're good things to do first of all but if you look at our industry from a
competitive standpoint we're local, we're part of communities, our
employees work in the community's being part of the fabric [... ].402
In summation, Britt matter-of-factly states "I think these things are good to do but it's
dollars and cents, it makes sense." This sentiment, as will be revealed further in this
chapter, is duplicated by C-SPAN. Any capitalist endeavor-if it is remains in existence
-must support the creation and accumulation of capital. In the last instance if any
activity does not assist in the accumulation of capital it cannot be called a capitalist
project. From the perspective of a citizen an act of public service is inherently good if it
has social/democratic utility but it is only good from the perspective of capital if it has an
exchange value. According to the man in charge of the second largest cable corporation
in the U.S., how a company is perceived in a community is perhaps the single most
important way a company can increase its bottom line. Britt stressed the value cable
public affairs practitioners lies in their ability to "talk to all of the other constituencies we
have," including: the press, politicians, regulators and wall street.403 Britt contrasted the
work of public affairs to traditional "marketers," (i.e., advertisers) who speak to only one
audience: the consumers.
402. Brian Lamb interviews Glenn Britt.
403. Ibid..
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It may seem odd to those who know Lamb only as the demure CEO of C-SPAN is
acting as an expert in promotion. After all Lamb is the man who prohibits his on-screen
hosts from introducing themselves to prevent C-SPAN from promoting personalities over
programming,. Before Lamb is canonized as saint of the objective, recall he began his
political career as a spokesperson, first for Senator Peter Dominick of Colorado and then
for Nixon's Telecommunications Communications Office. It was his job to ensure the
image for a low-ranking senator and an extremely powerful, and controversial, executive
office worked to advance the respective goals of each. Once he founded C-SPAN, Lamb
spent the next thirty-plus years trying to get the public and politicians to recognize "This
industry deserves a lot more credit for doing the right thing than they ever get in a society
that's very cynical right now.,,404 The choice of interviewers was strategic and it points
towards an aspect of C-SPAN not regularly addressed by the network, its supporters, or
scholars; C-SPAN is designed to be used as promotional tool for the cable industry.
Though he resolutely refuses to acknowledge his network is primarily a public
relations tool, Lamb knows cable operators and corporations value the public service he
offers as a marketing tool-hence his high-profile presence at the convention. The best
PR practitioners are the ones who believe in what they are saying and not the ones who
simply "spin" news. Although C-SPAN's "public affairs" is the political and
governmental programming, those who operate C-SPAN (recall the networks' board and
executive committee are composed of the leading cable CEO's) understand how easily it
404. Brian Lamb interviewed by Don West and Sara Brown, "America's Town Crier: Brian Lamb of
C-SPAN," Broadcasting and Cable, July 21, 1997,70.
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is converted into the other type of public affairs-public image. C-SPAN does not need
to actively promote itselJfor its survival. The cable industry sponsorship secures stable
funding and its non-profit status eliminates the profit motive. The network was not
created to attract attention to itself, it is built to promote the cable industry. Perhaps no
better example of this function is the 1998 "Cable's Gift to America" ad campaign.
To celebrate its twentieth anniversary in 1999 C-SPAN spent $2M (one half of its
entire marketing budget) on a series of print and television ads. The ways these ads
contribute to creating a myth surrounding C-SPAN's existence was discussed in chapter
three; now we will examine the intent behind the rhetoric. Full page ads were taken out in
consumer publications but the major push was to get local MSO operators to use some of
their "ad avail" slots during major cable programming to run ads celebrating C_SPAN.405
1998 was an important year for the cable industry-broadcasters were attempting to bring
the must-carry mandate into the digital era by proposing new legislation. Due to the
efficient use of bandwidth, digital technology allowed broadcasters to broadcast mUltiple
channels in the same bandwidth they broadcast one analog channel in. Broadcasters
wanted these additional channels to be carried by cable MSOs under the provisions of
"must-carry" just as the older single analog channels were. Despite the timing of the ads,
and the fact Lamb's long standing opposition to any form of must-carry legislation was
well documented, Lamb insisted "the ad campaign has nothing to do with the impending
405. John M.Higgins, "e-SPAN Spending $2M on Image Ads," Broadcasting & Cable, December
21, 1998, np.
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must-carry debate.''406 Industry reporters were less convinced, "Seeking to help MSOs
build some political capital, C-SPAN is planning to celebrate its 20th anniversary with a
$2M image ad campaign touting its backing from cable operators.,,407 The campaign was
headed, not by C-SPAN, but by Comcast Chairman (and founder), Ralph Roberts.
Roberts lamented "most viewers wouldn't know that C-SPAN is a gift from the cable
industry to the American people."408 More importantly, the campaign would get the
industry some credit in Congress. "The very Congress that throws rocks at us doesn't
give credit for [C_SPAN].,,409 While Lamb deflected any connection between the ads and
specific legislation, an unnamed spokesperson for C-SPAN was quoted as saying the
campaign was to "remind viewers that nonprofit organization is creation of cable
industry."410 During the same time period, Bill Daniels-regarded as the founding father
of cable television411-wrote an editorial in a trade publication imploring cable executives
and managers to consider the marketing value of the good deeds the industry undertakes.
The prime example, unsurprisingly, was C-SPAN. "We have spent over $300 million to
create and fund C-SPAN and C-SPAN 2, and this effort should continue. However, it's
time we used networks such as these more to our advantage to build a positive reputation
406. Higgins.
407. Ibid..
408. Mass Media, Communication Daily, December 16, 1998, np.
409. Higgins.
410. Ibid..
411. "Cable Pioneer Bill Daniels Dies," Hollywood Reporter, March 8, 2000, p.l.
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for our industry cross promotions, more coverage of our wired schools and hospitals for
distance learning-whatever it takes, we must be more diligent and forceful with our
message that cable is doing the right thing.,,412 Cable was doing the right thing by
offering C-SPAN, as opposed to offering yet more light entertainment fare, but it means
nothing if the fact is not known. Marketing C-SPAN was-and is-a key component to
the industry's ability to market itself. One thing about the campaign becomes clear, the
industry is less interested in marketing the channel to the public than letting those in
power know about the industry's commitment to public service. While C-SPAN does not
constitute the whole of cable's dedication to public service, it is the "crown jewel" of
cable's public service efforts.
C-SPAN's Marketing Department
The current melding of public relations, lobbying, advertising under the umbrella
term "marketing" is clearly reflected in C-SPAN's structure. C-SPAN does not have a
public relations or public affairs department, it has a marketing department. The
department's work is divided among several areas, including: the C-SPAN bus,
community relations, education relations and affiliate relations.413 All four sections are
interrelated and staff move between the areas. Aside from specialized reports or
interviews in trade magazines, this aspect of the network has not been analyzed. The
412. Bill Daniels, "A Defining Moment," Broadcasting and Cable, November 16, 1998,3.
413. C-SPAN, Employment; "Internship Fall 2010," http://www.c-span.org/AboutlEmployment.aspx
& College of Business, Current Students; "Internships," Tennessee State University, www.cob.tnstate.edu/
announcement-CSPAN%20interns.pdf
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preference for studies and supporters of the network is to begin at the network's product,
public affairs programming, then study the results of this programming on the audience,
the politicians, the media systems as a whole and even US democracy. Critical political
economy teaches us the best place to start a structural analysis is at the level of
production.
If a cable network is to survive its programming has to be purchased. Cable
MSOs purchase programming from network owners, assign them a channel, and then sell
a package of channels to the consumers. Once an audience is established, the MSO can
sell advertising slots ("ad avails") to local businesses. For cable networks, marketing
programming to MSOs is referred to as "affiliate relations." When a cable system buys
programming from a network it becomes an affiliate of the network. Networks provide
content and do not own the infrastructure, they are dependent upon the cable MSOs to
distribute the programming.414 Cable networks must be responsive to the needs of the
MSO's and "affiliate relations" departments and personnel are a standard feature among
larger cable networks. Sometimes they are listed as "sales" or "distribution" but the
departments all perform similar tasks. Those working in affiliate relations negotiate
programming deals with MSOs, help roll out new products (i.e., channels or shows) and
assist in all aspects of national marketing.415 Affiliate relations is a business-to-business
414. Note: With the recent purchase of NBC-VA by Comcast this may no longer be the case. The
Comcast/NBC-VA deal is a classic example of how media corporations are becoming vertically integrated,
controlling both production and distribution of media goods.
415. Multichannel News website. "Jennifer Dangar." http://www.multichannel.comlww/4115-
Jennifer_Dangar.php
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function as opposed to "public relations" which deals with marketing services directly to
the public, although, as we shall see, the line is no longer as definitive as if might once
have been. Like other national cable networks C-SPAN has an affiliate relations
department.
The VP in charge of Affiliate Relations at C-SPAN is Peter Kiley. Indicating how
intertwined business and public service goals are at C-SPAN, Kiley reports to both of
C-SPAN's COO's-Kennedy for business items and Swain for public service
endeavers.416 Among his industry peers he is considered as one of the best public affairs
practitioners in the business.417 Like all the senior management at the network, Kiley has
been with C-SPAN a long time-twenty five years. He has not rested on his laurels
within the confines of C-SPAN and was recognized as a leader in the field by being
elected as the ACC president from 2003 to 2005. Like all affiliate relations directors,
Kiley attempts to increase subscription numbers for the network but unlike other network
affiliate relations managers, Kiley has an additional, more pressing charge. Kiley boils
his job down to a single task: "to ensure the MSO's providing C-SPAN get credit for
doing SO."418 This is not like other national cable networks, who seek and monopolize
attention for their network. A typical affiliate relations manager would want to build the
brand of their networks to increase the asking price with MSOs. This is not C-SPAN's
416. Peter Kiley, (VP Affiliate Relations, C-SPAN) interview with the author, February 23, 2006.
417. M.C. Antil, "M.C. Antil's Cab1eFo1ks: Peter Kiley," Cablefax, August 28,2007, np.
418. Peter Kiley, interview with author.
222
directive. "Sure, we wish we got more credit from affiliates for what we do, but that's not
our nature. We don't spend $55 million promoting ourselves. This is what we do. What
other fully distributed network volunteers to go into a market-a tough market-to help
an affiliate, then works 19-hour days, does its job and just moves on?,,419 When C-SPAN
is abstracted apart from the cable industry, Kiley's sentiment appears selfless; the
network tirelessly puts the needs of the industry before its own needs. When the network
is not considered as an autonomous public service but as an symbol for the cable industry
itself, however, the act reveals different motivations.
The guiding policy of C-SPAN is public service but, according to Kiley, before
any major action is undertaken by the network, managers first ask "If we do that, does it
help policy or business objectives?"420 If an action has tremendous value as a public
service but cannot be converted into capital the CEOs of the MSOs will "pat C-SPAN on
the back but point out it does not meet their objectives."421 (Just as industry executives
did to Lamb when he was trying to pitch C-SPAN as a "Meet-the-Press" style public
affairs network.) The implication is clear-the next project had better meet business
objectives. In 2008, during the Presidential campaign C-SPAN partnered with the
Midwest cable giant, Mediaone, to produce regional programming about the elections.
The event was "a home run and gave C-SPAN some nice content," but more than that,
419. Peter Kiley, interview with M.e. Antil, "M.C. Antil's CableFolks: Peter Kiley," Cablefax,
August 28, 2007, np.
420. Peter Kiley, interview with author.
421. Ibid..
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Kiley's team "used it as one more occasion to spread C-SPAN's cable message: 'C-SPAN
was created by the cable industry. It's not a government channel. It is a public service and
exists because your local cable company is a good corporate citizen.,,422 Kiley and his
staff preemptively screen services for compatibility with business objectives. It is
Herman-Chomsky's Propaganda Model applied to media services instead of journalistic
content. The values of capital are so ingrained by C-SPAN's staff very few, if any,
services will be undertaken or expanded if they do not also contribute to the sponsoring
corporations' bottom line. The use of the Internet is a perfect example.
C-SPAN has the largest, most accessible, archive of online video and audio of
any national cable network. Most cable networks show edited snippets of popular shows
-enough to pique interest but not enough to substitute for a cable subscription. These
clips are often sponsored by advertisements and frequently available for a limited time.
From the beginning of the Internet, C-SPAN pursued the exact opposite course, making
as many clips available as possible and archiving a substantial number for later review. In
2010 the network completed a long-term project and made the staggering announcement
it was making 23 years worth of videos (160,000 hours) available to the public-free of
charge.423 The network posting all video it has produced since 1987 and because this
represents such a wealth of information has created a user-friendly search engine to mine
this vast resource. By adding buttons allowing user to embed the videos within
422. Peter Kiley, interview with M.e. Antil.
423. C-SPAN Press Release, "C-SPAN's Online Video Library Now Open to the Public," March 17,
2010, http://www.c-span.org/AboutlDefault.aspx
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individuals' MySpace and FaceBook webpages the network is not only enabling users to
share the videos, it is encouraging it. As the New York Times put it, "No other cable
network is likely to give away its precious archives on the Internet. [...] But C-Span is one
of a kind, a creation of the cable industry that records every Congressional session, every
White House press briefing and other acts of official Washington.,,424 And no other
network is giving away its precious archives on the Internet. Notice how effective
C-SPAN is at promoting the cable industry when the Times reporter, somewhat
superfluously, includes the fact the network is "a creation of the cable industry." There is
no doubt this act is incredibly valuable to researchers, journalists, elected officials and
everyday citizens but is it selfless? The answer lies in public affairs marketing.
At first glance, the migration of C-SPAN from a cable channel to an online
archive seems contrary to the goals of cable MSOs-who make money by offering
television programming via cable subscriptions. Why would cable subscribers want cable
television if they can receive the same content, free, on the web? This would be selfless.
No longer is the cable MSO limited to providing television, it is a full service
telecommunications company--capable of offering voice (phone), video (television), and
data (the Internet). In short, even if a web user watches a C-SPAN clip online there is a
good chance he or she is using cable high speed Internet access-and paying a market
determined price for the privilege. Since the 70's cable has has dominated the
424. Brian SeIter, "e-Span Puts Full Archives on the Web," New York Times. March 15,2010, http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/03/16/arts/television/16cspan.html
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subscription television market and it has increasingly worked to become the leading
provider of voice and data service-something that is currently held by the older telco's.
The largest cable corporation in the US, Comcast, considered 2009 a good year despite
losing 623,000 cable subscriptions. It gained 1 million Internet subscribers and 1.1
million phone customers.425 The future of telecommunications services is "bundling"
where you receive all of your mass media entertainment and communication needs from
one company. The "cable" company no longer indicates a television company. C-SPAN
was on the leading edge of this movement and any major disagreements about the
practice were settled a decade before.
C-SPAN has been streaming video online since 1997 and is considered one of the
pioneers of the technology.426 The decision to stream live video was not popular with
local affiliates, who saw a threat to subscriptions. General managers from local MSOs
began calling C-SPAN expressing their displeasure with the policy.427 From the outside it
appears as C-SPAN was putting its public service mission before the economic needs of
its sponsors. The real story is quite different. No major policy decision of a corporation
(for-profit or non-profit) is made without consultation, and vote, by the board. Recall
C-SPAN's board is a who's who of the cable industry's CEOs. To say C-SPAN embarked
on an online video project is not fully correct; C-SPAN's board decided streamed web
425. Comcast Corp., "Form lO-K, Filed 02/23/10 for the Period Ending 12/31/09," 5,
http://www.cmcsa.com/annuals.cfm
426. Online, Cable/ax, February 18, 1997, np.
427. Kiley, Peter. Interview with the author.
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video would be a beneficial product for the network to undertake. It was beneficial, not
because it was a good public service, but because it would help showcase the power of a
broadband Internet connection. Having been allowed to offer data services under the
Communications Act of 1996, the cable industry was seeking to make inroads as a
consumer ISP. As Kiley put it, "The big boy providers had also been trying to get people
away from dial up and this was another service offered to move people to broadband."428
The local general managers called C-SPAN and were mad, but because their bosses-the
corporation CEOs-made the decision, they could not be too mad. Once again,
C-SPAN's exchange-value was first perceived by those higher in the capitalist power
structure. The managers saw loss but the owners saw long-term political economic value.
The dilemma/opportunities of the Intenet is reflected in another technology-
video-on-demand (VOD). VOD is the process where a cable television viewer, with her
remote, selects the programming she wants to watch at that moment. Prior to VOD there
was pay-per-view (PPV). PPV allowed a subscriber to order (over the phone) a movie,
adult entertainment, or sporting event. These events were transmitted on channels
normally scrambled; when the subscriber ordered the event the channel would be
unscrambled for the duration of the PPV event. VOD is different because subscribers are
able to watch non-live events immediately, not wait for a predetermined time slot.
Additionally, technology allows networks to make hundred, if not thousands, of hours of
programming available. In March 2010 cable companies teamed with Hollywood studios
428. Kiley, Peter. Interview with the author.
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to undertake a $30M advertising campaign highlighting the service 429 One Hollywood
executive stated "VOD in the home is a fantastic consumer proposition and it's a strong
business with a good growth profile." VOD, while popular with Hollywood producers
seeking additional venues of distribution and the MSOs who would act as the new venue,
cable networks have not been eager to pick up the technology.
The issues with VOD are the same as streamed video: if viewers increasingly
chose their programming for themselves, networks' (which are nothing more than a
collection of programming located at one spot) brands are diminished. "One of a
programmer's big fears is losing its brand a sea of VOD programming."430 Strong brands
command high advertising rates based on the fact they are able to garner large audiences.
If networks provide free VOD content a viewer is effectively allowed to create her own
network-composed of programming from multiple networks. "Not surprisingly, the
more powerful networks-those with strong ratings, unique programming or widespread
brand identities-are more reluctant to provide content for free.,,431 Equally
unsurprisingly, the one network that thrives by subsuming its brand to the greater good of
the MSOs-C-SPAN-was an early adopter of VOD.432
429. George Szalai, "Studios, Cable Companies Team for VOD," Hollywood Reporter, March 17,2010,
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/hr/contenCdisplay/news/e3iff897d5a72be7303a6l4bf82f0965f8d
430. Matt Stump, Supplement; Special Report: Video-On-Demand, "Basic Nets Chew on VOD,"
Multichannel News, July 15,2002, lB.
431. Ibid ..
432. Ibid..
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Yet again, the hierarchal dichotomy of "the cable industry" becomes apparent.
MSOs wanted VOD because it highlighted the capacities of a cable subscription. It was a
service available on cable. The network owners did not want MSOs to provide the
service. As infrastructure owners, the MSO CEO's are not vested in particular networks;
they do not care what programming viewers watch as long as people sign up to use cable.
This is why the MSOs were not willing to forego the many gains the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 represented in exchange for an elimination of must-carry; the MSO's knew
the must-carry channels were popular and would attract customers to cable. C-SPAN
offered a perfect opportunity to test the capacities of digital cable and VOD because the
network is non-commercial and has nothing to lose. By offering VOD via C-SPAN the
MSOs introduce a new service to customers before the larger commercial networks might
be willing to do. Once demand is demonstrated, the commercial networks could be
pressured into offering it, using C-SPAN's practical experience with the service as a case
study to explore commercial applications. C-SPAN serves the MSOs, not other cable
programmers. C-SPAN's affiliate relations department is set up to assist MSOs in
"marketing [their] system with C_SPAN.,,433 When C-SPAN has joined with other cable
networks for a cause (e.g., Must Carry, Digital Must Carry, ala Carte) is when the MSO's
were also supportive of the network's position.
433. C-SPAN, Affiliate, "Market Your System," http://www.c-
pan.org/affiliates/members/marketcspan.asp
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All this is not to say that C-SPAN is not interested in its brand. C-SPAN is keenly
interested in extending its brand across any number of venues.434 What must be
remembered is that C-SPAN's brand is in service of the interests of the cable MSOs. As
has already been discussed, C-SPAN will not engage in any policy or service unless it
adheres the business goals of the sponsoring corporations. When C-SPAN distributes its
programming over cable's competitors it is not doing so solely based on principles of
public service, it is a political economic decision considering many factors.
In 2006 C-SPAN reached an agreement for AT&T to carry C-SPAN channels over
AT&T's new "V-verse" digital video network. By distributing video via a terrestrial
system of wires, telco's directly competed with cable companies. In keeping with its
public service mission, Peter Kiley explained his network was pleased "to bring our
informational programming to more Americans.,,435 From a public service standpoint the
decision makes sense but from a business perspective, why would cable give away its
"crown jewel" to competitors?
The 2006 deal with AT&T was not the first time C-SPAN offered its
programming to a competitor of cable-in 1999 C-SPAN struck deals with Direct
Broadcast Satellite providers (DBS), Echostar and DirecTV.436 Several large for-profit
434. Kiley, Peter. Interview with the author.
435. AT&T, Press Release, "AT&T U-verse to Include C-SAPN," September 13,2006,
http://www.att.com!genlpress-room?pid=4800&cdvn=news&newsarticleid=22697&mapcode=consumer
436. Echostar (now part of Dish Network), Press Release, "EchoStar Communications Corporation to
Offer Public Interest and Educational Channels," December 15, 1999,
http://dish.client.shareholder.com!releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=243930
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cable networks had also signed deals with DBS providers but their motivation is obvious
-more revenue and larger audiences to sell to advertisers. C-SPAN's decision to allow
its programming on DBS is apparently contrary to the thesis presented by this study:
C-SPAN exists to promote the cable industry. The decision seems to support the idea
C-SPAN is, as its owners and executives say it is, primarily a public service. One
important fact must be recalled-C-SPAN is selling its programming, like any other
network. These alternative television distributors are paying for the privilege of running
C-SPAN. C-SPAN is not giving away its programming. For C-SPAN to say it is
"provided by cable" is no longer one hundred percent accurate. DBS and the telco's are
paying affiliate fees to the network and these fees go into the daily operations. In
revisiting C-SPAN's motto (Created by Cable. Offered as a Public Service) we recognize
this truth; C-SPAN does not state the network is "funded" by cable but that it was
"created." With the additional revenue from DBS and the telco's C-SPAN could expand
its operations or use the money to subsidize the affiliate fees for the original cable
industry sponsors. The latter is a reasonable assumption given Lamb once attributed the
secret to his network's success was its low costs, stating "if you keep costs down, you
have a shot.,,437 The good news for cable MSOs is that while they may not provide one
hundred percent of the funds for C-SPAN they receive one hundred percent of the credit
and in the public affairs marketing game that is the most important thing. The C-SPAN
web video, explaining how C-SPAN is funded, stated "America's cable companies have
437. Lisa Horowitz, "e-SPAN's Lamb Says Web is News' Future," TV Week, November 20, 2008,
http://www.tvweek.com/newsI2008/11/cspans_Iamb_says_web_is_news_f.php
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been providing C-SPAN. "438 The number one goal of C-SPAN's public affairs
department is to ensure the cable industry revives the credit for C-SPAN. While C-SPAN
is distributed on a number of competing networks, C-SPAN's controlling body-the
board and executive committee-is exclusively composed of CEOs and presidents from
the cable industry. Competitors get the programming but have no voice, or ownership, of
the credit for funding or distributing it.
Additional revenue for cable's crown jewel and the ability of cable to monopolize
the credit for providing C-SPAN is only one reason C-SPAN's board allows the network
to be carried by non-cable competitors. When C-SPAN restricted public access of its
programming (e.g., Cobert and Spk. Pelosi) it received shift and cutting criticism from
the public and elected officials. From a public relations "public affairs" perspective, the
cable industry has no other option other than allowing non-cable television delivery
systems access to C-SPAN. To deny DBS or telco's television systems access to the
nation's premier public affairs programming network would be a brazen act of
selfishness, a clear admission cable is more interested in the credit than public service. If
cable did restrict access to C-SPAN it would be quite plausible Congress would step in
(spurred on by aggrieved DBS/telco television subscribers and DBS/telcos lobbists) and
investigate why C-SPAN gave cable a monopoly on its programming. The goal of any
network, commercial or non-commercial, is to expand its reach. This is true no matter if
the network is interested in profit or altruism. Restricting distribution would not only act
438. C-SPAN, "About Us," http://cspan.org/about/index.asp?code=About
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against the tenets electronic democracy, it is against business. How could C-SPAN
legitimately deny itself additional revenue? Even if there was a cost to C-SPAN (e.g.,
leasing additional satellite capacity) this could be built into the fee charged to new
distributors. There would not no feasible way even the most ardent public affairs
practitioner could spin C-SPAN's exclusion from increasingly popular distribution
outlets. The choice was obvious; allow alternative outlets to pay for the programming and
keep the credit. And those in the industry are eager to keep the credit. President of the
National Cable Television Cooperative (a programming and equipment purchasing
organization for MSOs) said "C-SPAN is the cable industry's gift to the Republic [... ]. It
wasn't started by the government, it wasn't started by some clown with a crazy idea about
making money. It was founded and run today, still run, by the cable industry. We support
C-SPAN through our monthly subscriber fees we pay to C-SPAN.439
In returning to the AT&T example we see another reality about the capitalist mass
communications marketplace: today's competitor could be tomorrow's partner. Putting
aside their differences in the hopes of reaping Federal stimulus money, AT&T and the
largest cable MSOs banded together in 2010 to create the "Digital Adoption Coalition.,,44o
As part of the $787 billion American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Congress
set aside $7.2 billion specifically for "broadband deployment projects" within
439. Mike Pandzik, interviewed by Liz Burke, August 11, 1999, transcript, The Hauser Oral and Video
History Collection, The Cable Center, Denver Co.,
http://www.cablecenter.org/education/library10ralHistoryDetails.cfm?id=155
440. One Economy Corporation, Press Release, "Public and Private Sectors Form Groundbreaking
Coalition to Support Broadband Adoption," nd, http://www.one-economy.com!
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under-and-un-served populations in rural and poor communities.441 The consortium,
which also includes computer giants, Dell, Intel and Microsoft, asked for $52.11 million
"To improve broadband access, services, and technology in approximately 250,000
low-income households nationwide ."442 It is very easy to make peace with a market rival
when it allows your corporation access to a quarter of a million new customers.
Especially when tax payers subsidize two-thirds of the cost. Before leaving the
noncompetitive nature of capitalist corporations, it is important to recognize an empirical
fact that sheds light on how "competing" capitalist corporations operate.
Until 2002, Comcast was a direct subsidiary of AT&T. In 1999 AT&T Broadband
purchased the nation's largest cable MSO: TCI. Two years later, in 2001, AT&T
Broadband merged with the third largest MSO: Comcast. One year after that, AT&T
spun off its broadband services into the Comcast Holdings Corporation.443 In the
monopoly capital marketplace a competitor is not only a potential partner, it is a potential
purchase. While Comcast is now financially separated from AT&T it is inappropriate to
speak of the two corporations as unrelated.
441. Grant Gross, "White House Awards First Broadband Stimulus Grants," PC World, December 17,
2009, http://www.pcworld.com/article/184977/white_house_awards_firsCbroadband_stimulus_grants.html
442. John Eggerton, "NCTA, Computer Companies, Telcos and Nonprofits Form Digital Adoption
Coalition," Broadcasting and Cable, March 23, 2010, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/450627-
NCTA_Computer_Companies_Telcos_and_Nonprofits_Form_DigitaLAdoption_Coalition.php
443. AT&T, Press Release, ''AT&T Board Sets Broadband Spin Off Date, Declares 1 for 5 Reverse
Stock Split And Names Five Members to Comcast Board," November 14, 2002,
http://www.corp.att.com/news/2002/ll/14-11068
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Public Affairs Are Local Affairs
Speaker of the House in 1977, "Tip" O'Neil allowed cameras into the chambers
and approved Brian Lamb's fledgling network to carry the signal outside of the halls of
Congress to the American people. O'Neil's widely recognized trademark
philosophy/mantra was "all politics is local.,,444 If we recall Time-Warner Cable's CEO
Glenn Britt's comments to Brian Lamb at the ACC convention, the same can be said for
the cable industry.
In 1997 Leo Hindrey was hired as the president of the nation's largest cable MSO:
TCL The company was weathering rough times and Hindrey began his tenure by
dramatically restructuring the company along regional, not technological, departments.
His intent was to return cable to its roots as a local service provider in communities.
Hindrey explained his decision by saying "This is still a local business and it should be
run as a local business." 445 Up until this point, the study has abstracted the cable MSOs
into national corporations with their primary interests being national business agendas
and federal regulations. Because a cable system has to apply for a franchise within
whatever local jurisdiction it operates, cable corporations are managed at the local level.
Corporate headquarters may set subscriber, ad sales and profit quotas but it is up to the
general manager to ensure the system operates smoothly within the political environment
of the franchising authority. Peter Kiley's job is to get the cable affiliates carrying
444. John Aloysius Farrell, Tip O'Neil and the Democratic Century, (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 2001), 65.
445. Thomas P. Southwick, "Cable Television: The First 50 Years," Cable World, December 7, 1998, 1.
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C-SPAN credit for doing so. His job is easier at the federal level-where C-SPAN has a
high profile-but difficult at the local level where officials don't fully grasp who offers
the network to their community.446 As show in the preceding chapters, C-SPAN largely
leaves the direct lobbying Congress up to the cable corporations and NCTA (although
Brian Lamb is a known figure to committee chairs). Cable CEOs frequently point to
C-SPAN as an example of what the industry does right if left unfettered. C-SPAN leaves
it up to the industry to decide how to best portray C-SPAN's public service aspects to
Congress. At the local level, however, C-SPAN becomes directly involved in crafting how
local cable operators can market themselves using C-SPAN.
Many local councils and commissions are televised on a cable channel strikingly
similar to C-SPAN. Instead of Congress, however, these cable channels provide gavel-to-
gavel coverage of local government meetings and bodies. Typically the staff is composed
of government workers or community volunteers. Unlike C-SPAN, these channels were
not entirely voluntarily. These Public, Educational, Government (PEG) channels were
negotiated when the cable system applied for a franchise to operate within the
community. The federal government does not mandate PEG channels but gives the local
authority the right to ask for them. The cable systems have long seen the loss of up to
three channels as a price they are willing to pay for operating as a de facto monopoly in a
community. Franchise authorities are federally prohibited from demanding cable systems
offer particular programming. If all politics is local, the local elected officials are likely
446. Kiley, Peter. Interview with the author.
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to focus on the mandated PEG channels rather than on if the operators voluntarily provide
C-SPAN. Knowing local officials are a powerful influence on the operations of a cable
system C-SPAN's affiliate relations department has developed promotional packages to
help the cable system market itself locally.
In 1993 C-SPAN came up with a brilliant way to local cable systems market
themselves within their communities using something as mundane as it turned out to be
effective: a bus. So popular have these rolling promotional vehicles become, C-SPAN
now operates two. The buses are mobile production studios that tour the nation, stopping
in local communities for students, teachers, and citizens to experience the network first
hand. C-SPAN states the bus visits "inform voters, empower teachers, enrich civics
education."447 Often C-SPAN producers will shoot a short piece about local history or
interview local students and educators about civics-related items. Especially in smaller
communities a visit from the bus is considered quite an occasion and often makes the
local news.448 The Abilene Reporter announced "C-SPAN fanatics will be happy to hear
the C-SPAN Civics Bus will visit the Mockingbird Branch of the Abilene Public
Library.,,449 The buses have their own homepage on the C-SPAN website. Under the
general "About the Bus" link C-SPAN explains it "launched its Bus program as a way to
bring the world of public affairs into schools and communities nationwide [... ] to discuss
447. C-SPAN, Bus Homepage, "C-SPAN's Civics Bus," http://www.c-span.org/schoolbus/index.asp
448. Stephanie A. Walken, "C-SPAN Bus Rolls into Yuma," Yuma Sun, March 11, 2010,
http://www.yumasun.com/news/bus-56898-span-mcguire.html
449. Education News, "C-SPAN bus cruising into Abilene," Abilene Reporter, April 2, 2010,
http://www.reporternews.com/news/2010/apr/02/atems-Iocation-in-question/
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media, public affairs, and C-SPAN's programming and free educational resources."450
The bus homepage features other tabs: "For Teachers," "FAQ's," and "For Media." There
is one link "For Affiliates" that sketches out another set of uses with different priorities.
From the perspective of eager young students and engaged teachers the bus offers a
unique opportunity to analyze and experience media's role in civics. C-SPAN "fanatics"
are given a chance to peek "behind the scenes" of their favorite network. From the
perspective of affiliates, the bus is an opportunity, first and foremost, to achieve some
quality public relations marketing. C-SPAN readily acknowledges this component and
informs affiliates it sends the bus out ''As a thank you to the cable industry for its
continued support."451 Yes, the network admits the bus is a way for it to highlight
C-SPAN's "unique brand of public affairs programming," but "It is also our way of
stressing your commitment to providing C-SPAN as a public service to your viewers."452
While C-SPAN bus visits have the ability to fulfill many uses for any groups, the actual
"Purpose of the Bus" is only revealed to the affiliates. Two of the three purposes are
obviously designed to meet the political economic needs of business before any
educational or civic goals. According to C-SPAN, the purpose of the bus is to
• Emphasize to your community that cable created and funds C-SPAN as a
public service.
450. C-SPAN, Bus Homepage; "About the Bus," http://www.c-span.org/schoolbus/about.asp
451. C-SPAN, Bus Homepage; For Affiliates, "System Visits," http://www.c-
span.org/schoolbus/cable.asp
452. Ibid..
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• Highlight your system's commitment to your community by hosting a
reception for local VIPs, local officials and school board members that
emphasizes cable's partnership with C-SPAN.
• Introduce students, teachers and Bus visitors to C-SPAN as an educational
resource. Visitors learn about the importance of media literacy and civic
engagement.453
The last purpose, to engage visitors in media literacy and civics, is the utility of the bus
visits. The general manager needs to know the bus visit will have a legitimate (i.e.,
noncommercial) use to the visitors or the system will look like it was shamelessly
promoting itself. Just as C-SPAN has to appear non-biased and non-sensational in its
programming to ensure it is seen as public service, the bus visits have to have a real
educational aspect to them. Notice the utility of the visits is the last purpose listed-
general managers are responsible for the systems bottom line and will not engage in any
activity they do not see as adding to the system's revenue. The system manager needs to
know what's in it for him. Once the manager is assured the real reason the bus would be
visiting, he or she will be open to what's in it for the public. Peter Kiley has stated the
education aspects of C-SPAN's public affairs campaigns are "Good for youth... but. .. the
real reason it is good is because it meets objectives of business."454 The educational
component is hardly contradictory to the goals of business and C-SPAN bus visits are an
all-inclusive package, costing the local system little-to-nothing out of pocket. The system
may decide to offer promotional tie-ins with local businesses or associations but, at the
453. C-SPAN, Bus Homepage; For Affiliates, "Purpose of the Bus," http://www.c-
span.orglschoolbus/purpose.asp
454. Kiley, Peter. Interview with the author.
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most basic, only needs to provide a parking lot. While the bus stops at historic sites,
museums, libraries, and national parks to shoot small "vignettes" its visits to communities
are always in conjunction with a cable system sponsor.
Moving from the public C-SPAN Bus Homepage to the more specialized Affiliate
Relations website exclusively set up for cable systems it becomes clear how the purposes
above are operationalized. Affiliates interested in learning the ways C-SPAN facilitates
their business needs can click on the "Market your system" link. The first way affiliates
can market themselves with the network is the bus. C-SPAN's affiliate relations
department has prepared a form letter the affiliate may use to "invite your key publics,
local government officials, and franchise authorities to tour the C-SPAN School Bus."455
The letter informs these potential guests "As part of our ongoing commitment to
education and public service, (name of cable system) is proud to sponsor a visit by the
C-SPAN School Bus." All the system has to do is fill in the blanks. C-SPAN has a list of
ways the local system can maximize the bus's visit. "Highlight your systems' commitment
to education and public service in your community by hosting a reception for local VIPs
centered around the C-SPAN School Bus visit. Tie the Bus visit into a community-wide
event such as a fair or parade and invite local officials and members of the community to
tour the Bus."456 Announcing the bus's visit to Bakersfield, California, Bright House (the
455. C-SPAN, Market Your System with C-SPAN, "Sample Letters," http://www.c-span.org/affiliates/
members/govofficialletter.asp
456. C-SPAN, Market Your System with C-SPAN, How to host the C-SPAN School Bus, "Bus Visit
Ideas," http://www.c-span.org/affiliates/members/busvisitideas.asp
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nation's seventh largest cable MSO) stated in a press release that "bringing the bus to visit
our schools and civic groups gives us the opportunity to showcase the great educational
resources cable television has to offer".457 The bus, as it turns out, fits perfectly with
Bright House's standing commitment to the local community: "Public affairs, social
responsibility, and community involvement continue to be major initiatives for Bright
House Networks as an ongoing commitment to the families and communities Bright
House Networks serves.,,458
C-SPAN suggests the system managers think of ways to tie in C-SPAN
programming to local organizations, museums, or institutions. A perfect example is using
C-SPAN's popular nonfiction book author interview program "Book TV" to partner with
a local bookstore or library as a way "...to get free publicity.,,459 At first a program about
books seems an odd fit for a network that specializes in Congressional meetings. Why
would the cable industry be interested in a program that highlights the publishing
industry? Time Warner Cable, the nation's second largest MSO, is part of Time Warner,
which owns Time Inc., one of the largest publishing corporations in the U.S.
Using public service programming to promote cable systems to local regulators
and subscribers is not limited to C-SPAN. C-SPAN pioneered the practice with "States of
the Nation," a series of programs produced from key cable markets during the 1984
457. Bright House Networks, Press Release, "Bright House Brings C-SPAN Civics Bus to
Bakersfield," February 2, 2010, http://brighthouse.comlbakersfieldJabout/1592.htm
458. Ibid..
459. C-SPAN, "Bus Visit Ideas."
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presidential campaign460 but commercial networks and MSOs soon learned the value of
public affairs efforts and began producing similar programming. Abstracting C-SPAN
from the industry it is part of makes no sense. A brief NCTA white paper highlighting
cable's contributions to public service programming begins by pointing out "While
broadcasters are demanding that Congress force cable operators to carry many untried
and untested channels, local cable systems have long filled the void of local programming
by developing dozens of local, regional and state community, news and public affairs
networks that offer a wide range of important programming. "461 Abstracting C-SPAN
from the business goals of the industry it is part of also makes no sense. Promoting
community involvement and educational value are built into the way cable public affairs
practitioners market cable television: "The integration of community outreach and public
affairs activities tied to business and policy objectives are vital components of our
industry's efforts to ensure customers, policy makers, and Wall Street understand new
products and service benefits."462 This quote is from Peter Kiley when he was acting as
the president of the cable public affairs practitioners association, ACe. At the 2004
NCTA convention, ACC sponsored a panel titled "Cable's Local Advantage: Public
460. ACC (formerly known as CTPAA), About Us; ACC History, "CTPAA Celebrates Twenty Years:
From Phone Booths to Roundtables," 2005, 4, http://www.cablecommunicators.org/aboutus_history.php
461. NCTA, White paper, "Cable's Regional and Local Public Service Programming," March 22,
2006, http://www.ncta.comlPublicationType/WhitePaper/595.aspx
462. Cable Television Public Affairs Association (now known as Cable Communicators Association),
Press Release, "CTPAA Sets Theme for Forum 2005 and Confirms Speakers," January 27, 2005,
http://www.cablecommunicators .org/press_release.php?id=I&year=2005
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Affairs and the Bottom Line,"463 chaired by Kiley. The panel, made up of public affair
managers from major MSOs and networks,
explore[ed] how portraying the right image of a cable company with a
local face can drive consumer decisions. [ACC] leaders will discuss how
operator/programmer public affairs initiatives increase awareness, sales,
and support for digital cable, interactive services, VoIP, and broadband
deployment. Topics will include how ad sales teams create a "win-win"
situation by tapping into local businesses wishing to have their names
affiliated with community outreach programs and how marketing/public
affairs partnerships can receive the biggest bang for the cable company's
buck,464
Selling a Public Service to the Public Sector: Cable in the Classroom
Unlike many industries, cable is able to integrate its actual products and services
directly into public service. A stunning example of this is Cable in the Classroom (CIC).
In 1989 the cable industry begun CIC and had the backing of 77% of the MSO
industry.465 At the heart of the project was wiring schools for cable and providing
educationally beneficial programming commercial free. The hardest thing CIC officials
had to deal with early on was building trust; school administrators feared the no-cost
aspect was simply a temporarily sales pitch.466 Over 81,000 public and private schools
have been provided access to cable under the program. MSOs, such as Comcast, offer
463. ACC, Publications; CPR Facts, "CTPAA at the National Show," April 23, 2004,
http://www.cablecommunicators.com/cprfacts_2004.php
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free installation of a set number of "drops" (typically meant to be installed in common
areas such as library or media center) and provides the school free cable service.467 CIC
should not be confused with Channel One-the controversial cable channel featuring
current affairs and educational programming along with commercials. CIC is an
initiative of the MSOs, in partnership with the national cable networks (who supply the
programming, stripped of commercials). Channel One is a for-profit network that makes
money by selling advertising slots. In return for the running the channel's commercially
sponsored reports in classrooms the Channel One pays the school's cable bill. The
non-profit CIC provides free broadband access and commercial-free programming. As
would be expected, C-SPAN's Congressional and historical programming is ideally suited
to CIC and the network was a founding partner. That CIC is designed to promote the
MSOs is apparent by the fact the website has a "How go get cable in your school" link,
that when clicked informs you "To get your school connected or to learn more about
what's available for your school, talk to your local cable company-they want to hear
from you1 468 Beneath its public service facade, CIC is a commercial venture. MSOs may
provide free installation and cable service but there is an effort to "up sell" school
administrators on purchasing business class communication packages for the school. The
Cable and Telecommunications Association for Marketing (CTAM) warns industry
insiders against such clumsy sales pitches and hungrily points out "With $536 billion
467. Comcast, "Cable in the Classroom Application," www.comcastnw.com/cic3Pplication.pdf
468. Cable in the Classroom, "How to get Cable in Your School," http://www.ciconline.org/get-cable
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spent in 2004-05 on K-12 education, there's a huge opportunity for cable to gain market
share,,469 using CIe. CTAM states "Cable has a lot to learn. It has no problem
impressing teachers with its commitment to education via Cable in the Classroom,
through which it provides free copies of shows and materials to schools. But it still hasn't
figured out how to gracefully add a business dimension to the relationship."470
Commodifying public resources is a key strategy of neoliberalism and public
service is seen merely as gateway towards selling other, non-public service products and
services. The network's marketing efforts, however, go far beyond promoting a specific
industry, they contribute to the convention wisdom that it is acceptable to be beholden to
private interests for access to public information.
C-SPAN: Model Public Service, Model for Global Neoliberalism
In the following section, three nations and their public affairs networks are
examined. These examples clearly demonstrate C-SPAN represents more than the idea of
gavel-to-gavel coverage of legislatures and political public affairs, it is a model of
ownership. C-SPAN is considered a world leader in public affairs television and the
experiences of Canada, Britain, and Australia indicate how deeply the market values of
C-SPAN are ingrained with ideas of public service. Brian Lamb once stated "If you tried
to start C-SPAN today, you couldn't. There wouldn't be room for it on cable systems;
cable companies wouldn't want it and they wouldn't pay for it. When we came along, it
469. "CTAM, CIC Clarify Education Pitch," Cable World, July 17,2006, np.
470. Ibid..
245
was all luck: Cable was new and they were looking for new ideas, and we had an idea that
didn't cost much.,,471 Aside from contradicting the concept C-SPAN is founded on deep-
seated charity and not material interests, the following examples will display how Lamb is
unable to discern the political economic forces at play behind his network. New
"C-SPANs" have continued to be started around the world.
Canada: As mentioned, C-SPAN is globally renowned for its coverage style and
programming. So much so "C-SPAN" has become shorthand for gavel-to-gavel public
affairs productions. What is less known is the content C-SPAN made its mark with-live
coverage of the House of Representatives floor sessions-was modeled on the Canadian
Parliament television coverage offered by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC).
In 1979, when Congress was opening itself up to television cameras Canada had been
broadcasting its parliament for two years. In 1977, Canada became the first nation to
broadcast their parliamentary sessions on live television.472 While C-SPAN may have
become known for its style, this study proposes it has made its mark on societies through
the funding and ownership model of private ownership. C-SPAN's global impact is in
promoting neoliberalism through public affairs television.
471. Brian Lamb interviewed by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, at the Conference on Broadcasting of
Parliamentary Business Through Dedicated TV Channels and Public Broadcasting Systems, Geneva,
October 6, 2004. Transcript available from the conference publication: "The Challenge of Broadcasting
Parliamentary Proceedings," www.ipu.org/pdf/publications/ebu_en.pdf
472. CPAC, About CPAC, History, http://www.cpac.ca/forms/index.asp?
dsp=template&act=view3&template_id=173&lang=e
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In the late 70s the Canadians decided television was an natural extension of public
records and they envisioned the telecasts as an "electronic Hansard," the name given to
the daily printed record of the debates of parliament.473 The Canadians also felt this
should be publicly owned. The televised record of parliament was produced by the
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) and distributed via broadcast and cable
channels. In the mid-80's the Canadian cable industry approached the CBC about the
possibility of expanding the Parliament Channel to include general public affairs
programming of the sort produced by C-SPAN. After reaching an agreement in 1988
both parties decided to create the Canadian Parliament Channel (CPaC). Since the
broadcasts are public property, the House of Commons had to approve, and in 1990
parliament gives it approval-with the stipulation that the gavel-to-gavel parliamentary
would continue to be the cornerstone of programming and that the channel not air
commercials. In late 1990 and early 1991 the financial crisis that was affecting the world
caught up with Canada and the federal government was looking at a $670 million revenue
shortfall.474 The CBC was asked to assume over $100 million in cutbacks and dropped
many services while cutting hundreds of employees.475 The Parliament Channel was one
of the services dropped. The House of Commons voted to fund a pared-down version of
473. Robert Marleau and Camille Montpetit, eds. "House of Commons Procedure and Practice,"
January 2000, ch. 24,The Parliamentary Record, Broadcasting Services, available from
http://www2.parl.gc.calMarleauMontpetitIDocumentViewer.aspx?Sec=Ch24&Seq=3&Lang=E
474. Richard Mackie, "Ontario Puts Off Spending Decisions, Jobs will be Lost, Laughen Admits,
Globe and Mail, November 20, 1991.
475. Christopher Harris, "CBC Cutbacks TV Made Abruptly Alter Emphasis off Local Programming,"
Globe and Mail, December 6, 1990.
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the channel out of its own budget. The private cable industry, which earlier was set to
partner with the CBC, soon took advantage of the federal crisis to gain sole ownership of
the channel. In 1991 a consortium of 27 cable companies offered to take over the
production and distribution of the channel "at no cost to taxpayers or cable
subscribers."476 This refrain will be familiar to anyone paying attention to the way
C-SPAN has promoted its services. A cash-strapped federal government had little option
but to accept. The first chairman of the Canadian Parliament Channel (CPAC) was Noel
R. Bambrough, an executive with one of Canada's largest cable corporations Shaw
Communications. The network is obviously modeled on C-SPAN and altruistic act of
Canadian cable corporations needs to be historically contextualized like C-SPAN.
Like U.S. cable corporations, Canadian cable corporations had to deal with federal
regulations. Since the 1970s the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications
Commission (CRTC) had restricted the importation of foreign (i.e., U.S.) programming
based on nationalistic cultural policies.477 The Canadian government specifically
restricted the importation of many types of American programming if it directly
competed with an Canadian equivalents. It was the Canadian version of "must-carry" and
it interfered with the cable operators bottom line. Just as with C-SPAN, the offer to
provide the nation's premier public affairs network appears less selfless when placed in a
context of a heavily regulated industry taking up a pet project of the government that
476. CPAC, About CPAC, History, http://www.cpac.ca/forms/index.asp?
dsp=template&act=view3&template_id=l73&lang=e
477. Marc Raboy, "Canada," In The Encyclopedia a/Television, ed. Horace Newcomb, Cary O'Dell
and Noelle Watson, (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1997), 282.
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regulates it. The Canadian government's preference for national content gives the
industry lobbying power while it simultaneously fulfilled the strict cultural policies at a
relatively low cost. What could be more Canadian than a channel dedicated to Canadian
politics? Being both a public and cultural service the industry can claim twice as much
credit.
Mirroring the motto of C-SPAN, CPAC's motto is "Created by Cable for
Canadians." If anything, CPAC's message is more direct in highlighting cable's role in
the network; the word "cable" is in pink while the rest of the words are in black.478 What
is not promoted is the government's role in CPAC. Canada, while it transferred
ownership to private hands still retained state control over content. CPAC's license had to
be approved by the CTRC. After seven years, in 1999, the original license was up for
renewal. Unlike the U.S. government and C-SPAN, the Canadian government placed
strict restrictions on CPAC. Many of the aspects about the network the consortium likes
to brag about (e.g., commercial free, only public affairs related to parliament/federal
policies, no fee to cable subscribers, etc.) were legally mandated in order for it to receive
a license. The most glaring difference between Canada and the U.S. is CPAC's carriage
on basic cable tiers is mandatory. The original CTRC ruling states CPAC's license
depends on it being "made available to all distribution undertakings [... J throughout
Canada.,,479 It is true that the government does not mandate the cable industry provide the
478. CPAC, http://www.cpac.ca/forms/index.asp?dsp=template&act=view3&template_id=46&lang=e
479. Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, Decisions, Notices and
Orders, "Public Notice CRTC 1992-6," January 17, 1992, http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/1992/PB92-
6.htm
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network but that if it does, it must be available to all outlets. While the industry
voluntarily provides the network, the shape of the network and its operations are
determined by the government to meet public service requirements. Even though the
government takes an active role in the network, the existence of it is still dependent on the
cable industry's ability to find a use for it. Most importantly, the Canadian example
provides a perfect case study for the privatization function of neoliberalism. The network
started out publicly controlled and owned but a financial crisis enabled capitalist interests
to take the financial burden off the hands of the indebted state. Even though the quality
of the network has not diminished (given the industry's cash flow, the opposite is
probably true) but what was once a public right has been transformed into private credit.
Where citizens could once demand the coverage they are now left to be thankful for its
existence. As with C-SPAN, the "largess" is strategic, and allows the industry to gain
power at the expense of citizens and the state. The state may put a brake on neoliberalism
by demanding content restrictions, but it is unable to prevent the cable corporations from
materially benefiting from offering the the network. As with the U.S., Canada's public
affairs network exists at the will of the marketplace.
Britain: Bound to tradition more than the commonwealth nations, Britain did not open
its Parliament to regular television coverage until 1992. Despite a long history of state
operated media, the British Parliamentary Channel was, from the beginning, a product of
the private cable companies. Miranda Curtis, the General Manager of the Parliamentary
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Channel is quite frank about the inspiration for this model "The development of the
channel has always from the very beginning been very clearly modeled on C-SPAN in the
u.s. Many of the companies that originally funded The Parliamentary Channel were UK
subsidiaries of companies that funded C-SPAN in the early days. The evolution of the
channel over time was simply limited by the growth of the subscriber and revenue base
but in so far as we were able over the last six years we have absolutely followed the
development model of C-SPAN to the "T"480 One company, NTL/Comcast UK,
described the foundation of its support thusly: "While NTL is certainly a commercial,
indeed highly entrepreneurial company, our support for TPC was based less on potential
future commercial or profitable opportunities than on our belief that access to full
coverage of the Parliamentary process is of benefit and interest to our customers. On this
basis, it makes good business sense to fund the development of the channel.,,481 Here we
see the echoes ofNTL's American parent company, Comcast. Not only is the network a
public service, it is recognized as a channel that subscribers are interested in. It is a
public service that meshes with business interests. The network's daily operations were
managed by Flextech PIc., a for-profit company that invests in cable programming. The
network itself was designated a non-profit. "The service was not created by the cable
480. Select Committee on Broadcasting, Minutes of Evidence, Examination of witnesses (Questions
58 - 79), July 15, 1998,
http://www.publications.parliament.uklpa/cm199798/cmse1ectlcmbroad/984/8071509.htm
481. Select Committee on Broadcasting, Minutes of Evidence, Annex 2, "Memorandum submitted by
NTL," http://www.publications.parliament.uklpa/cm199798/cmse1ect/cmbroad/984/8071504.htm July 15,
1998,
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operators as a money making venture; hence its 'not for profit' status."482 Shortly after its
founding, a former Speaker of the House of Commons, Rt Hon Lord Weatherill, became
the chairman of the network's board.
During the 1990s the Parliamentary Channel expanded its services and was well
received by the public and government. However, by 1997 the channel was facing
financial pressures. Like the American cable marketplace, the British cable corporations
were merging, the market ever more concentrated. By the late 90's mergers had ensured
the majority control over the Parliamentary Channel resided among three companies:
Cable & Wireless Communications, NTLIComcast UK, and General Cable and Telewest.
In addition to affiliate fees, the channel was financed by a series of revolving loans. As
one company summed it up "In the Autumn of 1997 the Parliamentary Channel members
realised that continued commercial pressure, the advent of digital, and possible
competition from other sources meant a strategic review of the aims and goals of the
channel was needed."483 The for-profit corporations were reconsidering their public
service investment and changes to the programming, along more commercially-friendly
options, were explored. At a public hearing, one Member of Parliament commented to
the channel's General Manager, Miranda Curtis" "the integrity of the service that you
undertook at the beginning and your commitment to that integrity was being undermined
482. Select Committee on Broadcasting, Minutes of Evidence, "Memorandum submitted by Telewest,
General Cable and Cable & Wireless Communications," July 15, 1998, http://www.parliament.the-
stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmbroad/984/8071502.htm
483. Select Committee on Broadcasting, Minutes of Evidence, "Memorandum submitted by Telewest,
General Cable and Cable & Wireless Communications," July 15, 1998, http://www.parliament.the-
stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cmI99798/cmselect/cmbroad/984/8071502.htm
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by what you describe as cutbacks."484 Curtis agreed and stated the companies proposed
cutting gavel-to-gavel coverage, causing her to tender her resignation. Parliament was
debating the next step. The founding of the Parliamentary Channel demonstrated how
powerful the allure of the U.S. model of neoliberalism was while providing a case study
in the pitfalls of relying on private interests to provide public services. Lamb himself
repeatedly warns us his channel's existence hangs by a thread. Unlike the privately held
Parliamentary Channel, C-SPAN's funding is completely self-sufficient. It has never
operated at a loss. As laid out in a previous chapter, the cost to C-SPAN is not the
production of the programming but in tying up channels. Britain's channel was funded
on an insecure model, ensuring the actual operating budget of the network was costing the
companies real money. This was in addition to the opportunity cost of a channel assigned
for public service. The sacrifice was too much for the companies. As it turned out,
Altruism had a price and Parliament turned the channel over to the BBC in 1998, where it
now resides-a public service controlled by the public.
Australia: In April of 2008 Australia's Prime Minister, Tony Rudd, convened a national
summit to develop a comprehensive "long term strategy for the nation's future.,,485 Ten
areas were debated, number nine was "The future of Australian governance: renewed
484. Select Committee on Broadcasting, Minutes of Evidence, Examination of witnesses (Questions
58-79), July 15, 1998,
http://www.publications.parliament.uklpalcm199798/cmselectlcmbroad/984/8071509.htm
485. Australian Government, Australia 2020, "About the Summit,"
http://www.australia2020.gov.au/aboutlindex.cfm
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democracy, a more open government (including the role of the media), the structure of
the Federation and the rights and responsibilities of citizens.,,486 The summit mapped
Australia's future, and C-SPAN played a part in defining what the future could look like.
In the final recommendations "An Australian version of 'C-SPAN'-AuSpan-would
make a big difference to the public policy debate. It was hoped that a public affairs
digital network would be established by 2020."487 As it turns out, the goal was six months
away. In December of the same year Prime Minister Rudd announced the launch of
''A_SPAN.''488 The Prime Minister pointed out ''Australians returning from the U.S. have
often asked a simple question - why don't we have our own C-SPAN?" Rudd then
mentioned the 2020 participants had envisioned ''A program along the lines of C-SPAN
in the U.S. or Canada could be established."489 It is worth noting Rudd selects American
and Canadian (both private networks) for attention and bypasses the now-public British
Parliamentary Channel. The omission was intentional because A-SPAN, soon to be
renamed A-PAC, was controlled by private cable companies. Far from hiding this fact,
Rudd gushed, "It's a superb initiative, it's 100 per cent industry funded."490
486. "About the Summit."
487. Australia 2020 Summit Final Report, "More public policy debate," (Commonwealth of Australia,
May 2008), 324. http://www.australia2020.gov.au/final_report/index.cfm
488. Prime Minister of Australia, Tony Rudd, Press Release, "Launch of A-Span - Australian Public
Affairs TV Parliament House, Canberra," December 8, 2008, http://www.pm.gov.au/node/5414
489. Ibid..
490. Ibid..
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A-PAC is jointly owned by Australia's largest satellite television company Foxtel,
owned by Rupert Murdoch, and the largest cable company in Australia, Austar, a
subsidiary of Liberty Global Inc. (the largest cable company in the world). The C-SPAN
model is taken one step further (as Britain did originally) by contracting the production of
the channel's programming to a private company: Murdoch's Sky News. In what by now
is a standard line from the C-SPAN neoliberal script, Foxtel states A-PAC "will be fully-
funded by the subscription television platforms on a not-for-profit basis. There will be no
cost to Australian taxpayers. "491 What was not mentioned by Rudd or the sponsoring
corporations is that the publicly controlled Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC)
was planning to offer just such a channel. Three months earlier, on September 10, 2008,
ABC managing director Mark Scott announced to the National Press Club his network's
intention "to run a digital channel to broadcast uncut media conferences, parliamentary
hearings and public addresses. "492 ABC was looking to make inroads in terrestrial digital
broadcasting. A national public affairs network fit in with the practice of making
information freely available to all Australians using over-the-air technologies. ABC
planned on offering an extensive line up of public affairs and news programming in
addition to the gavel-to-gavel coverage. It was noted that "such a service would certainly
491. Foxtel, Press Release, "A-SPAN -a New Public Affairs Channel for Australis from Subscription
Television," December S, 200S, http://www.foxtel.com.au/about-foxtel/communications/a-span-australia-s-
public-affairs-network-announces-program--lS74.htm
492. Emma Rodgers, "ABC Head Pushes for Digital 'Democracy' Channel," ABC News, September
10, 200S, http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/200S/09/l0/236l002.htm
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be a threat to Sky News Australia, a 24-hour news channel that requires a subscription to
access.,,493 Rudd's announcement, giving the government's whole-hearted endorsement
of a privately owned and operated public affairs channel "took the ABC completely by
surprise."494
Not only did the private interests want to provide the public service they actively
sought to undercut the viable public alternative. Australia represents an evolution on the
C-SPAN model. If Austar and Foxtel and were interested merely in public service, they
could have dedicated a channel to an ABC-produced A-PAC on their respective systems.
If they did this they would have to share the credit with ABC. Neoliberal private/public
"partnerships" only work for capital if the private interests are the ones who end up with
ultimate ownership (i.e., decide the existence of the service). There was no need to have
the private Sky News produce the programming unless the private owners were interested
in monopolizing the credit. Not only did the private corporations gain the right to use the
channel as a lobbying tool, they neatly cut out a competitor from offering free news
content similar to what they charged the viewer for. Capitalism is not competitive, it is
the elimination of competition. A publicly owned and operated media outlet is more of a
threat to the media corporations than another private channel, for the public outlet not
only directly competes for market share, it points towards an alternative form of
ownership and control-it is a threat to capital.
493. Amanda Meade, "ABC Push for Public Affairs Channel," The Australian, December 11, 2008, np.
494. Amanda Meade, "Pay-TV and ABC Battle in Public Affairs Arena," The Australian, December
15, 2008, np.
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These three examples-all from an Anglo-Western perspective-indicate the
flexibility of capitalist enterprises to adapt to the specific political economies of different
nations with different historical contexts. In all cases the C-SPAN model of ownership
and funding was seen as the most desirable starting point for offering a national public
affairs network. C-SPAN has become a the criterion for other nations and its standard is
predicated on consciously precluding public ownership.
Conclusion
As this chapter has demonstrated, C-SPAN is the leading "public affairs" network
in both uses of term: public service and public relations. Public service is the utility and
public relations is the exchange value of C-SPAN's programming. Both work in symbolic
relationship for the benefit of the sponsoring cable industry. In no way does C-SPAN's
commercially driven marketing campaign invalidate the utility of a live gavel-to-gavel
network dedicated to Congress but it brings up questions to be fully discussed in the
proceeding chapter.
C-SPAN's public affairs marketing efforts are part of the larger context of the U.S.
capitalist marketplace. Once the sales effort begun to dwindle, the favored child of
corporations-advertising-fell out of favor and new methods of creating wants was
sought. Suddenly a brand was not enough, a corporation needed social values. It is no
coincidence "corporate social responsibility" is making a comeback the same historical
moment the crisis of advertising unfolds. As audiences and markets fragment the only
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mass group left is society and corporations must learn to operate on the social level. The
cable industry, its roots physically located in communities, intrinsically understood this
and has sought to incorporate public service campaigns in its operations.
C-SPAN has taken its charge to promote the industry to new heights and in doing
so has fallen prey to the myth that it is in the first and last instance a public service.
Beyond motivation a simple fact remains, in order to enjoy any of these networks a viewer
has to pay a corporation for access to their private network. In return for the favor, the
corporation "gives" you what is already yours-representative democracy.
Beyond marketing the cable industry, a private C-SPAN legitimizes what has
already been normalized in the U.S.: private communications infrastructure and the
commodification of public resources. The "C-SPAN model" of public affairs television
binds a particular aesthetic (gavel-to-gavel) with a specific ownership structure (private
industry). In doing so, not only is an industry bolstered, the larger capitalist system is
promoted. In a world where capitalism is globalized, the "C-SPAN model" means an
acceptance and promotion of private interests. As demonstrated by the three examples of
Canada, Britain, and Australia, the C-SPAN model reflects the larger process whereby
U.S. inspired neoliberalism is being integrated into other nations, despite the fact these
nations had long histories of publicly owned media.
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
We never asked Congress to ever mandate the carriage of this network. We
have always been opposed to it.
It's a bit ofa risk, I admit, just throwing yourself out there on the
marketplace, and hoping that your industry will stay with you.495
-Brian Lamb
To offer public service as the exclusive explanation for why the cable industry
provides C-SPAN demonstrates, in the words of John Kenneth Galbraith, the "innocent
fraud" surrounding C-SPAN. In a brief essay, published towards the end of his life,
Galbraith noted that "out of the pecuniary and political pressures and fashions of the
time, economics and larger economic and political systems cultivate their own version of
truth. This last has no necessary relation to reality.,,496 While the cable industry claims
that C-SPAN is a public service, it is important to look beyond what the cable industry
495. Brian Lamb interviewed by Harry A. Jessell in "C-SPAN: The Other Washington Monument,"
TVNewsCheck, April 20, 2010. www.tvnewscheck.com/articles/20IO/04/20/daily.5/
496. John Kenneth Galbraith, The Economics ofInnocent Fraud: Truthfor Our Time, (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 2004), X.
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says about the network, to what the industry does with the network. The reality of
C-SPAN is that public serves the industry's business ends.
Findings
Why the Cable Industry Provides C-SPAN: From the perspective of the consumer
wanting to watch Congress on pay-television, C-SPAN is a public service. From the
perspective of capital, C-SPAN is a commodity that has special political economic
opportunities attached to it. The ultimate end of all capitalist undertakings is the creation
of capital. Therefore, the capitalist cable industry provides C-SPAN because it assists the
industry in its quest to accumulate capital. The study has revealed five ways C-SPAN
facilitates the creation of capital.
•
•
•
•
•
C-SPAN provides the cable industry a distinctive lobbying tool in Congress
C-SPAN allows the industry to curry favor with local franchising authorities
C-SPAN offers the industry a low-risk venue to test new services and products
C-SPAN is used to promote subscription-based communication systems
C-SPAN exemplifies the apparent benefits of neoliberalism
Each of these findings are discussed below.
C-SPAN as Congressional Lobbying Tool: The study proposes that this is the
foremost benefit for the cable industry and that all other political economic benefits
created by providing C-SPAN are subservient to the lobbying needs of the cable MSOs.
As has been demonstrated, the fortunes of the cable industry have been directly linked to
its regulatory standing among federal regulators and lawmakers since its inception. The
cable industry did not develop into a major communications industry until federal rules
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allowed it to exploit technological advancements. In every m~or historical account of the
cable industry, federal regulations are listed on par with technological innovations in
terms of the impact on the industry's evolution. C-SPAN scholars, Frantzich and
Sullivan, found, "Not far from many cable operator's minds was the assumption that by
being good citizens and providing public exposure to those who would be writing the
regulations, they could enhance their chances of affecting those regulations in a positive
way.,,497 Peter Kiley, VP of Affiliate Relations for C-SPAN, has said that C-SPAN's
biggest influence is not with the citizens who watch the network (as proponents of the
network insist), but on the politicians featured in the network's programming. Regarding
cable's efforts to promote its sponsorship among legislators, Kiley has said "Congress
understand this, they know cable provides C-SPAN. Congress is good about giving
'props' to the cable industry."498 Except for the 1992 Act, where the broadcast industry
was able to leverage the poor consumer performance of the cable industry to its benefit,
Congress has consistently drafted laws favoring the needs of the cable industry.
C-SPAN's focus on Congress must be acknowledged and analyzed. Why was the
first large-scale, and sustained, public service offered by cable directly connected to
Washington D.C.? The cable industry could easily have created an educational network,
on par with PBS's children's programming, but it chose to offer television coverage of
Congressional meetings. It must also be noted the industry created a public service using
497. Stephen E. Frantzich and John Sullivan, The C-SPAN Revolution, (Norman OK: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1996), 322.
498. Peter Kiley, Interview with the author.
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a very specific form of Congressional television coverage-gavel-to-gavel. The industry
did not support Lamb's efforts to start a federal public affairs network until Lamb sought
to feature Congressional meetings in a manner that Congress found acceptable. As was
presented in Chapter III, the House of Representatives wanted control of the cameras and
for its floor proceedings to be televised uncut. This was not only a way to open up
Congress, it was a way for Congress to speak directly to its constituents, bypassing the
handful of broadcast networks who had a monopoly on national television. In short,
cable offered Congress members everything they wanted out of a television outlet. It
would difficult to use a public affairs network that critically examined the actions of
Congress as a form of public relations, but C-SPAN's coverage of Congress allows the
participants to speak for themselves, for as long as they like.
In addition to providing Congress direct access to television viewers, the network
demonstrates cable industry's dedication to voluntary public service. Congress did not
mandate that the industry create C-SPAN, but the industry offered its services, free of
charge. As the discussion of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) demonstrates,
corporate philanthropy can only be considered charity if undertaken without legal
mandate. As presented in Chapter II, most authors on CSR recognize the practice of
highly regulated corporations voluntarily engaging in pro-social activities for what it is-
an attempt to circumvent stiffer regulatory requirements.
As digital technology allows telecommunication services to converge (e.g., telco's
offer television, cable companies offer phone service, and all offer Internet access),
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federal regulation continues to playa central role in communication corporations'
operations. Perhaps the most controversial example of this process is the debate over
"Net Neutrality," where telecommunication infrastructure owners are pitted against
Internet content providers (and citizen groups) over control of the Internet. Net Neutrality
will be discussed further later in this chapter.
Frantzich and Sullivan have written that "In its specific battles over government
regulation, there is no evidence that the cable industry simply prevails because of the
public service it provides with C-SPAN." While it may be difficult to quantify the
financial value that the cable industry gains as a direct result of C-SPAN, it is arguable
that the cable industry has seen more large-scale legislative victories than defeats since
C-SPAN has been offered. C-SPAN only boosts the cable industry's image in Congress.
Thus to ignore the value of C-SPAN as a lobbying tool is to encourage an "innocent
fraud" about the cable industry.
C-SPAN does not represent the only example of the cable industry's lobbying
efforts, but as the industry's self-described "crown jewel," it is not surprising that it is one
of the most notable examples of what private industry can achieve if left on it own. It is
also important to note that, unlike other entertainment and journalism programming
offered by cable television, C-SPAN's gavel-to-gavel coverage has no notable critics in
either Congress or the general public.
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C-SPAN as Lobbying Tool with Local Franchising Authorities: As noted in this
study, influencing federal regulation is the paramount reason that the cable industry
provides C-SPAN. However, not all government oversight of cable occurs at the national
level and C-SPAN also is used to influence local officials.
If a cable MSO wants to operate in a community it must apply for a franchise.
These negotiations typically result in lengthy legal documents that stipulate such things
as: levels of customer service, the requirement of Public, Educational, Government (PEG)
channels, definitions of service levels, and perhaps most importantly, what franchise fees
will be levied on the cable operator. The agreements have renewal dates and contain
clauses that allow the authority to revoke the franchise agreement if the cable operator is
in flagrant violation of the terms. Because of this, local managers of cable systems must
develop and maintain long-term relationships with the authorities.
Chapter VIII included a description of how C-SPAN dedicates much of its
"affiliate relations" to helping local cable operators market themselves, not to potential
subscribers, but to local officials. In this way the network distinguishes itself from other
cable networks that help local systems promote programming so the operator is able to
sign up new customers (and make the network more valuable to the system operator). In
other words, C-SPAN forgoes self-promotion in favor of letting the local cable operator
take credit for the public service. This may initially appear as selfless, but it is important
to remember that C-SPAN is owned by the cable operators and is not an independent
cable network. C-SPAN's board is composed of cable MSO executives and it would only
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make sense that the cable MSOs would want to promote their companies before any cable
network.
Cable MSOs can't make a profit (or accumulate capital) if they are not allowed to
operate. While the federal 1984 Act took much of the power away from local franchise
authorities, cable companies still have to pay tribute to localities by fostering long-term
relationships with city or county officials with whom they enter into legal agreements.
C-SPAN as Low-Risk Venue for New Products and Services: This study has
found that C-SPAN was developed, and continues to exist, because it serves the political
needs of the cable industry. But the network also provides important economic benefits
for the sponsors. One of these economic benefits is that, as the sole owners of C-SPAN,
cable MSOs are free to test new services and products before other networks might be
willing to undertake them. The political benefits of C-SPAN for the industry were
present from the beginning of the network's creation, but some of the economic benefits
of the network have evolved with digital technology.
The study found that the best example of this was streamed Internet video.
Commercial networks earn revenue through the affiliate fees they negotiate with cable
MSOs. The more desirable the network, the higher the affiliate fee the network can
extract from the infrastructure owner. Because of this, commercial cable networks strive
to develop control over their content in the hopes of creating a strong brand. If viewers
were able to obtain a cable network's programming for free (over the Internet), there
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would be little reason to sign up for a cable subscription. If cable operators lost cable
subscribers, they would be unwilling to pay high affiliate fees to cable networks. As a
result, when streaming video was first introduced in the late 1990's, commercial networks
were wary of offering the service. C-SPAN, however, eagerly embraced the technology,
streaming entire events live. Again, on the surface, this appears as a selfless act that only
confirms the cable industry's dedication to public service. What the study revealed was
that the 1996 Act opened the telecommunications market of Internet service to cable
companies and cable executives were anxious to move people off the telco dial-up
connections to the newer, faster, cable broadband Internet. At the time, there was no
better way to demonstrate the capacity of cable broadband Internet than by offering
streamed video (which required more bandwidth than dial-up connections were capable
ot). Cable is no longer a television service, it is a full telecommunication system and it is
willing to lose cable subscribers if it can make it up with increased phone or Internet
subscriptions. This strengthens the MSOs bargaining position with cable television
networks, who have to realize that MSOs can demand lower affiliate fees, or larger
chunks of the advertising time slots, because they are now making an increasingly larger
portion of their operating revenue from non-television sources.
By allowing the cable industry to display the power of cable broadband Internet,
C-SPAN proved to be an ideal platform for the cable industry to integrate and implement
the newest technological innovations. C-SPAN is not just a public service, it is a vehicle
for industry change. C-SPAN allows the cable industry to simultaneously test cutting
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edge products and services while promoting them. The goal of introducing new products
and services was not an exercise in vanity; it was a way to increase revenue. The
non-profit C-SPAN has valiantly proven its ability to offer services that will eventually be
offered by for-profit networks. This will become increasingly important as the industry
further concentrates, and the lines between telecommunications companies blurs.
As far back as 2004, C-SPAN was offered via the MobiTV cellular phone
broadcast service. Commenting on the move, C-SPAN's COO, Robert Kennedy, said
"Providing C-SPAN and C-SPAN2 to mobile phone users is an important step for us to
make our services available across new technologies"499 What Kennedy did not mention
was that the cable industry had been keenly aware that there was one telecommunications
market it was excluded from: wireless communications. In 2005 the major cable MSOs
teamed up to enter into a long-term partnership with cellular phone provider, Sprint.soo
Wireless service was the last frontier for cable companies and the one area where the
older telco's had a distinct advantage over cable. In 2008, the large cable MSOs,
Comcast, Time-Warner, and Brighthouse Networks, invested heavily in Clearwire, a new
wireless Internet provider. Using the microwave bandwidth utilized by cell phones,
Clearwire allowed cable access to the wireless market, moving it one step closer to the
cellular phone market. Given the concentrated nature of the U.S. communications
499. Business Wire, "MobiTV Brings Live C-SPAN and C-SPAN2 to Mobile Phones; Public Affairs
News Networks Now," September 7, 2004, All Business,
http://www.allbusiness.comlmedia-telecommunications/telecommunications/5528742-I.html
500. Dan Fromer, "Is Comcast Eyeing Sprint?" Forbes.com, November 10,2006,
http://www.forbes.coml2006/11/l0/comcast-sprint-mobile-tech-intel-cx_dClllOcomcast.html
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market, there is little doubt that cable MSOs will seek to consolidate with the wireless
providers not controlled by telcos.
Generally, then, C-SPAN has been able to assist the cable industry in
implementing a wise range of new and profitable technologies.
C-SPAN Helps Sell Cable Subscriptions: With a single notable exception, the
only way to access C-SPAN is through a subscription television, Internet, or cellular
service. The exception is WCSP-90.1 FM, C-SPAN's terrestrial broadcast radio station.
Serving the Washington D.C. area, WCSP's is likely more about politics than public
service; C-SPAN has not purchased radio stations in areas where federal officials are not
listening while driving their cars. Thus, if a viewer wants to watch C-SPAN on cable
television, he or she would have to purchase a cable subscription.
Often overlooked in the discussion about C-SPAN-as-public service is the fact that
C-SPAN has an avid, paying audience. Although the network does not subscribe to any
ratings service to measure its market share (nor do the television rating services track
C-SPAN's audience), it commissioned a study of its viewers in 2009. The study found
that of the 604 cable viewers surveyed, 40% watched C-SPAN in the last six months and
20% watched the network once or twice a week. 501 Extrapolated to C-SPAN's total
potential audience, this means that around 39 million Americans watch C-SPAN
regularly. C-SPAN has an audience. It may not be as popular as other commercial
501. C-SPAN, Marking 30 Years, "Media Release," March 18, 2009, http://www.c-span.org/30Years/
media-release.aspx#30years
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networks, perhaps, but the study indicates there is a considerable audience for the
network. And in the fragmented world of subscription television, a channel with 39
million regular viewers a week is worth pursuing.
Keeping this in mind, the legislative issue of "a la carte" subscriptions presnets an
important consideration-a cable subscriber has to purchase an entire package of
programming to receive C-SPAN. Whether or not a subscriber is interested in other cable
networks, he or she is paying for these networks. So those subscribers who are paying
$70 mainly for C-SPAN, are helping subsidize commercial networks. With close to 100
million subscribers, C-SPAN is one of the largest networks on cable television. The
overwhelming majority of systems that carry C-SPAN and C-SPAN 2 place them on the
"basic" cable package. Like magazines, cable networks cater to special interests by
offering sports channels, news channels, movie channels, etc. To appeal to the widest
number of potential subscribers, it makes sense to offer the widest possible sampling of
products on the basic package. There are dozens of sports, movie, and news channels, but
there is no other network that comes close to the type of programming that C-SPAN
offers. Because it is one-of-a-kind, C-SPAN broadens the offerings on the basic package.
C-SPAN as Exemplar of Neoliberalism: The last way that C-SPAN facilitates the
creation of capital is through its ability to advance the beliefs and practices associated
with neoliberalism. This is an over-arching benefit for capital, more than a direct
administrative benefit for the cable industry, as it helps to cultivate a society that tolerates
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privately owned and operated public services. Brian Lamb's pro-entrepenuer and
free-market approach is not a secret, and he does not miss an opportunity to point out that
C-SPAN succeeded because it was a private sector endeavor. It is difficult to imagine
Lamb's boasting in a society that did not normalize capitalist social relations.
David Harvey has defined neoliberalism as "in the first instance a theory of
political economic practices which proposes that human well-being can best be advanced
by the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework
characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, free markets and free trade."so2
This might provide a more appropriate mission statement for C-SPAN than its current
focus on public service. It can be argued that C-SPAN not only promotes te industry, it
promotes capitalism. Indeed, the process of commodification of Congress represented by
C-SPAN, provides a noteworthy example of, neoliberal philosophy.
The C-SPAN model is more than a visual style of production and public affairs
television; it is a paradigm of private ownership structure. This was clearly demonstrated
in Chapter VII with the examples of parliamentary television coverage in Canada, Britain,
and Australia. It did not matter that all of these countries had long standing histories of
public media, the overall trend for these societies since the late seventies has been to
privatize and commodify public resources. In these countries, neoliberalism prevailed
making it easy for the C-SPAN model to be accepted.
502. David Harvey, A BriefHistory ofNeoliberalism. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 2.
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What Is the Significance of a Privately Owned C-SPAN: This research question was
answered by studying the potential social effects of allowing a public service to be
handled by private interests. Three consequences of a private public affairs network are:
• Private interests control the content
• The existence of a public service relies on the will of the market
• A public resource is used for private gain
These issues recall the question of ownership, and ultimately, control of media products
and mass communication systems.
Private Control of Content: In early 2010, the U.S. House of Representatives'
video and photography production department, the House Recording Studio (HRS),
purchased high-definition cameras and equipment. Using the gear, government
employees of the HRS began to shoot television coverage of committee hearings and
transmit the signal to members' offices via closed circuit television system.503 In
addition, more and more legislative committees are streaming live video to the Internet
where viewers can access it from the committees' official government webpages. In other
words, C-SPAN is no longer the only organization providing television coverage of
Congressional hearings. When asked about the HRS's efforts, Brian Lamb said, "If it's
their cameras in the rooms, there is no guarantee that you're going to see it exactly as it
happens. Now I don't want to go too far with that because on most days it won't be a big
503. John Merli, "HD in the (U.S.) House," Government Video, January 11, 2010.
http://www.governmentvideo.com/artic1e/91032
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difference, but that is a hazard when you allow government people to put their hands on
the delivery mechanism of information. They control it and they determine what you see.
They do it all the time and it's always a threat to the American people seeing exactly
what's going on."S04 For Lamb, it is dangerous to allow the government to control the
delivery of information, but not for private interests to control it.
This assumption presumes that corporate sponsored media do not possess any
ideological position, and will not be tempted to censor content like the government. The
gavel-to-gave1 style of production discourages selective censorship of portions of
information from the whole of a meeting, so censorship largely becomes a matter of
programming decisions. A more direct form of censorship is excluding a meeting from
being covered. As discussed in Chapter III, C-SPAN's exclusion of the ala carte
committee activities demonstrated that private interests may present information contrary
to their interests. In planning daily Congressional coverage, producers use their
discretion about which committees are the most important for coverage. Herman and
Chomsky argued in their propaganda model, what is "newsworthy" depends on the
agenda of those in power. Agendas are internalized by producers, and become ingrained
become he point of normalized "common sense." And while producers may not
consciously deny coverage to a committee, they may favor, one committee over another,
based on the cable industry's position or interests.
504. Brian Lamb interviewed by Harry A. Jessell.
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Rather than state or market control, a better solution would be to create a public
body to make such programming decisions. In other words, the dichotomy presented by
Lamb-government vs. private control-is false. Citizens would be best served with
direct public oversight of the coverage.
C-SPAN Exists at the Will of the Market: Editorial control of media content is a
serious concern for critical media scholars. But it might be argued that a more serious
issue is involved with C-SPAN's (i.e., public access to Congressional television)
dependence on market forces.
Even though C-SPAN is privately controlled, it is promoted as a public resource.
One exuberant cable trade magazine reporter goes so far as to equate the network to a
fourth branch of government, This statement is flawed in many ways. Most importantly,
C-SPAN's existence is ultimately determined by the market, not public consent like the
actual branches of government. C-SPAN was created by the market (although it relied on
subsidized satellites, government-produced video and re-regulation in favor of cable's
interests), and is currently supported by the market. Its future depends on the market
finding the service useful. Despite being a non-profit public service, C-SPAN is a
commodity. This study has elaborated the ways that C-SPAN is used to suit the needs of
capital and has shown how the public affairs network is, in the last instance, a commodity.
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Ultimately the decision to carry or not to carry C-SPAN is a business decision not,
a public decision. Thus Brian Lamb is incorrect when he says "C-SPAN belongs to the
people."sos And Lamb has contradicted this statement, for instance, when he spoke about
the future of C-SPAN (discussed in Chapter VII). The cable industry may decide it no
longer makes sense, or is possible, to provide such a service. This is not idle speculation,
as popular commodities appear and disappear everyday. Britain is a prime example of
market forces shifting to the point that private sponsors discontinued the service. The
Parliamentary Channel started as a private enterprise, but within six years the sponsoring
companies decided that the cost was too high compared to the political economic value
they were receiving, and they relinquished it to public control via the BBC.
This study has been primarily interested in C-SPAN's exchange value (its ability
to be converted into capital), but C-SPAN's use value must not be neglected. C-SPAN's
content is dramatically different than the content of other cable networks. From the
position of social democracy, it would be difficult to argue that U.S. society "needs"
ESPN or the Discovery channel in the same way it can use C-SPAN. Because it is
unique, and because it is directly tied to a representative democratic process, C-SPAN is
easier to consider a basic media service in a society that needs mass mediation of
information to function. Therefore, it is possible to argue that television coverage of
505. Brian Lamb, interviewed by Ted Hearn, in "A Quarter-Century of Lamb and C-SPAN,"
Multichannel News, March 14,2004, http://www.multichannel.comJarticle/69123-
A_QuartecCentury_oCLamb3nd_C_SPAN.php
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Congress is exactly the type of content that should not be held to the whim of market
forces.
Using the stick of fear (private public affairs is the only way to avoid inevitable
government censorship) and the carrot of shifting the cost (by the industry picking up the
tab, no tax dollars are spent), C-SPAN's sponsors have effectively promoted private
ownership as the logical model. But they have downplayed the argument that this
arrangement reduces democracy to a market relationship where citizens are turned into
consumers with limited rights. C-SPAN places citizens in the role of consumers and
consumers have little or no say in what commodities are produced. Consumers may band
together and ask for a discontinued commodity to resume production, but they have no
rights to a commodity.
Public Resource Used for Private Gain: The last ramification of allowing private
interests to maintain the monopoly on Congressional television moves beyond the threat
of censorship and the network's tenuous existence into the overarching realm of social
power. This study suggests that by controlling C-SPAN, the cable industry is able to reap
political and economic benefits, which it can potentially use to gain an advantage over
competing industries. If competition is decreased the industry gains more social power.
With its enhanced power, the cable industry seeks to influence regulations that are not
only preferential to the needs of the cable industry, but are skewed towards market values,
not social values. Chapter VII provided the example of the 1996 Telecommunications
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Act, which shifted the federal communication regulations away from public interest and
towards competition. Mass communication systems were treated as businesses vital to
the economic well-being of the nation, not as systems of communication necessary to the
functioning of a modern democratic society. This was not always the case. Chapter III
outlined the Blue Sky debates, when cable television was considered a force for positive
social change. Blue Sky proponents put the needs of society before the economic
interests of the cable companies. But because the cable infrastructure was privately
owned, the public could not force the operators to put Blue Sky proposals into action.
While the communication industries engage in cutthroat competition, they agree that
industry in general should be controlled by private interests and that the government's
role should be to regulate business to facilitate the creation of profit and private capital.
From the perspective of a particular industry, the goal of gaining political economic
power is to beat out competing industries, and because of this, individual industries
attempt to gain political favor for their specific industry. From the perspective of capital,
however, industry rivalries melt away when there is a threat to private property and wealth
distribution. From the perspective of the citizen (or consumer), it is clear that
communication corporations actually avoid "head-to-head competition like the plague."so6
In summary, the cable industry uses its market strength to secure power. With this
power, it attempts to secure its economic priorities. C-SPAN may bring democracy to the
506. Consumer Federation of America and Consumers Union, "Lessons from 1996
Telecommunications Act: Deregulation Before Meaningful Competition Spells Consumer Disaster,"
February 2001, http://www.consumersunion.org/telecom/lessondc201.htm
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living rooms of American citizens, but it is a democracy based on market liberalism,
where the rights of corporations come before those of the people.
Conclusion
In Chapter I, this study directly addressed the issue of C-SPAN's ownership by
examining two examples: users posting Colbert's roast of President Bush to Youtube and
Speaker Pelosi posting Congressional committee footage shot by C-SPAN. After these
events, many people were undoubtedly made aware, for the first time, that private
interests held C-SPAN, and that it was not part of the government. After the network
forced Youtube to remove the clips, C-SPAN faced widespread public criticism. Despite
popular opinion against the network's decision to enforce its copyright, C-SPAN did not
back down. C-SPAN would only amend its policies after its decision to enforce copyright
affected one of the most powerful figures in the U.S. Congress, the Speaker of the House.
These events indicate that C-SPAN's priorities are to place the political well-being of the
sponsoring cable MSOs above the interests of the public. As a network that is entirely
owned by cable MSOs, C-SPAN's political position is that of the cable industry. C-SPAN
is indistinguishable from the cable infrastructure owners and the network's main political
concern is to guarantee the sponsor's economic concerns are being met by federal
regulators. However, this is not the justification that the network or its sponsors provide
for C-SPAN's existence.
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According to C-SPAN, the network exists because the cable industry wants to
offer a public service. However, this explanation represents a myth, perhaps useful, but
still obscuring material explanations that are revealed in a political economic analysis.
Once the myth of philanthropy is washed away, (as discussed in Chapter II), the material
history of cable is exposed as a history of attempts to influence federal regulation. Cable
could not compete with broadcasters because of restrictive regulations, thus the cable
industry needed to turn Congress into an ally (as demonstrated in Chapter III). During
this period Congress was looking to open itself up to television cameras. Global
capitalism entered the "neoliberal" stage, with widespread privatization of public
services. These processes combined to influence C-SPAN's creation as part of the
private sector. It is also important to note that the cable industry did not offer such a
public service until it was economically, politically, and technologically feasible. Thus,
C-SPAN represents the historical intersection of these existing social trends rather than a
single-minded public service project. A private C-SPAN was a obvious, but not
inevitable, outcome.
Finally, it may be possible to aruge that C-SPAN is a commodity. Whereas a
public service offered by the state is the result of public policy debates, a public service
offered by private interests is charity, unless the private interests are able to materially
benefit from it, in which case it becomes a commodity. Thus, by this logic, C-SPAN can
be considered a commodity. In addition, the cable MSOs have a de facto monopoly on
Congressional television through their ownership of C-SPAN, and the cable in
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infrastructure. While there may those who feel that the Internet bypasses the cable
industry's monopoly, this neglects the network the network of privately owned
telecommunications infrastructure that Congress must use to get its committee hearings
and floors sessions to the public via streamed web video. In the recent legislative battle
over Net Neutrality, the corporations that control the Internet's infrastructure have
pledged to fight any efforts by the public to interfere with corporate rights to control these
networks. If Net Neutrality laws are not passed and Internet service providers are not
declared common carriers, corporations will be able to restrict access to the Internet.
Furthermore, there will be nothing stopping the MSOs that offer cable broadband from
giving preferential treatment to C-SPAN's streamed video rather than the government's
web video. Ultimately, it might be argued that the Internet will not set us free as long as
it is controlled by private interests.
C-SPAN is frequently described as a window on the legislative process. However,
this study has presented the case that a better way to think about the network is as a
window on the political economy of the mass communication system in the U.S., where
systems of communication are privately controlled for private gain. In light of these
findings, it is possible to suggest a more appropriate motto for C-SPAN. Currently, the
network boosts: "C-SPAN: Created by Cable. Offered as a Public Service." A more
suitable motto might be: "C-SPAN: Created by Cable. Presented as a Public Service to
Legitimize the Private Ownership of Mass Communication."
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